The Constitutional Court found No. 269 / 2008 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 29 January 2008 on the application for annulment of the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Law No 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
01.08.2008
269
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on 29 January 2008 in plenary in the composition of Stanislav Balík, František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Krórek, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiří Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Excellent and Eliška Wagner on the application of the Municipal Court in Prague to abolish the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, expressed in the words: "For an action or another motion to initiate proceedings in the administrative judicial proceedings, (a) against the decision of the administrative authority CZK 2 000, - ',
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Definition and recap of the proposal
On 21 September 2006, the Constitutional Court received a request from the Municipal Court in Prague to abolish the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, expressed in the words: "For an action or other application to initiate proceedings in the matters of administrative justice and (a) against the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000, - '.
The appellant did so pursuant to Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, after having concluded, in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 48 (1) (a) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "p."), that the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to the Law on Legal Duties, to be applied in the resolution of the sp. recitals 9 Ca 52 / 2006, 9 Ca 53 / 2006, 9 Ca 54 / 2006, 9 Ca 55 / 2006 and 9 Ca 56 / 2006, are contrary to Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to Article 1 of the Constitution.
In those cases, sp. zn. 9 Ca 52-56 / 2006, the Municipal Court in Prague is decided on five actions against the Finance Directorate for the City of Prague seeking the annulment of 162 decisions of the defendant, which rejected the appeal against the payment measures for the transfer of real estate tax issued by the Finance Office for Prague 5. By those decisions, the applicant was not recognised in the tax proceedings as having been entitled to an exemption from property transfer tax pursuant to § 20 (7) (a) and (b) of Act No 357 / 1992 Coll., on inheritance, donation and property transfer tax, which it applied from the transfer of residential and non-residential units in a well-identified real estate, whereas the purchase contracts with the relevant purchasers - physical and legal persons - are different dates and legal effects of the transfer of property rights arising from those contracts also occurred at a different time (date). The administrative decision on the assessment of the tax as well as the decision on the appeal in administrative proceedings were issued by the financial authorities as separate decisions, both in fact and in law assessing the specific case of the transfer. The applicant contested 162 administrative decisions 5 against those administrative decisions which correspond to a particular object of the transfer (e.g. an apartment with a non-residential space) or only a non-residential space of a specific nature (e.g. a cellar, a garage).
The initial reasoning of the application for annulment of the legal provision in question of the Municipal Court in Prague is based on a reference to one of the conditions for the application of the actions before the administrative court, which is the fulfilment of the charge obligation under Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended. According to Article 1 (a) of the Act, the court fees are levied for proceedings before the courts of the Czech Republic, from the acts listed in the schedule of the court fees, and in the cases of the administrative judiciary under item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees, which is annexed to the Law on judicial fees, the court fee of CZK 2 000 is set as a charge against the administrative authority's decision. In cases in which the applicant challenges more than one administrative decision, the appellant considers that the action is in fact an action within the meaning of item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees. In other words, if this act is purely formal without taking into account the content and circumstances leading to the issue of an administrative act, only a written submission marked as an action, or is any application made in such a written submission, since, if it is always against a different decision, it must also be an action. In this context, the appellant points out that, in the administrative court, the proceedings before the administrative court are defined not only by the heading of the parties to the proceedings, namely the applicant and the administrative authority, which, in the administrative proceedings, decided at the second instance, but also by the subject-matter of the procedure, which is autonomously a separate administrative decision, since it is an assessment of the legality of such a decision both materially and procedural.
In order to justify its active legitimacy for the standard control procedure, the Municipal Court recalls that the legal provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Schedule of the Court's fees are to be applied in those legal cases as a precondition for the hearing of actions brought.
However, the determination of the amount of the legal fee in the proceedings in question depends on the approach to one of the two indicated interpretative alternatives to item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees. In considering them, the appellant submits that the amount of the charge determined by reference to the number of written submissions would not correspond to the number and extent of the actual amount of the application and, in accordance with Paragraph 65 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the administrative proceedings, and would depend solely on the applicant's will, in how many pleadings - written submissions - to exercise his right to judicial protection against a certain number of administrative decisions issued, and the proceedings initiated would be charged an amount of the applicant's will, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings. Within the framework of his or her vacancy with the proposal, the plaintiff would determine the amount of the court fee himself by making a proposal for individual actions. Such a consequence of the applicant's disposing powers is considered by the applicant to be a breach of the constitutional principle of equality (with reference to Article 4 (1) of the Charter), as it would in its view create inequality in the right of access to the court. For that reason, the Municipal Court in Prague, in analogous cases, was based on the fact that it was not decisive for the imposition of a charge, how the action was brought, whether the cases were related, whether they concerned the same parties, whether the court would be heard and decided on the basis of the same factual and legal assessment, and whether the contested decisions were issued or not on the same date, but on the basis of heading 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees in conjunction with § 1 (a) of the Law on the judicial fees levied on each application against one separate administrative decision.
However, that court procedure was not found to be constitutional in conformity with the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn. I. ÚS 664 / 03. Following the reproduction of the content of the finding and the reproduction of that finding corresponding to the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court No. 2 As 53 / 2004-76 and No 1 Afs 127 / 2005-105, the Municipal Court of Prague finds that, because of the complete symmetry of the procedural procedure on the matter of the charge and the substance of the dispute, the Court of First Instance is bound by the view of the Constitutional Court, according to which the party is obliged to pay a judicial fee for the action against each individual administrative decision, by virtue of which it is required.
Thus, if the Constitutional Court is not regarded as a constitutionally conformal collection of a judicial fee of CZK 2 000 from an action against each administrative decision, and the other provision of a judicial charge in administrative justice matters does not result from the law, the City Court considers that the provision of item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees, which must be applied only in conjunction with § 1 (a) of the Law on judicial fees, is unconstitutional. According to the appellant, that conclusion is also based on the arguments put forward by the Constitutional Court in the decision of page 1 of the ÚS 664 / 03, according to which the disproportional amount of the charge in relation to the amount of the tax charged (40% of the total tax levied) has occurred in accordance with the procedure applied by the municipal court. However, compared to the case at hand, the appellant disputes the argument as the total amount of the court fee (324,000 CZK) in relation to the total amount of the tax levied, determined by the sum of the individual tax (each tax of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands and millions), seems to be very reasonable. According to the appellant, the disproportion between the amount of the court fee and the possible outcome of the proceedings cannot be applied, for example, in the proceedings concerning the review of administrative decisions in respect of infringements, since, in view of the amount of the fine under Act No. 200 / 1990 Coll., on infringements, this amount is lower than the court fee. The City Court of Prague points to the similarity of the cases at issue, pointing to a different view of the Constitutional Court of the subject-matter of the administrative procedure, where, in the judgment in Case C-664 / 03, the Court of First Instance argues that the Court of First Instance had initially held that, in the present version of item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees, only an administrative decision could be relied upon as a benchmark, since that tariff item relates to the administrative justice in which an individual administrative act is subject to review and the court considered the legality not only material but also the formal aspects of the administrative act. For that reason, individual tax decisions are treated as an administrative case in a separate procedure, or an individual administrative act, which is why, in terms of the legal fee, the action against multiple decisions is not considered as a single commercial case on the basis of the facts and legal issues of the nature of the relationships underlying the tax decisions. Payment notices are issued separately to tax authorities and are a separate execution title.
However, from the point of view of the legal opinion contained in the finding in point I of the ÚS 664 / 03, the legislation in question does not, according to the appellant, express the points of view indicated by the Constitutional Court. The situation arising after the adoption of the finding, sp. zn. I. ÚS 664 / 03, according to the conviction of the Municipal Court in Prague, does not permit five actions against 162 administrative decisions to charge the legal fee of the action against any administrative decision, since such a procedure would be unconstitutional. However, the municipal court does not, in its view, have the possibility of charging the applicant a court fee even from a formal point of view according to the number of actions, since it is responsible for collecting the court fee at the correct amount, and this amount cannot be determined by the will of the applicant and the method of bringing the actions which he has chosen, while other criteria for collecting the court fee from Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., as amended, do not result. At the same time, the Court of First Instance takes the view that the Court of First Instance is bound to examine the link between the amount of the legal fee and the subject-matter of the proceedings, i.e. the need to decide on the amount of the charge on a case-by-case basis, which would, however, constitute a possible contradiction with the principle of equality and predictability of the law and the principle of the economy of the proceedings (given the need in this case, to make the case under consideration at the time of the opening of the procedure).
In the light of those reasons, the appellant gives an opinion that the legal regulation of judicial fees in the administrative justice system should specify the rules for which action or proceedings and the amount to which the court fee may be levied from the plaintiff so that the court is not subject to various interpretative alternatives when applying the relevant provision of the law. Since the Municipal Court in Prague, on the basis of that finding of the Constitutional Court, has found itself in a procedural situation in which it does not have the degree to which the applicant is required to pay the legal fee of the actions brought in order to fulfil its legal obligation to collect the legal fee under the provision of clause 14a (2) (a) of the Law, in conjunction with Paragraph 1 (a) of the Act, and is in breach of one of the fundamental principles of the law and of the principle of legal certainty and of trust in the law, which is the principle of the principle of the law, the internal distribution of the judicial fees in conjunction with Section 1 (a) of the Act, the law, the law of the Court of the Court of Justice, which provides for a different interpretation of the amount of the judicial fee in action against a decision of the administrative authority, and thus imposes an unequal status of the parties in their constitutionally guaranteed.
For the reasons thus set out, the Municipal Court in Prague proposes that the Constitutional Court should decide, after the procedure carried out, that the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, expressed in the words: "For an action or other application to initiate proceedings in administrative proceedings, a) against the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000," shall be deleted from the date set by the Constitutional Court in its decision.
Recital of the essential parts of the party's observations and of the appellant's replies
Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal in question to the Chamber of Deputies. First of all, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, Ing. Miloslav Vlček notes that item 14a, including the contested provision of point 2 (a), was inserted into the schedule of judicial fees by an accompanying law to the Administrative Order, which was published under No. 151 / 2002 Coll., the draft law being submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by the Government on 4 October 2001, and then discussed as print 1081. The question of compliance of the contested legal provision with the constitutional order is then referred to in the statement of reasons for the proposal, according to which "the proposed regulation complies with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and the international treaties by which the Czech Republic is bound '. The first reading, as stated below, took place on 25 October 2001 at the 39th session of the Chamber of Deputies, in vote 234, the proposal was directed to the Constitutional Committee, with 109 of the 117 Members present and no one opposed it. Press 1081 was discussed by the Constitutional Committee at its 97 meeting on 18 January 2002, and, contrary to the original text of the Government proposal containing the sum of 5 000, - CZK, the Constitutional Committee in the adopted resolution proposed to reduce this amount to CZK 2 000 (resolution No 235 was subsequently discussed as print 1081 / 1). The second reading took place at the 46th session of the Chamber of Deputies, the general debate on the proposal took place on 30 January and 8 February 2002, followed by a detailed debate on 8 February. The amendments resulting therefrom were summarised in print 1081 / 2. The third reading took place at the same - that is, the 46th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on 15 February 2002, the final motion for a resolution by which the Chamber of Deputies gave its assent to the draft law adopted, according to press 1081, as amended by the amendments, was adopted when 149 of the 159 Members present and no one was against it. Subsequently, the bill was passed on to the Senate, which did not deal with it. The President of the Republic signed the Act on 28 March 2002.
On the basis of the above, the President The Chamber of Deputies notes that the law was passed by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared.
In the light of the Chamber of Deputies adopted amendments which affected the contested provision only in amount of the amount proposed, and in the light of the explanatory memorandum, it is noted that the legislature has acted in the conviction of the law adopted with the Constitution and the rule of law, and that it is up to the Constitutional Court to "lodge a constitutional complaint with the Municipal Court in Prague '(sic!) and its proposal to abolish the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the schedule of judicial fees of Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended by Act No 151 / 2002 Coll., in the words:" For the application for the initiation of proceedings in the administrative judicial proceedings and the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000,', assessed the constituency of that law and gave the relevant decision.
The President The Chamber of Deputies draws attention to the not-exactly-worded proposal of the Municipal Court in Prague, in which it is proposed that the words "For the action for the initiation of proceedings in the administrative judicial matters (a) against the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000, - ', in heading 14a (2), the introductory phrase is:" For the action or other application for the initiation of proceedings in administrative matters', and the text is subdivided into points (a) to (d). By deleting the above words, according to the party to proceedings under item 14a (2), only the words "or other proposal 'and the text (b) to (d) would remain in the introductory wording, which would in practice lead to confusion and inapplicability of this provision.
Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
The introduction of his statement of 7 November 2006 by his chairman, MUDr. Premysl Sobotka, in agreement with the President of the Chamber of Deputies, draws attention to the incorrect wording of the draft petition, pointing out the grammatical inconsistencies of the residency following possible deposition (for example, the words "or other '), and the incomparability of the legislative-technical [it is proposed that item (a) item 14a (2), inter alia, in the words" For an action for the initiation of administrative proceedings', although the words (a) do not contain at all], and, finally, the inconsistencies contained [the word "action 'would not be fully covered by point (d) (2) of heading 14a, i.e." other cases', which do not include, for example, for action for inaction]. In addition to the content of its observations, the participant adds that it will cover the version of the application for cancellation of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the schedule of charges.
The genesis of the contested legal provision is stated in the statement that the adoption of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees was part of the period of legislative discussion of the reform of the administrative justice in 2002 [except for the newly inserted provision of point 2 (d), which was included in that item by Act No 159 / 2006 Coll., on conflict of interest]. It was implemented by Act No 151 / 2002 Coll. The draft Law was referred to the Senate on 25 February 2002, under No 224, the draft was directed by the Senate Organising Committee to the Constitutional Law Committee as a committee of guarantee, as well as the Committee on Territorial Development, Public Administration and the Environment. The two committees, by resolutions No 83 of 6 March 2002 and No 94 of 12 March 2002 respectively, recommended the Senate to approve the proposal as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. On 21 March 2002, at its 15th meeting of the Senate's third term of office, the bill was debated by the Senate plenary and, by resolution No 327, expressed the will not to deal with it. In vote 95 was 38 of the 43 senators present for the motion, one was against the motion.
According to the statement of the contested provision, the content was not in any way problematic in the course of the Senate legislative procedure, as demonstrated by the form of adoption of the draft law, which is de facto the approval of the bill by the Senate without debate. The party to the proceedings then concludes that the Senate has negotiated the draft law within the limits of constitutional competence and has decided, as has already been stated.
In its Opinion on the substance of the case, the party to the proceedings is based on the interpretation of Article 1 of the Law on Judicial Charges. It states that its definition of prima facie makes it possible to distinguish consistently between the charge for the proceedings, the charge for the action of the court and the charge for the action of the administration of the court, and, in response to the inconsistent application practice, the Court of First Instance dealt with the importance of this distinction in its Opinion of 4 July 1996 in Cpjn 68 / 95 and Opjn 1 / 95. In the further review of the development of the legislation on judicial fees, starting with the Imperial Decree No. 279 / 1915, on judicial fees, through Law No. 173 / 1950 Coll., on judicial fees, Decree No. 116 / 1966 Coll., on judicial fees, Act No. 147 / 1984 Coll., on judicial fees, and certain regulations on them, respectively, on the Finance Minister Act No. 22 / 1959 Coll., on judicial fees, and on Law No. 255 / 2000 Coll., amending Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended. If, according to the participant, the first of these modifications was characterised by clarity and relatively high specificity, the adjustments from after 1948 were characterised by a higher degree of generality, ambiguity and mixing of various legal institutes (e.g. in the legislation of 1951 and 1959, the mixing of charges for the action or the proposal with charges for various extracts, certificates, etc.).
In relation to the provisions of § 1 of Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., as amended by Act No. 255 / 2000 Coll., it is noted in the opinion of the President of the Senate that item 14a, which is part of the provision in question, is classified in the tariff as a charge for proceedings, neither of the provisions of § 1 (a) under which the procedural fees are levied "from the acts listed in the Tariff of Fees', nor of the introductory phrase of point 2 of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees, which reads" for an action or any other application for the initiation of proceedings in administrative proceedings', nor of the concentration of the two, it cannot be taken that the procedure as a whole should not be charged. According to the participant's conviction, the legislator specified the fee rate according to the requirement for the availability of judicial protection, the nature of the case under consideration and the difficulty of the determining authority - the court. In view of the fact that the appellant considers in its submissions the terms of the procedure, the action and the action of the contested administrative decision, the party takes the view that, despite variable means of expression, the legal structure of the charge law remains unchanged over time, the basis of which is to break down into the procedural and action charges, taking into account the difference between the actions of the court and those of the judicial administration. For this reason, he worded the following interpretation of the provision in question: in the legal proceedings before the administrative court against the decision of the administrative authority, the exercise of the judiciary in one instance is charged at the amount of CZK 2,000 due when the action is brought.
The party stresses the freedom of expression of a legal entity, which is why it considers it appropriate to impose a legal fee on the action (the applicant's disposition act) and not to regard it as an economic contribution to State expenditure as an official activity. A part of the applicant's vacancy is his right to determine the subject-matter of the proceedings (or one application to the administrative court for review of several administrative decisions). On the other hand, (referring to the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court No 53 / 2004-76 and No 1 Afs 127 / 2005-105), the Court of First Instance draws attention to the right to bring the case before the Court of First Instance for a joint hearing or more of the contested administrative decisions referred to in a single action to be excluded for a separate hearing, unless the joint proceedings are possible or appropriate (§ 39 (2) of the EC Treaty). It is concluded from the above analysis that, in a case in which more than one administrative action is challenged by a single administrative action, the decisions are factually and legally identical and concern the same parties, one procedure must be conducted, subject to a single tariff charge. In this context, emphasis is placed on the mutual link between compliance with the charge obligation and guaranteeing access to the court.
Based on the analogous elements between civil proceedings and administrative justice, the participant agrees with the doctrine opinion for the purpose of judicial fees (V. Hora, Czechoslovak Civil Law of Procedure. Volume II, Prague 1923, p. 71), according to which the judiciary, on the one hand, must not "be a gainful enterprise ', on the other hand, should not" be judicated, misused and brought to the detriment of the whole'. In other words, the potential plaintiff is to have an incentive (do not abuse the judiciary), in terms of the company, the fee plays a part of the economic equivalent for the activity of the court (exercise of the judiciary). According to the participant, that legal conclusion is also based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (Buffalo, s. r. o. in liquidation, against Italy). Based on the proportionality of the relationship of these purposes, the President of the Senate considers the amount of the court fee appropriate (i.e. CZK 2 000).
On the basis of the appellant's argument of ambiguity, the party to the proceedings notes that, in its view, the legal rules in the case in question are set out in a sufficiently clear, comprehensible and sufficiently general manner to enable the court to apply the standard on a case-by-case basis, leaving sufficient discretion. It also considers that the finding of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. I. ÚS 664 / 03, according to which "the interpretation of Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., according to which the party is obliged to pay the court fee for any administrative decisions which are in fact completely identical and which relate to the same participants and are issued on the same day by the same administrative authority, is not only a disproportional but also an anticonstitutional one ', constitutes a clear and understandable starting point for resolving any interpretative doubts. On the basis of the above, it points out the principle of a constitutionally conformal interpretation of a simple right, which should be the starting point for the applicant's action in the case.
Finally, it is entirely up to the Constitutional Court to "assess the constitutionality of the application for annulment of the contested provisions'.
In its reply to the observations received by the Chamber of Deputies on 17 January 2008, the appellant points out that, in its proposal, it is based on Article 11 (5) of the Charter, according to which fees may be imposed only on the basis of the law, and Article 37 (3) of the Charter, according to which all parties in the proceedings are equal, which concludes that, even in the event of an action against multiple decisions, the amount of the financial costs of the dispute must be determined without prejudice to the judgment of the judge taken in the examination of the facts. The City Court of Prague illustrates the argument of the principle of equality of parties in a reply and examples from its own practice. It also asks whether, where the amount of the court fee depends on the court's discretion, it should not be given within the meaning of Article 34 (1) of the EC Treaty. In order to formulate the petition, the appellant notes that it is within the competence of the Constitutional Court under Paragraph 70 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. to decide that the law or other legislation or its individual provisions shall be repealed on the date it designates in the finding, giving the instrument to avoid the occurrence of undesirable disproportion. In conclusion, it notes that it insists on its proposal, which it does with reference to the more recent case-law of the Constitutional Court (Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 464 / 06 - see in electronic version http: / / nalus.ujud.cz, not published in the ECR).
Abandonment of oral proceedings
According to the provisions of Paragraph 44 (2) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., the Constitutional Court may, with the consent of the parties, refrain from oral proceedings if it cannot expect further clarification of the case. Since both the appellant, in its submissions of 22 January 2008 and the parties to the proceedings, in the letter of the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic of 8 January 2008 and the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic of 7 January 2008, expressed their consent to the abandonment of the oral hearing and, furthermore, the Constitutional Court considers that further clarification cannot be expected from the hearing, the oral hearing in the present case has been abandoned.
Petit of the proposal and the classification of the contested legislation
The Constitutional Court is bound in its decision-making by the scope of the application and in its decision-making from its borders (ultra petitum) it is not possible [see, for example, the judgment in case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 94, sp. zl. If the Municipal Court in Prague proposes to abolish the provisions of item 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, expressed in the words: "The Constitutional Court considers the definition of a petition to be a manifest error, and if, in its reasoning, the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000, - ', although the whole of the proposal is directed towards point (a) of item 14a of the schedule of charges, the Constitutional Court considers the definition of a petition to be a manifest error, and if, in its reasoning, it is not an ultra petitum procedure, but a clear violation between the content and the citation of the law, indicating a petition (see, mutatis mutandis, in sp. Otherwise, in the event of a deregulation by the appellant of the legal provision indicated, the remainder of item 14a (2) of the schedule of charges would cease to be reasonable.
The provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the schedule of charges annexed to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended, read: "(a) against the decision of the administrative body CZK 2 000, - '.
Conditions for the applicant's active legitimacy
The application for annulment of the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees annexed to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended, was submitted by the Municipal Court in Prague in accordance with the provisions of § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended.
As already stated in the national case, in the above cases sp. zn. 9 Ca 52-56 / 2006, the Municipal Court in Prague is decided on five actions by FAD, a. s., against the Financial Directorate for the City of Prague, seeking the annulment of 162 decisions of the defendant, which rejected the appeal against the payment measures for the transfer of real estate tax issued by the Finance Office for Prague 5. By those decisions, the applicant was not recognised in the tax proceedings as having been entitled to an exemption from property transfer tax pursuant to § 20 (7) (a) and (b) of Act No 357 / 1992 Coll., on inheritance tax, donation tax and property transfer tax which it applied on the transfer of residential and non-residential units in the precisely identified property.
The Municipal Court in Prague did so in accordance with Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, following its decision-making activities in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 48 (1) (a) (a) (s. s.), concluded that the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Schedule annexed to Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended by the laws to be applied in the resolution of the sp. zn. 9 Ca 52-56 / 2006, are contrary to Articles 36 (1) of the Charter and Article 1 of the Constitution.
The procedural condition of the active legitimacy of the General Court pursuant to § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, is such a position of the Law, or its individual provision, which is proposed to be annulled, on the subject of the tribal proceedings which give rise to decision-making reasons for the General Court's assessment of the case.
Since the payment of the court fee is a condition for the hearing of the case (Section 9 of the Law on judicial fees), the appellant's compliance with the conditions of his active legitimacy for the standard control procedure can be established.
Constitutional conformity of competence and legislative process
In accordance with the provisions of § 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, the Constitutional Court is required to assess whether the contested law, its individual provisions, or other legislation or its individual provisions, has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.
The House of Deputies approved the draft law in question, i.e. Act No 151 / 2002 Coll., amending certain laws in connection with the adoption of the Administrative Rules, at its 46th meeting of 15 February 2002, by Resolution No 2106, when 149 Members and Members were elected and were not opposed to it.
On 21 March 2002, at its 15th meeting of the Senate's third term of office, the bill was debated by the Senate plenary and, by resolution No 327, expressed the will not to deal with it. In vote 95 was 38 of the 43 senators present for the motion, one was against the motion.
The Law in question was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and was duly declared under No 151 / 2002 Coll. in an amount of 61 Collection of Laws, which was circulated on 17 April 2002, and pursuant to Article XXVII for the decision of the Constitutional Court the relevant provision of Article X (18) became effective on 1 January 2003.
Content compliance of the contested legal provisions with the constitutional order
The most general expression of the purpose and meaning of the judicial fees is contained in the explanatory note to the Government Bill on Judicial Charges (print 476), adopted by the Czech National Council on 5 December 1991 and published under No. 549 / 1991 Coll.: "The task of law governing the assessment and collection of judicial fees is also to ensure that the costs incurred by the State are partly borne out by the administration of the judiciary and, at the same time, to limit the submission of some unformed proposals for the initiation of legal proceedings. At the same time, it is their job to encourage the mandatory to fulfil their obligations voluntarily towards the fellow citizens and other entities. '
From a comparative point of view, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfGE 50, 217 [226]) accents the first of the purposes of the court fee. In its view, the "public-law cash performance charge, which is unilaterally imposed on the taxpayer for the purpose of public service vis-à-vis the individual (public-law standard or similar act of authority), is intended to cover its costs in whole or in part, following such performance '.
The purpose and purpose of the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees annexed to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended by Act No. 151 / 2002 Coll., is to reflect the adoption of the Administrative Rules of the Court and in the regulation of judicial fees.
The fundamental objection to the unconstitutional nature of that legal provision by the appellant is the existence of its several interpretative alternatives and the ambiguity and uncertainty of the aspects of their choice. In addition, the appellant does not accept the arguments contained in the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn. I. ÚS 664 / 03, according to which, by determining the amount of the legal fee referred to in point (a) (2) of item 14a of the schedule of charges by charging the application in respect of each contested administrative decision, the amount of the charge in relation to the amount of tax levied was disproportionately, and gives examples of such disproportion.
The question of the constitutionally conformal interpretation of the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees was dealt with in a comprehensive manner by the Constitutional Court in the finding of page I. ÚS 664 / 03 (see above). In his introduction, he followed his previous caselaw on the charge obligation (sp. zn. IV, ÚS 162 / 99, ECR 15, p. 104), in which he pointed out that "the regulation of the charge obligation or exemption from it by Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, constitutes one of the fundamental moments of the right to judicial protection within the meaning of Article 36 (1) of the Charter '. In the present case, the ÚS 664 / 03 concluded that" when deciding on the amount of the charge under Law No 549 / 1991 Coll. it could reach such an extent that it would also intervene in the fundamental law under Article 36 (1) or (2) of the Charter'. Therefore, as a constitutional contradiction, the interpretation of Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., according to which the party is obliged to pay the court fee for any administrative decisions which are factually and legally entirely identical, concern the same parties and are issued on the same day, the same administrative authority, is not only disproportional but also unconstitutional. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms sets out in Article 36 (2) the principle that those who claim to have been shortened on their rights by a decision of a public authority may appeal to the court to examine the legality of such a decision. In the light of this article of the Charter, the municipal court procedure had the character of a substantial restriction on the complainant's access to the court. '.
That opinion was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its further caselaw. In the find sp. zn. II. ÚS 745 / 06 (not yet published, see http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), he stated that "the constitutional result of the interpretation of Act No 549 / 1991 Coll. cannot be such an interpretation that the party to the proceedings is obliged to pay a judicial fee for each administrative decision in respect of decisions which are factually and legally entirely identical, relate to the same participants and are issued on the same day by the same administrative authority." In a further finding concerning the issue, sp. zn. I. ÚS 43 / 07 (not yet published, see http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), the following: "If the contested resolution of the City Court, based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Law No 549 / 1991 Coll., assessed the complainant's legal fee of CZK 2 000 for each individual administrative action of the contested administrative decision, although all those decisions concerned one single case (appeal against the payment notice), addressed the same legal question, only the complainant, was issued on the same day by one and the same administrative authority and contained an identical legal argument, such a procedure under the Constitutional Court had the nature of a material limitation of the complainant's access to the court, or, in the light of Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms." The appellant's argument that, by means of a resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 464 / 06 (see above), it cannot be concluded that, within the meaning of Article 23 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. this decision was not capable of giving rise to a change in the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court on the subject under consideration.
The question of interpreting the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees was also addressed in its case law by the Supreme Administrative Court. By virtue of the nature of the action as a disposal act, by which the applicant refers to the court with a request for judicial protection and by which it defines the subject-matter of the legal proceedings, he has inferred in Case 127 / 2005-105 of the Court of First Instance an obligation to respect whether the applicant has contested a single decision or decision several, unless such a procedural action by the applicant is contrary to procedural rules. In other words, if objective cumulation is admissible, the court is not entitled to thwart the effects of the disposing act by excluding cases for a separate hearing (contrary to the conditions laid down in Paragraph 39 (2) of the EC Treaty), thereby violating the disposing principle (on which the administrative justice is built), the subjective public right of the individual to respect the autonomy of his will and the principle of procedural economics. For the reasons set out above, the Supreme Administrative Court in judgment No 53 / 2004-76 of the Court of First Instance in judgment No 53 / 2004-76 has, inter alia, established the following, the relevant consequence for the question under consideration: "This procedure, where it is not justified, is burdensome by the parties to the litigation (for example, unfounded multiplication of the court fee)."
The Constitutional Court found no reason to derogate from its previous case-law on the case in question in the procedure for examining the compliance of the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the schedule of charges with the constitutional order. Only to supplement it adds the following:
The fundamental reasoning methods of the Constitutional Court's procedure in the standard control procedure include the principle of the priority of constitutionally conformal interpretation prior to deregation, according to which, in a situation where a provision of legislation allows two different interpretations, one being consistent with the constitutional order and the other being contrary to it, there is no reason to repeal that provision. When applying the law, it is then the task of all state bodies to interpret it in a constitutional way. This method is based on the principle of the division of power and the associated principle of restraint, i.e. the principle that, if it is possible to ensure the constitutionality by alternative means, the Constitutional Court chooses the one who limits the legislative power to the minimum.
The Constitutional Court has applied for this principle in a number of its decisions. For the first time, he did so in the sp. zn. The principle of the priority of the constitutional interpretation prior to cancellation was then used in a number of other decisions on the control of standards [e.g. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 96 (Reports of decisions, Volume 6, Found No. 98), Pl. ÚS 15 / 98 (Reports of decisions, No. 13, Volume 13, Found No. 10 / 99), Pl. Pl. ÚS 4 / 99 (Reports of decisions, Volume 14, Found No. 93, No.192 / 1999 Coll.
The Supreme Administrative Court, in accordance with the tradition, doctrine and constitutional principle of the protection of freedom in the judgments cited, accentuated the importance of the principle available in administrative proceedings, within its capacity as an applicant to define the subject-matter of the proceedings, i.e. by cumulation of the administrative decisions contested. In addition to the moment of the protection of freedom and the autonomy of the will, he pointed out in this connection the rationality of such a procedure, the principle of procedural economics. The Constitutional Court fully agrees with the interpretation of the two principles, i.e. the principles of the disposition and the principles of procedural economics.
The admissibility of objective cumulation in the petition also corresponds to the purpose of the legal institutions of the concentration or the exclusion of the case (§ 39 pp.). Therefore, if, on the one hand, the autonomy of the appellant's discretion in the application of the principle of disposition is protected, on the other hand, the homogeneity of the legal proceedings is also protected by the institution of the exclusion of the case under Paragraph 39 (2) of the EC Treaty, according to which one action is directed against several decisions, the President of the Chamber may, by order of any such decision, exclude any such decision for a separate hearing, unless the joint procedure is possible or appropriate. Joint proceedings shall be possible and appropriate if they are in fact and legally identical or similar and relate to the same parties. In this context, the argument of the Supreme Administrative Court in Case 24 / 2005- 70 Afs 24 / 2005- 70 does not refer to the inadmissibility of the procedure under Paragraph 39 (2) of the EC Treaty, but to the failure to comply with the bail-out clause.
In this context, the Constitutional Court merely notes that, in that finding, it merely pointed out the possible negative consequences of the interpretation of the provisions of point (a) (2) (14a) of the Schedule of Fees laid down by the Municipal Court in Prague.
The interpretation of the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the Tariff of Fees annexed to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended by Act No. 151 / 2002 Coll., contained in the caselaw cited by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, therefore considers the Constitutional Court to be constitutional conformance, i.e. consistent with both Article 36 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Constitution. This makes it justified to apply the principle of priority to constitutionally conformal interpretation before deregulation and in the case under consideration.
For the above, the motion of the Municipal Court in Prague to abolish the provisions of point (a) (2) of item 14a of the tariff fees annexed to Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended by Act No. 151 / 2002 Coll., was rejected (§ 70 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll.).
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 269 / 2008 Coll., on the application for annulment of Clause 14a (2) (a) of the Annex to Law No 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 01.08.2008 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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