The Constitutional Court found no 264 / 2005 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 28 April 2005 on the application for annulment of Article 174a of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Addresses and Government Administration of the Courts and amending certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges), as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
30.06.2005
264
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on 28 April 2005 in plenary composed of JUDr. Stanislav Balík, JUDr. František Duchoň, JUDr. Vojen Güttler, JUDr. Pavel Holländer, JUDr. Ivan Jana, JUDr. Dagmar Lastovecká, JUDr. Jiří Mucha, JUDr. Jiří Nykodým, JUDr. Pavel Rychetský, JUDr. Miloslav Excellent, JUDr.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Recital of the proposal
By a proposal submitted pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), received by the Constitutional Court on 8 November 2004, the Supreme Court in Prague sought the annulment of the provisions of Article 174a of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Courts, Addresses and Government Administration and on the amendment of certain other laws (Law on Courts and Courts), as amended. The Supreme Court received an application from the applicant, P. P., a. s., to determine the time limit for the regulation of the hearing in a case pending by the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem with reference to the provisions of § 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges. The Supreme Court concluded that the provision cited did not comply with Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention '), Article 96 (1) of the Constitution, and Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (" the Charter'). It therefore suspended the procedure by contacting the Constitutional Court with a proposal to abolish the provision cited in the Law on Courts and Judges.
The appellant is aware that that provision aims to fulfil the constitutional right of a party to the proceedings without undue delay, while the enforcement of the right to decide on the matters of a party without undue delay need not be reserved for the Constitutional Court alone, but it is possible that there may be a positive legal provision laying down a procedure for that right to be exercised directly in the General Court, but the appellant considers that the contested provision of the Law on Courts and Judges is implemented in violation of other conventions, constitutions and the Charter of Guaranteed.
In particular, the appellant criticises the contested provision as being contrary to the principle of independence of judges, enshrined in Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 36 (1) of the Charter. The contested provision leads, in addition to the desired consequence, to the competent court being moved into business and to the undesirable effect of ordering it to proceed. Given that the principle of arbitral order is generally applied in the proceedings (the judge himself chooses the procedure of the various steps he takes), which is also part of each judge's tactics, by imposing specific steps, he is imposed on him a tactic which is foreign to the proceedings. This is more a question of effectiveness than of constitutionality, but that also violates the independence of the judge. It is essential from a constitutional point of view that, in the appellant's view, by determining a very specific step, the nature of the further procedure with a direct impact on its outcome can be substantially determined. The Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court also examine the procedural procedures of the courts (e.g. § 212a (5) of the Civil Code), but this is a review of the procedure in cases already closed, and it is therefore not an impact on the subsequent proceedings. The appropriateness and urgency of the various procedural steps are also not assessed, but only the question of whether the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Constitution, the Charter and the procedural rules. In the case of the contested provision, it is a matter of determining the procedure in an open, pending case. As this is about influencing the matter by defining a further procedure which is yet to be drawn up in a decision of substance, it is about intervening in the independence of the judge in his decision. In doing so, the judge will be responsible for the outcome and not for the one who directed him.
The appellant further objected to the constitutional principle of equality, both generally within the meaning of Article 1 of the Charter and specifically in relation to judicial proceedings within the meaning of Article 96 (1) of the Constitution. This contradiction was given in the example. If one party makes an application under the contested provision, it shall be the party itself. The other disputing party has no right to comment on the proposal, as the court has to say, on a matter where it is also a party, and it is necessary to just learn about it. At the same time, she should have the right to comment on the procedure and communicate her ideas. The contested provision was intended for the benefit of those interested in the earliest possible termination of the case. As a result, however, it may lead to the fact that, on the contrary, those who are interested in stalling proceedings will repeatedly submit senseless, unrealistic or even seemingly serious proposals only so that the case is repeatedly transferred to a superior court and proceedings cannot continue. In this respect, the whole matter may turn against the principle it is intended to protect.
The appellant concluded that an action under Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Courts is without further constitutionally possible and even desirable, but cannot pursue the objective of requiring the court to take very specific procedural steps within a certain period of time. It should only lead to a court which makes unnecessary delays in the present proceedings requiring it not to proceed with delays and to act without delay in the matter without imposing on the court which is to take the course of the proceedings. Paragraph 79 of the Administrative Rules is such an example in the positive legislation, where the obligation imposed is a result and not a procedure. The findings of the Constitutional Court have also rightly laid down the obligation to leave behind delays and to act without delay, and have never laid down how the court or administrative authority concerned should act specifically (e.g. to call on participants, request documents, etc.).
At the oral hearing, the appellant supplemented his application by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of 12 January 2005 sp. zn. 21 Cul 3 / 2004, in which he saw confirmation of some of his arguments.
Procedure and recap of the observations of the parties
Pursuant to Article 69 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court), the application was sent to the parties for observations.
The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic stated in its observations on the proposal that the reason for the amendment of Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments was insufficient protection against inaction and delays in court proceedings, which was also criticised by the European Court of Human Rights. It was therefore proposed to replace the current administrative review of the handling of delays in the management of the possibility of making an application for a deadline for the execution of a procedural act decided by the court. The explanatory report on the Law on Courts and Judges established compliance with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic as well as with the international treaties by which the Czech Republic is bound, as well as compatibility with the legal acts of the European Communities. The Chamber of Deputies has expressed the belief that the contested provision cannot be regarded as contradictory to the principle of independence, enshrined in Article 6 (1) of the Convention, nor to Article 36 (1) of the Charter or Article 38 (2) of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention. Article 36 (4) provides for authorisation for the legal arrangement. The contested provision also complies with the requirement of Article 13 of the Convention under which any person whose rights and freedoms have been violated by the Convention must have effective remedies before the national authority, even if the infringement has been committed by persons in the performance of official duties. The contested provision also complies with the procedural principle of equality between the parties within the meaning of Article 96 (1) of the Constitution, since it gives every party or party to the proceedings an opportunity and considers that his complaint for delays in proceedings has not been properly dealt with, to make a proposal to determine the time limit for the execution of the procedural act which he considers to be delayed.
The Chamber of Deputies noted on the formal page that the draft law published under Act No. 192 / 2003 Coll., amending Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Admission and Government of the Courts and on the amendment of certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges), as amended, Act No. 283 / 1993 Coll., on the Prosecutor's Office, as amended, and some other laws, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 13 May 2003 (for which 175 Members and 1 was opposed). It was delivered to the Senate on 14 May 2003 and subsequently returned to the Chamber of Deputies with amendments voted on on 10 June 2003. The bill presented by the Senate was not approved but the original bill referred to the Senate. The proposal was adopted when 127 in favour of the 181 Members present, one opposed, the others abstained. On 10 June 2003, the law was passed by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared.
Finally, the Chamber of Deputies expressed the belief that the law adopted was in line with the Constitution and the rule of law. At the same time, it stated that it agreed that the Constitutional Court should refrain from oral proceedings in this matter.
The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic first briefly summarized the contents of the proposal of the Supreme Court in Prague and then stated the reasons behind the adoption of the provisions of Paragraph 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges. The main reason for its adoption was the attempt to comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, since, in the view of the Court, protection against inaction by the court or delays in proceedings was insufficient. The Institute has been designed to determine the time limit for the execution of the procedural act, systematically included in the Law on Courts and Judges, as an effective remedy to speed up the trial or to remove delays in proceedings. Paragraph 174a of the Law on Courts and Courts is described as a simple procedural procedure which is essentially common to both criminal or civil proceedings and administrative justice.
The Senate also describes the course of the legislative process in the Senate. On the basis of the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee on 28 May 2003 and after consideration at the sixth session of the Fourth Plenary of the Senate on 29 May 2003, it was decided to refer the bill back to the Chamber of Deputies as amended. However, these proposals did not affect Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges. In the course of the negotiations of the law, the effectiveness and therefore the futility (formality) of the contested provision were questioned. In particular, concerns have been raised about the possible overcrowding of the general courts as a result of the excessive idea of proposals to set a time limit for the execution of a procedural act, as the actions are expected to be the subject of disputes which are complicated, and the question of how the judge will be able to assess whether these are delays, to what extent he will have to familiarize himself with the file, and whether there will be a situation where the regional courts will deal with prosecutions for delays in the district courts and not judge themselves. As regards the legislative process, he concluded that the Senate had discussed the bill and decided on it within the limits of its constitutional competence. 60 of the 64 senators present voted in favour of returning the bill to the Chamber of Deputies with amendments.
In the next part of his speech, the Senate summarized the starting points of the issue. Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 38 (2) of the Charter establish the right to hear the case within a reasonable time without undue delay. However, it is clear from the caselaw that the proportionality of the duration of proceedings is a matter of individual assessment and a number of objective factors must be taken into account. Before the adoption of the provisions of Paragraph 174a, the only legal means of legal protection against delays in proceedings was the procedure provided for in paragraphs 164 to 174 of the Law on Courts and Judges in the framework of the so-called complaint procedure, which was implemented by the administration of the court. In addition, those who felt wronged by inaction or inaction by the court could invoke their right only through a constitutional complaint. The Czech Republic has not been able to achieve acceptable results through these two national legal means, as reasonable complaints about undue length have been constantly increasing. On the basis of the above considerations, it could be concluded that fundamental human rights did not have sufficient institutional reflection in this respect. Therefore, Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges was approved.
The Senate has divided its comments into two parts of its substance. In the first, he dealt with the issue of judicial independence, and in the second, the issue of equality between the parties. In the first part, he stated that the proposal does not express concern about interference with the independence of the courts by legislative or executive powers, but rather about the threat of independence within the judicial power itself. The independence of judges cannot be interpreted as a single principle of law, but in particular as part of the right to a fair trial, which it fulfills and completes. The legislature has offered the procedure laid down in Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges. The proposal is thus decided not after an administrative but after a judicial independent line, according to the legal procedural rules. A sufficient constitutional guarantee to dispel the fear of interfering with the independence of the court is, in the view of the party to the proceedings, the obligation of the court to proceed in a legally defined manner. For the whole process to be rational, decisions must have binding effects for the addressee. According to Article 174a (7) of the Law on Courts and Judgments, the court competent to carry out the procedural act is therefore bound by the time limit laid down in the decision. In addition to the straightforward method of the legal establishment of the procedural time limits addressed to the court, the legislator chose only a different path to the same objective. The expression of an individual judicial decision is that any long, constitutionally acceptable period can be determined, but the proposal can also be rejected or rejected. Moreover, it is not excluded that the majority of the decisions on the application for a deadline will be rejected as irrelevant without the court which decides on the case, in its procedure or tactic brought by the proposal being "interrupted 'or affected. Thus, contrary to the method of legal time limits, the procedure laid down in Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments appears more appropriate. In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 174a, the legislature tried to fulfil the principle of a fair process in all its elements, including the maintenance of judicial independence, in the Constitution of the designated area.
In the part concerning the equality of the parties, the Senate stated that the procedure for determining the time limit for the execution of the procedural act was the sui generis procedure. This procedure is entirely under the jurisdiction of the court, it can be described as a special, narrowly targeted, circumstantial and not unlike the one in which the judge is decided to exclude under the provisions of § 14 et seq. of the Civil Code. The specificities of the proceedings are also reflected in the definition of the parties, where the applicant is the sole party. This implies that the proposal to set a time limit for the execution of a procedural act is not against the party to the dispute, but against the body which stands above the parties. If a fair trial is part of a case within a reasonable period of time, then it does not matter who is initiated by the delay procedure. It is essential that a mechanism is initiated whereby the court which decides on the application must assess and decide on the duration of the application. It must be based on the criteria set out in Article 174a (7) of the Law on Courts and Judges (complexity of the case, importance of the subject matter of the proceedings for the appellants, conduct of the parties or parties). The Senate does not agree with the appellant's objection, which imports an infringement of the principle of equality from the fact that the other party does not have the opportunity to comment on the proposal for a deadline. As indicated above by the party, the proceedings must be carried out in favour of a fair trial as such. In the course of the proceedings, the court must take into account the conduct of all the parties, but, on the other hand, any observations on the applications, other than those of the "contested court ', are irrelevant for the moment in question. It is the communication of their ideas to the participants about the further procedure of the court that could be inadmissible interference with judicial independence, as the Supreme Court in Prague states in its proposal. The party to the proceedings recalled that none of the parties to the proceedings was denied the possibility of initiating the application for a deadline; both parties may refer to the court independently of each other. It follows from the above that there cannot be a breach of the principle of independence in connection with Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges.
By virtue of its systematic classification, the possibility of using the provisions of Paragraph 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments is reserved for cases where a complaint for delays in proceedings has not been properly satisfied within 1 month in a complaint procedure held with the competent judicial authority. The purpose of the regulation fully justifies its placement in Part 6, Title III, of Part One of the Judicial and Judicial Act. The mechanism of one-stop decision-making on a proposal under the provisions of Section 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments is not an isolated regulation. The same model has been applied by Austria since 1 January 1990. In conclusion, the party also referred to the legal sentence of the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn. IV. ÚS 180 / 04 (Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 34, Found No 112), according to which the existence of a proposal to determine the time limit for carrying out a procedural action under Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments brings with it a qualitative change to remove the earlier toothlessness of the complaint on delays in proceedings. The procedure of the complainants under the provisions of Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges will be a necessary condition for the admissibility of a constitutional complaint from the point of view of Article 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
Derogation of the contested Regulation
Application for a time limit to execute a procedural act
(1) If the party or party to the proceedings is of the opinion that his complaint of delays in proceedings brought before the competent authority of the state administration of the courts has not been properly dealt with, he may submit a request to the court to determine a time limit for the execution of a procedural act which, in his view, is delayed in the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the "application for a time limit").
(2) The application for a time limit shall be lodged with the court against which the delays in the proceedings are objected. The application must show who is submitting it (hereinafter referred to as the "appellant '), what matter and what procedural action is involved, in which, according to the appellant, delays in the proceedings are seen and what the appellant seeks; in addition, the application must contain a reference to the court against which it is directed, signed and dated.
(3) The Court of First Instance against which delays are objected shall, within five working days of the date of service at the latest, forward the application for a period of time, with its observations to the court responsible for the application. inform the applicant of its progress. The court responsible for the application shall, in civil and criminal proceedings, be the court closest to the highest degree if the application is directed against the district, county or supreme court, and the Supreme Administrative Court, if the application against the Regional Court is directed against the administrative justice; if the application is against the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court, it shall be decided by another Chamber of the Supreme Court, responsible for the work schedule ("the competent court ').
(4) The applicant shall be a party to the proceedings. Save as otherwise provided in this law, the provisions of Part One and Part Three of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis to the application for a time limit.
(5) The competent court shall decide on the application for a time limit by order. The application shall be rejected if the applicant has not lodged a complaint with regard to delays in the proceedings or if he has been brought by someone who is not entitled to file the application, or if the applicant has not corrected or completed the application properly within the prescribed time limit, otherwise he shall decide on it without action within 20 working days of the date on which the case was referred to him or when the application was duly corrected or supplemented.
(6) If the court against which the application for a time limit is directed has already taken the procedural action against which the application contests proceedings, the competent court shall reject the application; It shall also proceed if it concludes that there are no delays in the proceedings.
(7) If the competent court concludes that the application for a time limit is justified because, in view of the complexity of the case, the importance of the subject-matter of the proceedings for the appellant, the procedure of the parties to the proceedings and the procedure of the Court of First Instance in the proceedings, it shall determine the time limit for the implementation of the procedural act in respect of which the application contests; that period is bound by the court competent to execute the procedural act. If the application is recognised as justified, the costs shall be borne by the State.
(8) The order by which the competent court has decided on the application for a period of time shall be served on the appellant and the court against which the application has been lodged. There shall be no appeal against the court's decision on the application for a time limit. '
The statement of reasons for the contested provision states that the previous regulation of the Law on Courts and Judges allowed only the lodging of a complaint, which is dealt with by the competent authorities of the state administration of the courts, to protect against the inaction of the court or of delays in proceedings. The examination of the handling of such a complaint was then also carried out on the administrative line. Such a solution was considered insufficient, in particular in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Articles 13 and 35 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (right to an effective remedy before a national authority for an inadequate duration of proceedings). It is assumed that the remedy must be effective and expedited where there are delays in the implementation of individual actions - the failure to deal with a complaint by a judicial authority is therefore proposed (instead of examining a complaint by an administrative line under § 174, this is left only to complaints concerning inappropriate conduct by judicial persons or to breach the dignity of the judicial proceedings), so that the complainant, if the delays in proceedings continue to exist, has the opportunity to refer directly to the court and, if the court of higher degree finds that the procedural delays do not comply with the obligation, has the obligation to order the competent court to take action within a specified period. It should be a simple procedural procedure, in principle common to both criminal or civil judicial proceedings and administrative justice, for that reason (and also to follow up on complaints to the judicial authorities), which is proposed directly in the Law on Courts and Judges. Following the amendment of the application to determine the time limit for the execution of the procedural act and its proceedings, it was also necessary to adapt the previous procedure for complaints concerning delays of proceedings, the handling of which should only be entrusted to the presiding courts.
Conditions for the applicant's active legitimacy
The Constitutional Court first addressed the question whether the appellant - the Supreme Court in Prague - is entitled to file a motion for annulment of the contested provisions. Article 95 (2) If the Constitution concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. Pursuant to Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, an application for annulment of the law or its individual provisions is also entitled to file a court with regard to its decision-making activities pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Prague submitted a motion to abolish Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges when it concluded that the provision cited was contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic in a procedure based on a proposal for a deadline for implementing the procedural act. In the light of the above provision of the Law on the Constitutional Court and the Constitution, the applicant's active legitimacy is given.
Substantial assessment by the Constitutional Court
In the very foundation of our constitutional system, the principle of the division of state power is enshrined. It is expressed in Article 2 (1) of the Constitution, which states that the source of all state power is the people who exercise it through the authorities of power legislative, executive and judicial. Its aim is to prevent the concentration of power and its abuse (see sp. zn. In order for this basic objective to be achieved, these three powers must exist independently, which does not mean that they are not linked, but must be independent enough that one power cannot assume the powers of others. This mutual balance of all three powers is the basis for a good functioning democratic system.
The Constitution, in relation to the courts, sets out the principle set out in Article 81, which provides that the judicial authority is exercised by independent courts, and in relation to the judges in Article 82 (1) of the Constitution, which implies that the Judges are independent in the performance of their duties. In the contested provision, the appellant sees intervention in the Constitution as a guaranteed independence of the courts. It is therefore appropriate to first deal with this issue in general. The Constitution refers in Article 81 to the independence of the courts and to Article 82 (1) to the independence of judicial decision-making. These terms are closely related, but are not identical. When the Constitution talks about the independence of the courts, it means their institutional independence from legislative and executive powers. It is a provision which is closely linked to the provision of Article 2 (1) of the Constitution in that it defines the relationship of power between the judicial authorities and the remaining two State powers. On the other hand, when speaking in the subsequent provision that judges are independent in the performance of their duties, it means the Court's own decision-making activities. This distinction is not meaningless. If the appellant had in mind a breach of the principle of independence of the courts, he would aim at the institutional creation of a court as a judicial authority, in which he would see the prevailing influence of one of the two remaining fundamental powers and, therefore, a breach of the balance between them, which is the fundamental principle of division of power. However, there is no such thing as the content of the proposal. It goes against the provisions of the Law on Courts and Judges, which gives the Court the power to intervene in the conduct of the trial to other, subordinate courts. In this law, it sees the possibilities created, in its words, "a contradiction with the principle of independence of the Court, established by Article 6 (1) of the Convention and Article 36 (1) of the Charter." However, from the perspective of the Constitution, it is about the independence of judicial decision-making.
The principle of the independence of the judiciary contains a number of aspects which, in their totality, are intended to create the preconditions for courts to carry out their duties and duties, in particular in the area of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. In order to fulfil the conditions of independence, it is necessary for the court to be able to base its decisions on its own free opinion on the facts and on their legal side, without having any obligation to the parties or public authorities, and without its decision being subject to review by another body which would not be equally independent in that sense.
The constitutional guarantee of judicial independence means that no one is entitled to intervene in court proceedings and judicial decisions. The Law on Courts and Judges in § 79 expresses that principle in such a way that judges are independent in the performance of their duties and are bound only by the law. They shall interpret it to the best of their knowledge and conscience and take decisions without delay, impartially and fairly and on the basis of facts established in accordance with the law. The independence and impartiality of judges must not be disturbed. The independence of judicial decision-making is therefore not an absolute but, on the contrary, relative concept, because the judge cannot act arbitrarily in his decision-making, but within the limits of the law which, and the appellant is right about, must be consistent with constitutional order. Indeed, if there were absolute independence, it would be counterproductive as it would make decisions more difficult than making them possible. There are limits to judicial independence. But commitment by law does not mean dependence on legislation. In relation to legislative power, the judge is also independent. The independence of the judge from legislation means that legislative powers are prohibited from exercising direct influence on the decision-making of specific cases during the course of the proceedings. However, this does not prevent legislative powers, but rather it is its main role to establish the rules and procedures that judges will apply when implementing the law.
The appellant sees an infringement of the constitutional order contested by the provision of the Law on Courts and Judges in that, on its basis, the superior court may order the subordinate court to take full legal action within a certain period. In his view, it imposes an inadmissible tactic on the conduct of the proceedings on the subordinate court and thus can substantially determine the nature of the further proceedings having a direct impact on its outcome. This procedure cannot be compared with the procedure of the court in the appeal proceedings, because it is not about influencing the subsequent proceedings but about reviewing the procedure already concluded. In his view, the contested provision therefore creates conditions for influencing decisions in an unfinished case and thus for intervening in the independence of the court in its decision.
The Constitutional Court does not agree with that argument. Judicial independence does not mean that a judge can be lazy in his decision making. The judge must make decisions impartially and fairly, to the best of his conscience and consciousness in accordance with the laws and without delay. It is not possible to compare the speed of decision-making with the independence of the judge. Both of these values are equally important and, from the point of view of constitutional order, they must be given sufficient legal protection so that they cannot be disturbed. That is why the right must create conditions for the consistent protection of the independence of judicial decision-making as well as for the consistent protection of the Court of Justice's nullity in decision-making.
Paragraph 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments is the first attempt in our legal order to address delays in judicial decisions. The current legislation was adopted mainly on the basis of numerous criticisms from the European Court of Human Rights, which considered the existing possibilities to remedy delays to be insufficient. In addition, the Constitutional Court noted, in a number of its decisions, a breach of the right to a fair trial resulting from delays in proceedings and pointed out to the State that systemic measures had to be taken to prevent delays in proceedings. However, the possibilities of the Constitutional Court were and are limited. Moreover, the proceedings for a constitutional complaint brought about further delays in the proceedings. A new arrangement with its relatively strict deadlines is a solution that should meet the requirement of proper protection of participants from delays.
This adjustment is based on the principle that it is within the jurisdiction of the superior court to assess whether delays occur. Therefore, this is not an intervention of another power in the exercise of jurisdiction. In order for such intervention by a superior court, if it decides to do so, it is necessary to grant it an appropriate legal obligation. It cannot stand the objection that this is an inadmissible influence on the court's tactics at a stage where the proceedings have not yet ended. The law is aimed at cases of inaction by the court and not at proceeding tactics. The legislator may have the right to assume that the superior court is able to distinguish between inaction and tactic. This, in particular, in a situation where the judge against whom the motion is directed has to comment on the application and, therefore, explain the reasons why the action has not yet been carried out or decided to implement it or not to implement it. It is therefore a legal procedural procedure which excludes the libel of a judge. The guarantee of sound decision-making can also be inferred from the fact that the case is decided by a superior judge, but it is also independent in its decision-making. Moreover, the court seised merely determines whether the procedural acts in respect of which it is alleged that the failure to implement them are to be carried out and within what period. The evaluation of these actions is then fully in line with the principle of free assessment of the evidence of the court finding.
After all, our legislation is not unique in dealing with delays. A similar solution can be found, for example, in Austria. Paragraph 91 of the Austrian Law on the organisation of courts (RGB1. Nr. 217 / 1896, as amended by BGB1. 343 / 1989, Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) allows the party to apply to the superior court for a reasonable period of time to implement the procedural act (die Vornahme der Verfahrenshandlung) if the court which decides the case meritologically hesitates to implement it. An example may be given of the regulation of the hearing, the presentation of an expert opinion or the drawing up of a decision. The court responsible for the delay shall immediately submit the application to the superior court, together with its observations, if, within four weeks, it does not carry out all the required actions and shall inform the appellant accordingly. If, within 14 days of receipt of the notification of the actions carried out, the applicant does not declare that he insists on the application, the application shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. The proposal shall be decided by the Board of three with maximum acceleration. There are no appeals against decisions.
Another question is the appellant's concern about the abuse of this institute. There is a real threat to this possibility. In advance, however, it is difficult to determine to what extent this threat will become a reality. In any event, the legislator should consider such legal arrangements as would create obstacles to abuse, for example by limiting the possibility of proposing a time limit for the assessment of a procedural act after one such proposal has already been made, or by tying the possibility to a time limit which would run from the design of a procedural act.
The appellant also sees in the contested provision a breach of the principle of equality as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter and Article 96 (1) of the Constitution. According to the contested provision, the application is lodged by only one party to the dispute and only it is a party to the proceedings. In the event that other parties are not a party to the proceedings (the appellant refers to the parties at issue, although they may not always be the parties at issue), he sees a breach of the principle of equality between the parties in the dispute, as they do not have the opportunity to comment on the application or otherwise participate in such proceedings.
In this respect, too, the Constitutional Court does not agree with the appellant's conclusions. The procedure for the proposal to determine the time limit for the execution of the procedural act is not the continuation of the contested procedure or the continuation of the criminal proceedings or the continuation of the review procedure for an administrative decision. This proposal calls for a specific procedure, the sole purpose of which is to assess whether there are unjustified delays in the court proceedings. This procedure does not interfere with the rights of other parties, as it is in fact a matter of assessing whether a court should have already carried out certain procedural acts. It is therefore not a substantive decision, but a procedural decision. Although it may occur that this is a procedural act proposed by one party and contradicted by the other, it is always a situation which is purely at the discretion of the court. The subject of the proposal cannot be another argument as to why such a procedural act should be carried out, but only an argument as to where delays in proceedings are seen. The content of the proposal is precisely defined in Article 174a (2) of the Law on Courts and Judges. This procedure cannot therefore serve to enforce procedural acts which the court does not wish to carry out.
Although the law refers only to the appellant as a party to the proceedings, it is in fact a dispute between the appellant and the court on the speed of the proceedings which must be decided by the superior court. This is not a relationship between the parties. After all, this cannot also be about inequality because all parties have the right to make a proposal under Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges.
If, in addition to the application, the appellant referred to the order of the Supreme Court of 12.1.2005 sp. zn. 21 Cul 3 / 2004, this voucher is not applicable. On the contrary, the Supreme Court stated in that decision that Article 174a of the Law on Courts and Judgments is a fulfilment of Article 38 (2) of the Charter.
In view of the above, it did not find The Constitutional Court provisions of § 174a of the Law on Courts and Judges contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, and there are therefore no grounds for its annulment. It therefore rejected the application for annulment of the provision cited in its entirety under Paragraph 70 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 264 / 2005 Coll., on the application for annulment of Article 174a of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Addresses and Government of Courts and on the amendment of certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges), as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 30.06.2005 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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