Communication from the Constitutional Court No. 262 / 2013 Coll.

I. Decision of the Minister of Justice pursuant to § 399 (1) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (Criminal Code), as amended, which was authorised to extradite a person from the Czech Republic to a foreign State for the purpose of prosecution or enforcement of a sentence already imposed in respect of the deprivation of liberty, is not a decision on an appeal against a judgment of the court which, pursuant to § 397 (1) of the Criminal Code, has been given the admissibility of its extradition. While the court decides whether one of the grounds set out in Paragraph 393 of the Penal Code is to make extradition inadmissible, the Minister of Justice does not further review the conclusions of the Court and only deals with their substantive correctness in the light of the possibility of exercising his authority to refer the matter to the Supreme Court in the event of doubt under Article 397 (3) of the Penal Code. In addition to assessing its political aspects, the Minister of Justice's own decision to authorise extradition, whose assessment is not strictly for the courts, is limited to determining whether the court has ruled that extradition is admissible, whether any of the facts referred to in paragraphs (399) (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has occurred and whether, where appropriate, any other fact which would constitute a legal obstacle to the authorisation of extradition has occurred. For these reasons, the person concerned may lodge a constitutional complaint both against the decision of the Supreme Court on the complaint against the order of the Regional Court which decided on the admissibility of the extradition at first instance and against the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise the extradition. Both of these decisions differ from one another in their purpose and subject to an assessment, therefore they are in the nature of the decision on the last procedural instrument which the law provides for the protection of that person's right (Section 72 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended). The time limit for lodging a constitutional complaint shall be assessed separately for each of them.

II. In the proceedings concerning a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Minister of Justice pursuant to § 399 (1) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (Criminal Code), as amended, which was allowed to issue a complainant from the Czech Republic to a foreign state, the Constitutional Court also assesses whether the extradition does not prevent the fact that the person concerned has been granted international protection in the Czech Republic or that its application for international protection has not yet been definitively decided, including any judicial review. The purpose of the two conditions of authorisation for extradition is to guarantee that its implementation will not constitute a breach of the non-refoulement obligation within the meaning of Article 33 (1) of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, published together with the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967 under No 208 / 1993 Coll., and Article 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, which takes precedence over other obligations under international treaties. The Constitutional Court does not, however, examine or review the legal conclusions contained in the decision of the Court which stated that extradition was admissible in the present proceedings.

1. On 4 March 2011, the Constitutional Court received a constitutional complaint from A. A. against the decision of the Minister of Justice of 24 February 2011, No 2727 / 2008-MOT-T / 119, which authorised its extradition to the Russian Federation for the purpose of criminal prosecution; the case is conducted under page III of the ÚS 665 / 11. The complainant considers that this Decision infringes its rights guaranteed by Article 33 (1) of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, published together with the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967 under No 208 / 1993 Coll., and Article 3 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention '), in conjunction with Article 1 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (" the Constitution'). The Minister of Justice should have authorised it to be issued before the end of the procedure for its application for international protection.

2. By a complaint received by the Constitutional Court on 8 April 2011, the complainant extended his complaint for the application to repeal the order of the Supreme Court in Prague dated 22 September 2010 No. 8 To 85 / 2010 and the order of the Municipal Court in Prague of 9 February 2010 sp. zn. NT 475 / 2008, which stated that its publication was admissible. The complainant considers that their conclusion is factually incorrect, does not agree that none of the grounds for inadmissibility of extradition under Paragraph 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is given, and draws attention to the consequences of these decisions in terms of its constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Before, however, the Constitutional Court was able to carry out a substantive review of the constitutional complaint even in this part, it had to consider whether it had been submitted within the time limit laid down in Section 72 (3) of Act 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by 31 December 2012. This was undoubtedly the case in the part where the constitutional complaint was directed directly against the decision of the Minister of Justice. However, in the view of the Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court, which is the subject of this Opinion and whose reasons are detailed below, this Decision cannot be considered at the same time as a decision on the last procedural remedy of the complainant for the protection of the law within the meaning of Article 72 (3) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court '), where its infringement was to take place by decision of the courts on the admissibility of extradition. The deadline for lodging a constitutional complaint against them must therefore be determined from the receipt of the order by the Supreme Court to the complainant, which took place on 5 October 2010, which in this case means that the constitutional complaint has been lodged late to this extent. For the same reason, in proceedings concerning a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Minister of Justice, neither can the conclusions of the court on the basis of which it was stated that the issue of the complainant was admissible be reviewed or reviewed.

3. The purpose of the extradition procedure (or the extradition procedure) is to establish all relevant facts for the decision of the Minister of Justice on the request of a foreign State to extradite a person from the Czech Republic for prosecution or for the execution of a prison sentence already imposed or a detention measure. The Minister of Justice, if he does not decide to close the proceedings (Paragraph 399 (4) of the Criminal Code), either authorises the extradition (Paragraph 399 (1) of the Criminal Code) or does not allow (Paragraph 399 (2) of the Criminal Code). However, if the court declares that extradition is inadmissible, the Minister of Justice shall only inform the requesting State that extradition cannot be authorised (Paragraph 399 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) without issuing a formal decision thereon.

4. The issue of a person for one of the purposes mentioned above is substantially affecting his or her constitutionally guaranteed rights and is vigorously affecting his or her circumstances, and therefore, in the light of Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter), decisions on him or her cannot be excluded from judicial review. The legislature was aware of this requirement and reflected it in the extradition proceedings by making the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise extradition conditional on a binding assessment of the admissibility of extradition by the general courts. Whether, in a particular case, one of the grounds for inadmissibility of extradition under Paragraph 393 of the Penal Code is given, the Regional Court shall decide. The person to whom the extradition is sought may also file a complaint against his decision, which shall be decided by the Supreme Court. Should the courts conclude that extradition is not admissible, it could not be authorised. The Minister of Justice would have to respect their decision unless it was able to obtain their annulment after the Supreme Court brought the case under Paragraph 397 (3) of the Penal Code, to which he would be entitled in case of doubt. In such a case, however, the own decision on the admissibility of extradition would depend on the court's decision.

5. In view of the specific design of the extradition procedure, the III. Chamber of the Constitutional Court had to ask itself whether the decision of the Minister of Justice in relation to the previous decisions of the courts on the admissibility of the issue had the nature of the appeal decision which the law provides to the complainant for the protection of his right. If that were the case, the constitutional complaint under Paragraph 75 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act would be admissible only against him and only together with his decision could it be possible to challenge the decision of the courts on the admissibility of his extradition, as the complainant did.

6. It follows from the present case-law that the Constitutional Court does not take a uniform approach to dealing with the question set out. For the first time, he made an explicit comment on it in the decision of 15 April 2003, sp. zn. I. ÚS 752 / 02 (N 54 / 30 SbNU 65), which decided on a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Minister of Justice and the resolution of the Supreme Court and the Regional Court in the admissibility proceedings. As is apparent from his reasoning, the Constitutional Court observed in fact that "merely stating the admissibility of extradition does not mean that extradition will take place ', the ground for which" the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise extradition must be seen as the last means of protecting the complainant's right'. It was based on the principle of subsidiarity of the constitutional complaint. "The Constitutional judiciary is based primarily on the principle of reviewing cases in which unconstitutionality cannot be corrected in another way, and, in the event of the improper extradition by the Minister of Justice, only by decision of the General Courts would it not be possible to intervene in the rights guaranteed by constitutional order." For these reasons, a constitutional complaint against decisions by the courts on the admissibility of extradition, which would have to be rejected as inadmissible in the sense of non-enforcement of procedural remedies for the protection of the law, would have to be made prior to the authorisation of the Minister of Justice.

7. In this way, the defined relationship of the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise extradition against decisions of the courts concerning its admissibility was, of course, reflected in the assessment of the timeliness of the constitutional complaint against decisions of the general courts. In this case, the Constitutional Court has determined the deadline for its submission from the delivery of the decision of the Minister of Justice, not from the service of the order of the Supreme Court. The same procedure can be seen from its findings of 20 December 2006 sp. zn. I. ÚS 733 / 05 (N 230 / 43 SbNU 605), of 10 November 2010 sp. zn. I. ÚS 2462 / 10 (N 221 / 59 SbNU 195) and of 5 September 2012 sp. zn. II. ÚS 670 / 12. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the Constitutional Court, in a number of cases, has admitted a constitutional complaint against the order of the Supreme Court, which was decided on the complaint against the order of the Regional Court on the admissibility of extradition without insisting that the Minister of Justice should decide on the request for extradition. As an example, the finding of 4 February 1999, sp. zn. IV, can be given in the first place. ÚS 427 / 98 (N 20 / 13 CollNU 147), which concerned previous but similar legislation (cf. paragraphs 380 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended until 31 October 2004). However, reference should also be made to the finding of 3 January 2007 in sp. zn. III. ÚS 534 / 06 (N 1 / 44 SbNU 3), as well as to a number of resolutions rejecting the constitutional complaint for obvious unfounded reasons (e.g. resolution of 15 June 1999 in sp. zn. I. ÚS 507 / 98, of 5 April 2006 sp. zn. II. ÚS 165 / 06, of 9 September 2008 in sp. zn. III. ÚS 1757 / 08 or of 29 January 2013 in sp. I. ÚS 48 / 13, available at http: / nalus.ujun.cz). On the grounds of this different approach, the Constitutional Court stated in its decision of 10 October 2012, sp. zn. IV. ÚS 353 / 12, in which it stated that the decision of the Minister of Justice "was not... strict sense of the appeal which the complainant's legal order provides to protect his rights; In other words, it is not a procedure that would be available to the complainant. It is not excluded - since the rule of law does not provide for a postponement period for the Minister - that the extradition may be carried out after the decision of the Minister of Justice before the deadline for lodging a constitutional complaint expires. The denial of the possibility of lodging a constitutional complaint against a decision by a complaint court could in many cases make it impossible to protect the fundamental rights of individuals effectively" (page IV, ÚS 353 / 12, paragraph 20).

8. The Constitutional Court agrees with the opinion of the Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court, according to which a constitutional complaint may be lodged both against the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise extradition and against the decision of the Supreme Court which has been declared admissible for extradition. In both cases, the decision is final from the point of view of their subject matter, each of which may, as will be stated below, lead separately to a breach of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned. The conclusion set out in the decision of the Supreme Court in paragraph IV of the ÚS 353 / 12, according to which the constitutional complaint is already admissible against the decision of the Supreme Court, is therefore correct, but the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to supplement it in that sense, deviating from the legal opinion expressed in that decision of the Court of First Instance I ÚS 752 / 02 and implicitly contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court. I ÚS 733 / 05, sp. zn. I ÚS 2462 / 10 and sp. II. ÚS 670 / 12, that the period for bringing a constitutional complaint against it may be withdrawn exclusively from its service and not from the service of the decision of the Minister of Justice.

9. Although the decision to authorise extradition is based in substance on the decision of the courts on its admissibility, the Minister of Justice cannot be considered as another decision-making instance in the relevant court proceedings. In the end, as an executive authority, he could not have had such a position, just as he could not reassess, change or disturb the judgments of the courts. The purpose of the judicial assessment of the issue of the admissibility of extradition before its decision is to provide the highest possible guarantee from the point of view of national law that, in the case of a particular person, it does not infringe its constitutionally guaranteed rights by the authorisation of its extradition. The law foresees that, at the time of the decision of the Minister of Justice on the authorisation of extradition, the issue of the admissibility of extradition will be resolved and, therefore, the issue of extradition can take place in a relatively short time (e.g., the length of the extradition pursuant to § 400b (4) of the Criminal Code), which would, by nature, make any subsequent protection of the rights of that person at least difficult or even impossible. For these reasons, the Minister of Justice himself no longer revises or replaces the judgments of the courts and essentially deals with their substantive correctness only in view of the possibility of exercising his authority to bring the case before the Supreme Court in the event of doubt under Paragraph 397 (3) of the Criminal Code. Even the finding of a change in the relevant circumstances (§ 400b (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) could lead to the conclusion by the Minister of Justice that this decision is out of date and cannot be relied upon when authorising extradition, but not to carry out a reassessment of the admissibility of extradition separately, i.e. without a prior decision by the court.

10. The self-decision of the Minister of Justice on the authorisation of extradition shall be limited to determining whether the court has ruled that extradition is admissible, whether any of the facts referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Paragraph 399 of the Penal Code have been brought to light and whether, where appropriate, there has been no other fact which would constitute a legal obstacle to the authorisation of extradition. In so far as the law confers on it the possibility to refuse extradition even where, in the view of the courts, no legal reason is given which would make extradition inadmissible, it does so, in particular given that its decision also has a political dimension and, in cases of extraditional nature, it can be regarded as a manifestation of national sovereignty [cf. In its discretion, it therefore also examines other (i.e. political (and primarily foreign-policy) aspects of the extradition of a specific person to a foreign State, which, by virtue of the nature of the matter, cannot be defined by law and are subject to control, in particular in terms of the possibility of establishing constitutional political responsibility. On the contrary, the assessment of the political aspects of the issue is fundamentally not the case.

11. However, those conclusions do not call into question the nature of the Minister's decision as a final decision in the context of an extradition procedure, of which the person concerned is also a party by nature. It is the decision of the Minister of Justice that constitutes the legal basis for the implementation of the extradition and its associated interference with its fundamental rights and freedoms. The possibility of lodging a constitutional complaint against him does not change either the specific nature of the extradition procedure, which assumes that the person to whom it relates applies his procedural rights, particularly in a relatively separate judicial procedure.

12. For all these reasons, both the decision of the Minister of Justice on the issue of the extradition procedure and the decision of the Supreme Court which was given that extradition is admissible in relation to the legal proceedings on the admissibility of extradition should be regarded as a decision on the last procedural remedy for the protection of his right under Article 72 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act. The person to whom the issue is concerned may thus, before the decision of the Minister of Justice, be empowered to review the decision on the admissibility of extradition by the Constitutional Court, even if the legal obstacle to the decision of the Minister would be to lodge a constitutional complaint only in the event of a postponement of the enforceability of the contested decision by the Court pursuant to § 79 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court.

13. In conclusion of this part of the Opinion, which is the substance of the question of the admissibility of a constitutional complaint in matters of extradition, the Constitutional Court considers it desirable to state that the power of the Minister of Justice to bring a case before the Supreme Court in case of doubt under Paragraph 397 (3) of the Criminal Code does not constitute an appeal available to the complainant (cf. It is a special procedural instrument, contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure throughout its period of effectiveness (originally in its § 380 (2), then, until 31 October 2004, the expiry of which took effect of the amendment made by Act No. 539 / 2004 Coll., in its § 380 (3)), which was and continues to be designed primarily to enable the Minister of Justice, as the issuing authority, to exercise his objections in relation to decisions of the Court, not only for the benefit of the person to be issued. The complainant cannot rely on the fact that the Minister of Justice makes use of his authorisation, nor can he claim its use by any procedural means which would have to be decided [cf. Mutatis mutandis by similar reasoning in relation to § 62 of the Family Act, namely the finding of 8 July 2010 sp. zn. Therefore, a decision on the last means provided for by the law to protect its rights must always be regarded as a decision of the Supreme Court which decided on a complaint against a decision by the Regional Court on the admissibility of extradition pursuant to Paragraph 397 (1) of the Criminal Code. It is against him that the complainant must lodge a constitutional complaint if he believes that the assessment of the issue of the admissibility of extradition by the general courts has infringed his fundamental rights.

14. The consequence of the legal opinion that the decision on the last procedural remedy for the protection of the law which was to be infringed in the legal proceedings on the admissibility of extradition is already considered by the order of the Supreme Court, is also the absence of the Constitutional Court's authority to review or, in any way, to replace the legal conclusions of the General Courts on the admissibility of extradition in proceedings on a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Minister of Justice on the authorisation of extradition, and to oblige it to proceed to this effect. He would only be entitled to this in proceedings concerning a constitutional complaint directly against the order of the Supreme Court. However, if such a constitutional complaint had been lodged and the Constitutional Court had complied with it and for this reason annulled that court decision, this would have been reflected in the assessment of the constitutional complaint against the decision of the Minister of Justice. This would, in turn, cease to satisfy the necessary condition for authorisation of extradition.

15. The Constitutional Court, in its proceedings against the decision of the Minister of Justice to authorise extradition, only assesses whether all the conditions arising from the rule of law have been fulfilled for him, or whether he has committed insolence or interpretation in their assessment which would be in extreme conflict with the principles of justice. In this sense, of course, the fundamental existence of a final order by the court, which was decided that extradition was admissible, is essential. This condition would not be met if its enforceability had been postponed by the order of the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 79 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court or as a result of interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights pursuant to Article 39 of its Rules of Procedure. However, extradition could not be allowed even if the person concerned was granted international protection or the procedure for the request for extradition had not yet been definitively concluded, including any judicial review.

16. As regards the latter condition, the Czech Republic's obligation under Article 1 (2) of the Constitution to respect its obligations under international law is necessarily reflected in the decision of the Minister of Justice. The Constitutional Court has already stated in the past that, in the event of a conflict of obligations under international agreements, the priority of the obligations under the human rights agreements results mainly from the content of these agreements following Article 1 (1) of the Constitution according to which the Czech Republic is a legal State. "Respect for and protection of fundamental rights are the defining characteristics of a materially understood rule of law, therefore, where there is a contractual obligation to protect fundamental law and a contractual obligation aimed at endangering the same law, the first obligation must prevail '(cf. sp. zn. I. ÚS 752 / 02). This conclusion is also relevant in relation to the measure of the obligation resulting from the principle of non-refoulement with an obligation to extradition, i.e. the extradition of a person for prosecution or execution of a sentence in a foreign state.

17. The principle of non-refoulement is the prohibition of a State to expel or authorise the extradition of a refugee to another State in which its life or personal freedom would be threatened on the basis of its race, religion, nationality, belonging to a particular social class or political conviction (Article 33 (1) of the Convention on the Status of Refugees), or in which it would be threatened by violating its right to life (Article 2 of the Convention) or being subjected to torture or to degrading treatment or punishment (Article 33 (1) of the Convention on the Status of Refugees), e.g. the European Court of Human Rights of 12 April 2005, § 41 and 42, and of 28 February 2008 in the case of Saadi against Georgia and Russia No 36378 / 02, § 335, of 8 November 2005 in the case Bader and Kanbor v Sweden, § 13284, § 41 and of 28 February 2008 in Case of Saadi against Italy. The existence of these circumstances may be assessed independently of each other in the procedure for granting international protection under Act No. 325 / 1999 Coll., on asylum, as amended, and in the legal proceedings for the admissibility of extradition under § 397 of the Penal Code.

18. The legislature has defined the administrative procedure for granting international protection before the Ministry of the Interior and the legal proceedings for the admissibility of extradition as two separate procedures, each of which pursues a different purpose and the conduct of which is not mutually dependent. However, the result of both of them is relevant to the decision of the Minister of Justice on the extradition authorisation. The court ruling on the admissibility of extradition in the context of the assessment of individual grounds under Article 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall, in a binding manner, determine whether the person concerned has applied for international protection and the outcome of the procedure. If he had found that his request had been granted, he would have had to declare the extradition inadmissible under Paragraph 393 (b) of the Criminal Code. Otherwise, even if the application was rejected, it would not be bound by the factual or legal conclusions made in the relevant administrative procedure and the question of whether extradition would infringe the principle of non-refoulement within the meaning of Article 33 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Convention, or whether other grounds for non-extradition are given, would have to be fully assessed [Paragraph 393 (k) and (l) of the Code]. However, a situation may also arise where the administrative authority decides on the application for international protection only after the court has ruled on the admissibility of the extradition. It should be accepted that the court is not obliged to wait for the termination of the international protection procedure and that the admissibility of the extradition procedure may be decided in the course of [cf. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 26 June 2001 sp. zn. 11 Tcu 26 / 2001 (Rt 42 / 2002)]. However, it may also be due to the fact that the application for international protection will only take place at the final stage of this legal proceedings or even after its completion. In any event, the administrative authority will not be bound by the factual and legal conclusions of the Court of First Instance in the further proceedings and will be able to assess them separately in the context of international protection proceedings. The court's decision that extradition is admissible also does not prevent the administrative authority from deciding to grant international protection for reasons which the court did not consider sufficient to conclude that extradition was inadmissible.

19. For these reasons, it is clear that the person concerned has two procedures in which he or she can obtain protection from interference with his or her fundamental rights and freedoms, which would result from a non-refoulement infringement. The granting of international protection is a ground for which the court would have to declare the inadmissibility of extradition pursuant to § 393 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such a case, the Minister of Justice could not at all have decided to authorise extradition. However, extradition could not take place even if the court had stated that extradition was admissible, but the granting of international protection would have taken place only after its decision. The obligation of the Minister of Justice not to grant extradition would in such a case have to be derived directly from Article 393 (1) of the Treaty. (b) a criminal Code which clearly states the relevance of this outcome of the procedure for granting international protection for the decision to authorise extradition, as well as the fact that an assessment of the facts which could possibly justify the granting of asylum or supplementary protection to the applicant cannot be replaced by a decision by the competent administrative authority in the extradition proceedings under Article 397 of the Penal Code. It remains to be added that the Minister of Justice must take account of the additional granting of international protection, even if it is an assessment of the grounds for the inadmissibility of extradition under Paragraph 393 of the Penal Code, which is the subject of the court's judgment. However, this exemption is due to the nature of this plea of inadmissibility. In fact, both the court and the Minister of Justice merely state the existence of a decision by a public authority, which the law allows for, even after the court has ruled on the admissibility of the extradition. An interpretation that would prevent this from being regarded as a reason for the inadmissibility of extradition would also be absurd in the light of the fundamental rights and freedoms in question.

20. In contrast to the court which was able to rule on the admissibility of extradition before the termination of the international protection procedure, the Minister of Justice cannot allow extradition until such proceedings have been definitively concluded, including a possible subsequent judicial review (similar opinion, albeit for other reasons, has been found by the complainant and the Supreme Administrative Court, whose jurisdiction does not, however, include a review of the procedure of the Minister of Justice in the context of extradition proceedings; cf. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 10 August 2010 No. 4 Azs 10 / 2010-110). In a situation where the law allows both the current conduct of the international protection procedure and the admissibility of extradition proceedings, the person whose extradition is sought cannot be denied the possibility for his application for international protection to be dealt with when his outcome may be relevant to the extradition proceedings even after the court has stated that extradition is admissible. Should the Minister of Justice be able to authorise extradition before the end of the procedure for granting international protection, the examination of that person's application would in fact depend on the circumstances in question whether or not it will be issued in the course of that procedure. Thus, the Ministry of the Interior itself could, in a number of cases, achieve a situation by extending the procedure where, as a result of the issuance of the applicant, it will have to stop the procedure on its application. Such a procedure would naturally lead to an unequal status of applicants for international protection without any legitimate reason. It would be possible to recognise the characteristics of insolence, which would result in not only a breach of the right of the person to be extradited to a fair trial under Article 36 (1) of the Charter, but also an infringement of Article 43 of the Charter by which the Czech Republic has undertaken to accept and deal with asylum applications for persecution for the application of political rights and freedoms. However, such rights could not be infringed if the person to whom they were issued would have requested international protection in the course of the extradition proceedings for the same or similar reasons, i.e. without changing the applicable circumstances, repeatedly after the completion of the procedure for its first application. Its issue in these circumstances could not, by the nature of the case, have caused interference in the abovementioned rights.

21. The interpretation outlined in § 393 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is essentially the existence of a legal procedural guarantee of the principle of non-refoulement, which, in view of the existence of two proceedings, constitutes a higher but not necessary standard of protection for the related fundamental rights and freedoms. Similarly, this principle cannot be understood as meaning that the possibility of a foreigner seeking political asylum arising from Article 43 of the Charter generally takes precedence over the international obligation to extradite persons to foreign countries for the purpose of prosecuting them or the execution of prison sentences. Such a priority could, within the limits resulting from the constitutional order and the relevant international treaties which are binding on the Czech Republic, be imported in the case of a commitment arising from the non-refoulement principle already mentioned, but not even in the case of its specific procedural guarantee under the asylum procedure. Those limits of priority of the non-refoulement principle are expressed in particular in Article 1 (1). F Convention on the Status of Refugees, which excludes from the scope of this Convention a person for whom there is serious reason to believe that he has committed, for example, a crime against peace, war crime, a crime against humanity, or a serious non-political crime outside the country of his asylum before being allowed to reside there as a refugee.

22. The procedure for the application for international protection shall, as a general rule, lose its meaning if the applicant is extradited to a foreign State before its expiry, the same conclusion being made in relation to the subsequent judicial review. In this context, of course, the risk of disproportionate extension of the duration of the extradition procedure, which is linked to the condition of a decision by the Minister of Justice to authorise the issue of the abovementioned proceedings, cannot be underestimated. However, this risk cannot in itself constitute a reason for which the person for whom the extradition is sought should be denied the legal possibility of applying for international protection and, in its assessment of the existence of grounds justifying the granting of international protection and thus the inadmissibility of extradition. In particular, it is the duty of the Ministry of Interior to proceed as effectively as possible and without delay in cases where extradition proceedings are conducted and to use the means provided by the Asylum Act [e.g. Section 10a (e) or Section 16 (2) of the Asylum Act]. In this respect, the application may also be made to the procedure of the Regional Courts in the action against the relevant decision of the Ministry of Interior (Section 32 of the Administrative Code) and the Supreme Administrative Court in any subsequent appeal proceedings against the decision of the Regional Court.

23. Since the above conclusions deviate from the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court, as set out in the finds in Sections I, ÚS 752 / 02, I. ÚS 733 / 05, I. ÚS 2462 / 10 and II. ÚS 670 / 12, the III Chamber of the Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 23 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, submitted the question of the relationship between the decision of the Minister of Justice on the authorisation of extradition pursuant to Article 399 (1) of the Criminal Code and the decision of the courts on the admissibility of extradition pursuant to Article 397 of the Code, the deadline for its submission and the scope of the review of the plenary, which has identified and adopted the legal opinion in its arguments.