The Constitutional Court found No. 256 / 2010 Coll.

Motion denied.

The Constitutional Court received a proposal from a group of 25 Senators to abolish the provisions of § 68 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 114 / 1992 Coll., on the Conservation of Nature and Landscape, hereinafter referred to as "the Nature Conservation Act '.

The appellant submits that the contested provisions are contrary to Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as they do not comply with the principle of legal certainty, the principle of protecting citizens' trust in law and the principle of predictability of the consequences of legislation. The implementation of interventions to improve the state of the preserved natural environment by nature conservation authorities or third parties under the contested provisions shall not be conditional on the issue of any individual administrative act which would give the owner of the land on which the intervention is to be carried out the possibility of exercising his rights and defending his interests in a relevant manner. The Act on Nature Conservation in the cited provision provides only for the nature conservation authorities to require the owner of the land to carry out the intervention and, after a futile expiry of the intervention period (for which no criteria are laid down in the Nature Conservation Act, it may be a time limit set by the order of hours, days, months and years) to inform him that the intervention will be carried out by the nature conservation authority itself or by an authorised third party. The Act does not impose on nature conservation authorities or the obligation to specify its scope and form in the call for intervention for the owner of the land. The call for intervention will thus meet the requirements of the law even if the owner is called upon to improve the state of the preserved natural environment in general, by literally taking over the text of the law.

Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the provisions of Section 68 (3) of the Nature Conservation Act that the interventions to improve the natural environment may take, since neither the form of such interventions nor the scope nor the limits within which they may be implemented are even indicated in this nor in other provisions of the Nature Conservation Act. The Nature Conservation Act describes only the purpose of the intervention, which according to its provisions is § 68 (1) "the conservation of nature's species wealth and the maintenance of the environmental stability system." Therefore, it is not excluded that action to improve the natural environment should also take the form that is equivalent to expropriation, in the mere formal preservation of ownership.

While it can be argued that, without explicit legal regulation, the nature, scope and duration of the intervention to improve the natural environment must be chosen in such a way as to respect the principle of proportionality and, from the possible forms of intervention, to always choose only one that leads to the fulfilment of the purpose of minimising the intensity of the intervention in the existing ownership law, since the need for their application results from constitutional order. However, in view of the principle of legal certainty, leaving such broad limits for administrative discretion is unacceptable.

Interventions to improve the state of preserved natural environment carried out by nature conservation authorities or third parties pursuant to Section 68 (3) of the Nature Conservation Act are a restriction on property rights. The constitutional conformity of this conflict of private (property law) and public (nature and landscape protection) interest is, in conjunction with Article 4, in view of the content of Article 11 (4). The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, once again necessary to measure the principle of proportionality, as defined in its content by the extensive decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court, in particular its partial principle of necessity, according to which the use of only the most respectful - in relation to the fundamental rights and freedoms concerned - from several possible means, and the principle of proportionality in the narrower sense, according to which the damage to fundamental law must not be disproportionate in relation to the intended objective, i.e. measures limiting fundamental human rights and freedoms, must not go beyond, if there is a conflict of fundamental law or freedom with the public interest, its negative consequences of a positive public interest in those measures.

In this context, the applicants believe that the intensity with which the implementation of the interventions to improve the natural or landscape environment pursuant to § 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act interferes with property law does not correspond with the need to fulfil the public interest in maintaining the natural and landscape environment, as defined in § 1 of the same Act, as they are aimed not at preserving it, but at changing the state that is already in conformity with the public interest in nature and landscape conservation (the purpose of the interventions is "improving the state of preserved natural and landscape environment ').

The applicants consider that Article 11 (4) The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms also states that Paragraph 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act allows nature conservation authorities to implement a compulsory restriction on property rights without the right to grant adequate compensation. The contested provision, namely Section 68 (4) of the Nature Conservation Act, provides the owners with only a claim for compensation which will be caused in the implementation of the interventions. In addition, the refusal to grant compensation for the restriction of property rights may be justified by the arguments and contrario by reference to the provisions of § 58 (2) of the Nature Conservation Act, which links the right to compensation to the creation of situations entirely different from the implementation of measures to improve the natural and landscape conditions under § 68 (3) and (4) of the Act, systematically falling under Part Six of the Act.

In the appellants' view, when defending the constitutional conformity, paragraphs 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act cannot be argued either by reference to the third sentence of Article 11 (3) or by reference to Article 35 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The failure to intervene in order to improve the natural and landscape environment within the meaning of Article 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act cannot in any way be regarded as an exercise of property rights which would harm or harm the environment at all and which would thus be in conflict with the prohibitions contained in Articles 11 (3) and 35 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal in question to the Chamber of Deputies. In his observations, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament Ing. Miloslav Vlček stated that in the general part of the explanatory report on the draft Act of the Czech National Council No. 114 / 1992 Coll., on the conservation of nature and landscape, the Act also states that the general protection of all living fauna and flora is enshrined in the Act, that their use or interference with them must be based on legal authorisations and that the Act also regulates the obligation to prove the origin of specially protected plant and animal species. In the specific part of the explanatory memorandum, Section 68 states that, in the framework of the active conservation of nature and landscape as a manifestation of the same will of the authorities of the State protection of nature or municipalities and owners or tenants of land, agreements may be concluded on ways of improving the natural environment. These agreements may be subject to financial contributions under the provisions of Paragraph 68 (2). However, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 68 (3), interventions to improve the natural environment may also be carried out as a legitimate activity of the State Protection Authority or the natural or legal person entrusted with it. This provision is a type of measure in the absence of action, but is not exclusively linked to the prior obligation of the State Protection Authority to seek an agreement with the owner or user of the land to implement the proposed measure itself. The financial contribution is a possible money incentive to pursue and ensure the conservation objectives of nature so that the nature conservation authority does not have to use its authorisation under Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act. Paragraph 68 (3) of the Law was inserted in the original text of the Government's proposal for a provision in the context of the discussion of the draft law for the words "paragraph 1 'in the words" if the owner or tenant of the land does not do so himself'; This amendment was proposed by the constitutional committee of the Czech National Council. The law was adopted on 19 February 1992 by the necessary majority, namely 105 votes, 3 against and 4 abstentions. The Act was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared in the amount of 28 Collection of Laws, sent out on 25 March 1992. Despite the extensive amendment of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act, the contested provisions of Sections 68 (3) and (4) have not been amended to date. In this state of affairs, it cannot be said that the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the Constitution and our rule of law. At the same time, the President of the Chamber of Deputies has agreed to abandon oral proceedings.

Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. His chairman, MUDr. Premysl Sobotka, stated that, in view of the fact that the Senate started its constitutional function in December 1996, a statement on a matter which would be based on the direct negotiation and adoption of the provisions of Act No. 114 / 1992 Coll., on Nature Protection and Landscape Protection, cannot be provided by the Senate, since the legislative process linked to the adoption of the law containing the provisions in question was carried out before its establishment. None of the amendments to the Law in question which the Senate had discussed in its existence concerned the contested provisions. At the same time, the President of the Chamber has agreed to waive oral proceedings.

The Constitutional Court's appeal to the proposal was also addressed by the Ministry of the Environment, which stated above all that conservation of nature and landscape is undoubtedly of public interest. The purpose for which the provisions of Section 68 (3) and (4) have been incorporated into the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act is to ensure the conservation of nature and landscape in cases where, despite the call, the owner of the land or its lessee does not fulfil his legal obligations and thus the conservation of nature's species wealth or the maintenance of environmental stability systems is threatened. In many cases, the contested provisions are irreplaceable and their absence would have irreversible negative consequences for nature and landscape. As an example, it sets out (quite common in practice) the necessary measures against invasive species, which must be carried out in a coordinated manner to a large extent on a large number of parcels at once (for example, the intervention against the Bolshevik, the Japanese wing and other geographically non-indigenous species). The applicants claim that the implementation of the interventions is aimed not at preservation, but at a change in the state ("improvement '), which itself is already consistent with the public interest in nature and landscape conservation. Improving the state of the preserved natural and landscape environment is linked to the preservation of nature's species wealth and the maintenance of the environmental stability system, thus clearly expressing the public interest pursued by the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act (see Section 1). Paragraph 68 (1) of this Law fully corresponds to the objectives of Council Directive 92 / 43 / EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats, wild fauna and flora, with the objective of this Directive, inter alia, the conservation or restoration of a favourable conservation status of selected natural habitats and species of wild fauna and flora; in accordance with Article 3 (3) of this Directive, Member States shall endeavour to improve the ecological cohesion of the Natura 2000 system, inter alia, by developing landscape elements outside that system which are of great importance for wild animals and wild plants. The notification of the owner or tenant of the land pursuant to Section 68 (4) of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act is carried out in practice by a written call, following negotiations a protocol is drawn up on the discussion of the intention (its form follows from the internal regulations of the Nature and Landscape Agency of the Czech Republic). Although the implementation of the interventions by nature conservation authorities pursuant to Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act is not conditional on the issue of any individual administrative act, it cannot be accepted by the appellants that a situation may arise where the owner of the land becomes aware only of the implementation of the intervention, of the implementation of which particular activity was actually called upon by the nature conservation authority and of the type of intervention and to what extent it will be carried out on its land. Even the implementation of interventions to improve the natural and landscape environment is an act of the administrative authority, which is covered by Part Four of Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., the administrative order. It is therefore a formalised procedure that respects the constitutional postulate, according to which state power can only be exercised in cases, within the limits and in the ways laid down by the law. The nature conservation authority shall specify its scope and form in the call for intervention. Paragraph 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act are in practice applied in principle with the consent of the owners or tenants concerned (with the exception of a few isolated cases, this is a maximum of five cases per year). Consequently, as a result of the application of these provisions of the Nature Conservation Act, there is no forced restriction of property rights or imposition of illegal obligations. On the contrary, a number of interventions are carried out for the benefit of owners or tenants, in particular in the case of measures against invasive species. It therefore does not agree with the appellant's claim that the damage to its right of ownership is disproportionate in view of the intended objective of the intervention. In the Ministry's view, the positive effects of the intervention on nature and landscape certainly outweigh the possible negative consequences for the owner of the land, if any. It is not true that the owner of the land in question would not have been able to obtain adequate compensation for any damage that might have arisen from the intervention. On the contrary; directly in the provisions of Paragraph 68 itself, it is stated that responsibility to owners or tenants lies with the nature conservation authority. In order to minimise the potential damage to the owner, the fact that the costs of the intervention, if implemented by the nature conservation authority, are borne by that authority and not by the owner.

In reply to the opinion of the Ministry of the Environment, the applicants stated the following. They do not agree with the claim made in connection with the so-called principle of highest value that the intensity of constitutional environmental protection (together with the constitutional protection of human life and health) is always higher than the protection of other constitutional order of protected values and constitutional principles. It is not possible (with reference to the so-called principle of highest value) to resign not only for the protection of ownership, but also for other constitutional principles and rights such as political rights, personal rights, the right to a fair trial. The contested provisions allow the nature conservation authorities to intervene in an unspecified and unrestricted manner immediately (or to allow other persons to intervene directly) in the property rights of the owners of the land without any prior procedure in which the owner of the land in question would be able to exercise his rights and without providing adequate compensation for the restriction of property rights, not in the event of the removal of the illegal situation or of an existing acute threat. The compulsory restriction of property rights, which may be implemented under § 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act, is not linked to the right to compensation for the restriction of property rights; the right to compensation for damages caused in the course of the forced intervention is of an entirely different type. In the appellants' view, the argument that the contested provisions of paragraphs 68 (3) and 68 (4) of the Nature Conservation Act are in practice applied in principle with the consent of the owners or tenants concerned, except for the minor exceptions of around 5 cases per year. In the appellants' view, Article 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act is not decisive for the assessment of the constitutionality of Article 68 (3) and (4) of the Nature Conservation Act as to whether and how the powers conferred on nature conservation bodies by these provisions are actually exercised, it is decisive how they could be exercised in accordance with the applicable wording of those provisions.

Paragraph 68 (3) of Act No. 114 / 1992 Coll., on the conservation of nature and landscape, reads: "Nature conservation authorities are entitled to carry out themselves or through other interventions to improve the natural and landscape environment referred to in paragraph 1, unless they do so by calling on the nature conservation authority the owner or lessee of the land itself, in particular as regards the protection of specially protected parts of nature and significant landscape elements. '

Paragraph 68 (4) of the Act states: "The owners and tenants of the land concerned are required to bear the implementation of the interventions referred to in paragraph 3 and to allow the persons providing them to enter the land. The nature conservation authority shall inform the owners or tenants in advance of the extent and duration of the intervention. The nature conservation authority which ordered the intervention shall be responsible for any damage caused to the owners or tenants of the land in connection with these interventions. This shall be without prejudice to the responsibility of the persons carrying out these interventions. ';

The purpose of the call under Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act is to act on the owners (and tenants) of the land to carry out their own activities in order to preserve the species wealth of nature and maintain the environmental stability system and to avoid the need for the nature conservation authorities to carry out this activity themselves (or through a third party). Thus, the subsidiarity of state integrity is enshrined, which only starts if necessary (when the objective pursued cannot be achieved otherwise). In order to achieve the objective pursued by law at all (i.e. to carry out an activity to preserve the species wealth of nature and maintain the environmental stability system by the owners and landowners themselves), the logic of the matter must be specified in the call for action. otherwise, the owners of the land (s) would not know what they were actually supposed to do and the challenge would lose reasonable meaning.

The appellant's objection - that the law does not impose on nature conservation authorities or the obligation to specify in the call for intervention intended for the owner of the land its scope (form), and that the call for intervention will thus satisfy the requirements of the law even if the owner is called upon to improve the state of the preserved natural environment in general, by literal taking over the text of the law - is excluded by the nature of the case as well as the following arguments.

It cannot be borne in mind that the appellant's objection (as well as the opinion of the Minister for the Environment) that the implementation of interventions to improve the preserved natural environment by nature conservation authorities or third parties under the contested provisions is not conditional on the issue of any individual administrative act.

The challenge in question is affected by the authoritative legal sphere of the owner (tenant) of the land. As a result of the failure by the owner (lessee) of the land, the authority of the nature conservation authority (or third party) to carry out specific measures and at the same time the obligation of the owner (lessee) of the land to abide by the implementation of this measure and the obligation to allow the persons providing it to enter the land. Thus, the right of ownership (as the measure foresees that the nature conservation authorities or their designated third parties will make adjustments, which otherwise belong to the owner exclusively within the meaning of Section 123 of the Civil Code), the right to privacy, the integrity of the dwelling, the autonomy of the will, etc. There is also an obligation on the nature conservation authority to inform owners (tenants) of the extent and duration of the implementation of the measures. By delivering a call under the contested provision, the owner (tenant) of the land is obliged to carry out specific measures (in order to preserve the species wealth of nature and maintain the environmental stability system). The actual content and importance of the call (decision in the material sense) does not change anything either by its legislator (inaccurately), i.e. "challenge '(not" buyer').

The call is therefore an individual administrative act. It is therefore an applicable administrative order (including the obligations of the administrative authority's decision, including, inter alia, the clarification of the requested measure - cf. the previous objection), offering the owner (lessee) of the land a procedural protection of its substantive rights, taking into account later judicial protection, which is consistent with the fundamental right of the individual under Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to seek protection of his right before a court and other body, and which also corresponds to Article 4 The Constitution of the Czech Republic guarantees that the fundamental rights of individuals are protected by judicial authority (cf. also compliance with Articles 6 (1) and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).

Furthermore, the appellant contends that the provisions of Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act do not give rise to any form of intervention to improve the natural environment, since the form of these interventions, nor their scope or limits in which they may be implemented, are not even indicated in this or other provisions of the Nature Conservation Act. The Nature Conservation Act describes only the purpose of the intervention, which according to its provisions is § 68 (1) "the conservation of nature's species wealth and the maintenance of the environmental stability system."

In principle, the Constitutional Court agrees with the premise that the provisions of Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act cannot be inferred from the form of intervention to improve the natural environment, but this cannot be regarded as unconstitutional. This premise arises from the nature of the matter, it is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective pursued to preserve the species's wealth of nature and maintain a system of environmental stability (in this respect, the text below), so it is constitutionally conformist. It is not possible and priori to formulate (into the law) the form (all) of conceivable measures in order to preserve the species wealth of nature and maintain the system of environmental stability that practical life brings. After all, a similar methodology is based on legislative use, for example, of so-called indeterminate terms, the specific content of which is fulfilled by the application activity of the administrative authorities, without this in the legal state of violation of constitutional order (e.g. legal certainty); otherwise it would be impossible to effectively implement public administration. In this, in a sense, there is a broader idea of a way out, the so-called doctrine of skepticism about standards; not all the rules of conduct, legal concepts can be formulated for futuro (precisely), therefore, for certain types of cases - because of their nature - they formulate above all the principles, objectives which the courts and state authorities then put into life application activities.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently held that the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union are bound by the principle of equal treatment.

Finally, if the appellant contends that the general wording in Section 68 (3) of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act allows for restrictions on property rights in the intensity of expropriation, in the mere formal preservation of property rights, it is sufficient to briefly point out Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms according to which expropriation is permissible in the public interest, on the basis of the law and for compensation.

The appellant further contends that the intensity with which the implementation of the interventions to improve the natural or landscape environment pursuant to § 68 (3) and (4) of Law No 114 / 1992 Coll. interferes with the need to fulfil the public interest in the conservation of the natural and landscape environment, as defined in § 1 of the same Act, as it is aimed not at conservation, but at a change in the state which itself already complies with the public interest in the conservation of nature and landscape.

However, the Constitutional Court states that the intervention in question is aimed precisely at preserving (from an environmental point of view) the state of the art, since according to Section 68 (1) of the Nature Conservation Act, the purpose of the intervention is to "preserve the species's wealth and maintain the environmental stability system '. The appellant does not contradict the purpose of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act, as set out in Paragraph 1 and the purpose set out in Paragraph 68 (1). According to the provisions of Section 1, the purpose of the Act is..." to contribute to maintaining and restoring the natural balance in the landscape, to protecting the diversity of life forms, natural values and beauty, to the gentle management of natural resources and to create a Natura 2000 system in accordance with the law of the European Communities in the Czech Republic. "This more generally formulated purpose of the Act is specified by the various following provisions of the Nature Conservation Act (a traditional legislative-technical method), inter alia, in Section 68 (1) of the Act, which declares the purpose of" preserving the species wealth of nature and maintaining the environmental stability system. "

It cannot thus be borne in mind by the appellant's objection that the intervention under Section 68 of the Act cited is aimed only at a change in the state of the art which, in itself, is already considered satisfactory in view of the purpose of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act. If that were the case, Section 68 of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act would not have a reasonable meaning. It is logical that the passage of time (and other factors such as nature) may gradually cause damage to species wealth and environmental stability (property owners, tenants), or even to the threat to their existence, and therefore to the environmental situation. Therefore, the contested provision provides for an obligation for landowners and landowners to improve (as far as possible) the state of the preserved natural and landscape environment so that (in the future) the condition is not affected, only which is environmentally favourable. This is about the level of prevention, but not just about it, because § 68 of the quoted law is headed - logically - all the more to a situation where the species wealth and environmental stability system on the land of owners and tenants (arg. and minori ad maius) has already been affected. This is a legitimate, constitutionally conformal objective (public interest) for the protection of the environment (after all, environmental protection is explicitly declared as constitutional value in Articles 11 (3) and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms).

The appellant's objection also goes against Council Directive 92 / 43 / EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora:... "the conservation, conservation and improvement of the quality of the environment, including the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, is an essential objective in the general interest of the Community, as referred to in Article 130r of the Treaty... the conservation of biodiversity may, in certain cases, require the maintenance or direct promotion of certain human activities... it is necessary, according to a set timetable, to declare specific areas of protection in order to establish a continuous European ecological network in order to ensure the protection or conservation of natural habitats and species in the interest of the Community in an adequate state of conservation... The measures taken pursuant to this Directive shall aim to maintain or restore a favourable conservation status for natural habitats, species of wild fauna and flora in the interest of the Community... Member States shall, where they consider it necessary, endeavour to improve the ecological cohesion of NATURA 2000 by maintaining and, where appropriate, developing landscape elements that are of decisive importance for wild animals and wild plants... '.

Finally, the appellant sees an infringement of the constitutional rule that the contested provisions allow the nature conservation authorities to implement a compulsory restriction on property rights without the right to grant adequate compensation. The contested provision, namely § 68 (4) of the Act cited, provides the owners with only a claim for compensation which will be caused in the implementation of the interventions.

Nor did the Constitutional Court find that objection justified.

Article 11 (4) The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms states that "Expropriation or forced restriction of property rights is possible in the public interest, by law and for compensation." Therefore, if there is a real (de facto) restriction of ownership, the owner has a fundamental right to compensation for it, which also applies fully to the case under assessment. The purpose of Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is that, where ownership is restricted in the interest of the public, in the interest of the company (i.e. not solely in the interest of the owner), it is reasonable and fair that the restriction on ownership is compensated by the body for which the restriction is granted, i.e. by the company (through the State). It is not fair to require that the "cost" of a company should be borne only by the owner whose legal (ownership) sphere is limited.

However, this requirement is met by the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act.

In order to implement measures within the meaning of Article 68 (1) of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act, it is possible to conclude an agreement between the owners (tenants) of the land and the nature protection authority on the basis of which the owners (tenants) of the land undertake to refrain from certain activities or carry out certain work. According to Article 69 of the Act cited, "financial contribution '(" eligible') belongs to the owner (tenants) (the text must be interpreted in a constitutional manner in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, i.e. as a financial contribution). This "financial contribution 'is, in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, necessary to consider as (inter alia) compensation for restrictions on property rights; This implies that at least the full amount of the restriction on property rights, i.e. any property damage, must be replaced.

Paragraph 69 of the Nature and Landscape Protection Act - that is to say, the need to pay a "financial contribution 'or compensation for the limitation of property rights - must also be extended to the case where, although a written agreement is not concluded (foreseen in Paragraph 68 (2)), the owner (tenant) of the land will carry out a measure within the meaning of Article 68 (1) of the Act cited. In this case, too, the right of ownership will be restricted; take appropriate action (whether actively or passively, i.e. by delaying a particular activity), the difference from the previous paragraph being only in the form - whether a written contract exists for the implementation of the measure. Even can argue a mine ad maius; If a claim for compensation is made in the event of the conclusion of a written agreement and subsequent implementation of the measure in question, all the more so must be entitled to compensation in the event of the implementation of the relevant measure in the absence of a written agreement (for example, the owner of the land will meet the requirement of the nature conservation authority, without insisting on its formalisation in the form of a written contract).

Finally, the possibility of limiting ownership remains in a situation where the owner, for a reason (e.g. for subjective or objective reasons, is not satisfied with the content of the proposed agreement pursuant to Article 68 (2) of Act 114 / 1992 Coll., on Nature and Landscape Protection, as amended by Act 218 / 2004 Coll.), does not enter into a written agreement or implement the relevant measure without a written agreement; This is therefore a possible case of the implementation of the competence of the nature conservation body under Section 68 (4) of the Nature and Landscape Conservation Act to implement the measure itself or through another [if the owner (tenant) is inactive]. However, even in this case, the legal regulation complies with the imperative laid down in Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

The Constitutional Court has already dealt with a similar issue, for example, in the finding of page IV. ÚS 652 / 06 of 21 November 2007 (N 202 / 47 CollNU 613 *), in which it stated that "The legislature may provide for restrictions on the exercise of ownership rights and did so in the cited provision of the Water Act, by imposing an obligation on the owners of the land adjacent to the water works to allow entry to other persons for the purpose. At the same time, however, he has agreed that this can only happen after prior discussion with them. This condition implies the conduct of the two parties, but it clearly cannot, in all cases, expect an agreement to be reached not only on the way, time, scope and other circumstances of the passage. It can therefore be considered that, in the event of a failure to reach agreement, any dispute must be settled by the court following an action (unless it concerns the competence of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Water Authority within the meaning of Section 53 of the Water Act). Thus, the provision cited does not in any way imply that the entry into and to some extent the use of foreign land should be sustained without compensation" (foreseen by Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms).

Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms refers, in the term "compensation ', to compensation for any damage to the owner caused by the restriction of its right of ownership.

In accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and in accordance with the previous case law of the Constitutional Court, it is therefore necessary to interpret Article 68 (4) of the Third Act on Nature and Landscape Protection in such a way that, in addition to the right to compensation, the latter's constitutional right to compensation for the limitation of its right to property is laid down.

It may be accepted that the proposed repeal of the contested provisions (in particular, the case of sub-cases IV. D /) would probably enable the new legislation to be formulated in such a way as to eliminate the ambiguity of that provision in relation to the issue currently under consideration. In this context, however, the Constitutional Court must emphasise that the reasons for the unconstitutional nature of the rule of law are not, in principle, any interpretative difficulties in interpreting the law. If the provision of legislation in certain situations does not provide a clear language response, this does not necessarily mean unconstitutional in itself. The scope of such interpretation and its importance is undoubtedly greater where the application of legal regulations is concerned, which are not entirely satisfactory in text, but are not in substance even unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court, while respecting the principle of minimisation of interventions, can only repeat what it has already judged in its finding of 3 February 1999 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 98 (N 19 / 13 CollNU 131; 38 / 1999 Coll.) that: "Of the many conceivable interpretations of the law, only one that respects constitutional principles (if such an interpretation is possible) must be used, and the repeal of the provisions of the law on non-constitutionality only, if the provision in question does not apply without violating the constitutionality (the principle of minimisation of intervention)." (cf. Case of the Constitutional Court of 3 February 1999 sp.

The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that there is a possibility of a constitutional interpretation of the contested provisions. In order to ensure legal certainty as well as to protect the right of ownership, the current wording of the contested provisions shall be sufficient. From the point of view of de lehferend, it would be appropriate to make a clearer wording of the contested provisions, but the Constitutional Court cannot, however, ignore the fact that de lejferend is the decision of the de lejferend, so it has no choice but to state that the contested provisions cannot be characterised as unconstitutional unless their wording excludes a fully constitutional interpretation.

In view of the above, The Constitutional Court did not find the application for annulment of the contested provisions of Act No. 114 / 1992 Coll., on Nature and Landscape Protection, justified, therefore it rejected it pursuant to Paragraph 70 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.