The Constitutional Court found No 210 / 2003 Coll.

1. Paragraph 12a (5) of the Second Law No 328 / 1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settlement, as amended, expressed in the word "cash," shall be deleted from the date of the declaration of the finding in the Collection of Laws.

2. The remainder is rejected.

On 2 December 2002, the Constitutional Court received the application of the 29th Chamber of the Supreme Court requesting the annulment of the provisions of § 12a (5) of the Second Act No. 328 / 1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settlement, as amended by Act No. 122 / 1993 Coll., No. 42 / 1994 Coll., No. 74 / 1994 Coll., No. 117 / 1994 Coll., No. 156 / 1994 Coll., No. 224 / 1994 Coll., No. 84 / 1995 Coll., No. 214 / 2000 Coll., No. 368 / 2000 Coll., No. 370 / 2000 Coll., and No. 120 / 2001 Coll.

The appellant stated that under sp. zn. 29 Odo 184 / 2001, the creditor's claim against the order of the Supreme Court in Prague dated 26.1.2001 No 2 Ko 172 / 2000-32 in a case brought before the Regional Court in Pilsen under sp. zn. 26 K 72 / 2000 [the debtor's application, G. and C. C. a. in liquidation, hereinafter referred to as the debtor, to declare bankruptcy]. When discussing this request, the appellant concluded that the law to be applied in the matter is contrary to the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). Therefore, according to the provisions of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (4) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, its annulment is required.

The following reasons have been given to this motion by the Supreme Court. The debtor's liquidator lodged an application with the Regional Court in Pilsen on 27 September 2000 for bankruptcy of the debtor's assets, stating that the company is overindebted and has no assets. By order of 4 October 2000 No 26 K 72 / 2000-12, the Regional Court rejected the application for bankruptcy of the debtor's assets for lack of assets. That decision was challenged by the appeal of the creditor No. o. b., a. s.

The appellant submits that the provisions of § 12a (5) of the bankruptcy and settlement law confer a right to appeal against the order rejecting the application for a declaration of bankruptcy for lack of assets to the parties to the proceedings, if they are the appellant and the other appellants and the creditor, who will prove that he has a cash claim on the debtor. It is based on the standard interpretation of the participation at the first stage of the bankruptcy proceedings brought by judicial practice on the basis of the opinion of the Civil and Commercial College of the Supreme Court, published under No 52 / 1998. According to that opinion, neither the bankruptcy procedure nor the appropriate provision of § 90 ° S. CS of the Act on bankruptcy and settlement has a separate provision defining the parties to the proceedings, and the group of parties is further defined by the indication of the persons to submit the application (further motion) for a declaration of bankruptcy. It is therefore not appropriate to define the participant in the insolvency proceedings in a different way. However, neither the provisions of § 12a (5) of the Second Law on bankruptcy and compensation (hereinafter referred to as "the contested sentence ') nor any other provision of the Act cited in this connection provide any answer to certain fundamental questions. First of all, it is not possible to establish from when the period of appeal for the persons referred to in that provision is elapsed. The resolution against which they are to appeal shall not be delivered to them. It is also not clear when this deadline will expire. In addition, it may be doubtful whether such appellants are subject to the status of the proceedings at the time when their appeal is brought to the court. The bankruptcy and settlement law expressly provides for the other appellants in Paragraph 4 (4). It is alleged that this creates room for proceedings before the Court of Appeal (contrary to the principle of two instances of proceedings) to become proceedings at first instance. In fact, the law of appeal does not admit to anyone who claims to be a creditor of the debtor, but only to when the claim against the debtor is substantiated. It is clear that by lodging an appeal, the person concerned becomes a party to the appeal proceedings. However, if it does not submit a further proposal at the same time (Section 4 (4) of the bankruptcy and settlement law), it is not clear how and with what procedural rights and obligations it will participate in the new proceedings before the Court of First Instance if it succeeds, the negative decision will be annulled and the case returned to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.

The appellant therefore submits that the contested provision is contrary to Article 1 of the Constitution and Article 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter). The above doubts lead the appellant to the conclusion that the contested sentence is contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The principle of equality of participants is, in his view, distorted by the fact that the contested sentence results in a different treatment of the parties to the insolvency proceedings. However, the different treatment is not supported by any legal aspect that would justify it. Finally, it also submits that a person who, as a creditor with a cash claim on the debtor, enters the proceedings only by lodging an appeal against the order of refusal to declare bankruptcy for lack of property, either becomes a participant in the insolvency proceedings only for his appeal stage, or becomes the same party as the other appellant in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 (4) of the bankruptcy and settlement law (even for proceedings before the Court of First Instance after the appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance following its appeal). In both cases, however, the appellant, which is another appellant, must, according to the sentence under appeal, prove his legitimacy by "proving 'a cash claim on the debtor. The Court of Appeal thus takes the role of the Court of First Instance at the same time (one-time examination of whether the appellant is a creditor of the debtor, without considering that the only factual argument on the basis of which, in the appeal proceedings, the order of refusal of the application for bankruptcy for lack of property may still be removed may consist in rebutting the conclusion on the apparent ownership of the debtor). Contrary to the appellant, which is another appellant, the appellant, according to the sentence under appeal, is not limited in its procedural rights to the state of the proceedings at the time when its appeal was brought to the court (that restriction is not imposed by the law on him, although his need may be of importance after the appeal by the Court of First Instance in a renewed proceedings before the Court of First Instance).

According to § 69 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, the Constitutional Court requested comments from the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as parties to the proceedings on the present proposal.

President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic ("the Chamber of Deputies') PhDr. Lubomír Zaorálek stated on the proposal that the contested provision of § 12a (5) of the Second Act on bankruptcy and settlement was included in the law on the basis of a proposal by Ms Eva Dundáček by Act No. 105 / 2000 Coll., which took effect on 1 May 2000 (House Press No. 219). The reason for the inclusion of that provision was to extend the range of persons entitled to appeal against the order rejecting the application for bankruptcy because of the lack of the assets of the creditor who had not yet been involved in the bankruptcy proceedings. In cases where, for example, bankruptcy is proposed only by the debtor and his application is rejected for the reasons set out above, his creditors did not have the status of parties and could therefore not challenge the relevant order by appeal. The appeal and the subsequent annulment of the order rejecting the application for bankruptcy because of the lack of assets is appropriate when creditors are able to mark any assets which may be declared bankrupt. The amendment to the law therefore brought about this possibility of appeal. The creditor who has a claim against the debtor shall be entitled to appeal. Under the same conditions as a creditor who would seek a declaration of bankruptcy himself, he shall certify it. The contested sentence was already part of the parliamentary proposal and did not change when it was discussed in the Committee on Constitutional and Economic Affairs or at second reading. Also in the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, which had no reservations about the bill referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, which in the final vote was accepted by the Chamber of Deputies. The legislature was based on the purpose of the law and the objectives of bankruptcy proceedings and was convinced that it complied with the requirement of compliance with international treaties pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution, the Constitution and the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. According to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the Constitution, the constitutional order and the rule of law. It leaves the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of that provision.

The President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Senate") doc. Dr. Petr Pithart also first described in his opinion the procedure for approving Act No. 105 / 2000 Coll., amending and supplementing Act No. 328 / 1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settlement, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 105 / 2000 Coll." or "the Act") and which included the contested sentence in the Act on bankruptcy and settlement. It states that the amendments by the Senate did not affect the provision in question and it can therefore be concluded that the Senate acted in the belief that the contested sentence is in line with the Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. With regard to the ius naturale, he believes that the practice has shown the need to strengthen the principle of equality between the participants in bankruptcy proceedings and the need to remove a differentiated approach to them. However, the question remains whether the body which has not joined the proceedings should be entitled to appeal against the decision rejecting the application for bankruptcy. In addition to the proposal, it doubts whether, in a situation where only some creditors are involved, the so-called "fraudulent bankruptcy" can be established for the bankruptcy court. In this context, the appellant also points out the above-mentioned position of the Supreme Court.

The Constitutional Court first examined, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, whether the law in respect of which the appellant objects to the unconstitutionality of its provisions had been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by a constitutional procedure. From the observations of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as from the relevant parliamentary press, and from the data on the voting process, the Constitutional Court found that the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill at its 21st meeting of 28 January 2000, when the 152 Members and Members present spoke out 128 and one opposed it. The Senate discussed the bill at its 16th meeting on 1 March 2000 and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies as amended. Of the 53 senators and senators present, 52 voted in favour. No one was against it. The Chamber of Deputies renegotiated the bill on 4 April 2000 at its 24th meeting. In favour of the bill approved by the Senate, 181 Members and Members 98 voted in favour and 81 against. The motion was accepted. The President of the Czech Republic signed the Act on 17 April 2000. The approved law was delivered to the Prime Minister for signature on 19.4.2000. The Act was published in the Collection of Laws on 25 April 2000 in the amount of 32 under No 105 / 2000 Coll. It was thus adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution provided for in the competence, in compliance with the rules laid down in Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.

Since further clarification of the case could not be expected from the oral hearing, the Court of First Instance asked the parties whether they accepted the waiver (Paragraph 44 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll.) that if they did not send an explicit statement to the Constitutional Court within the prescribed time limit, the court would assume that it would accept the waiver of the oral hearing.

The President of the Chamber of Deputies has already informed the Constitutional Court in his observations on the proposal to accept the hearing without oral hearing. The President of the Senate also informed by letter dated 13.6.2003 that he had agreed to waive the oral procedure. Since, prior to the determination of a possible date of publication of this finding, it was not established for certain whether the Constitutional Court's question under the provisions of § 44 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., was actually received by the appellant, this was verified by a telephone request on 24 June 2003. The appellant informed the Constitutional Court that it agreed to waive the oral procedure (cf. Official record of 24.6.2003). He no longer spoke to the question in writing.

In the present situation, the Constitutional Court considered that the conditions laid down in § 44 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. were fulfilled and waived oral proceedings.

The appellant seeks the annulment of the provisions of § 12a (5) of the Second Law on bankruptcy and settlement, under which "Against the order to reject the application for bankruptcy for lack of property, the creditor may also appeal to prove that the debtor has a cash claim '.

According to Article 1 (1) of the bankruptcy and settlement law, the purpose of this law is to organise the property ratios of the debtor who is bankrupt. The arrangement of the debtor's assets must in particular understand the settlement of the debtor's creditors' claims under the conditions laid down by law. Also the amendment to the Act on bankruptcy and settlement (Act No. 105 / 2000 Coll.) aims to strengthen the position of creditors, among other things. The legitimate objective of providing increased protection for creditors' assets is not even beyond the contested sentence as it strengthens the procedural position of creditors who have not yet been involved in bankruptcy proceedings and could not challenge the resolution rejecting the application for a lack of assets by appeal.

The appellant first sees in the contested sentence a contradiction with Article 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, according to which all parties are equal. As stated by the Constitutional Court in its recent finding, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 02 (found under No 101 / 2003 Coll. and will be published in the Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 29, Found No 33), in which he also dealt with the issue of the equality of participants in bankruptcy proceedings in other contexts, the provision of the Charter is intended to guarantee equal procedural rights and obligations of specific participants in a particular procedure. However, with its proposal, the appellant seeks abstract control of the contested standards, albeit against the background of a particular case. It is only known to the Constitutional Court in a mediocre manner, and it is not naturally his job to deal with it in any way in this proceedings. Therefore, the present proposal was examined by the Constitutional Court by the Prime Minister of Article 96 (1) of the Constitution, which sets out the general principle of equality between the parties in the same proceedings.

The Constitutional Court, by its finding in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 02, complied with the appellant by finding that the legislature had unacceptably granted various procedural rights and obligations to parties to the same proceedings. In addition, the Constitutional Court has not found the possibility of overcoming the inconstitutionality of the contested provision (Section 24 (4) of the bankruptcy and settlement law) by an interpretation which would be constitutionally conformal.

The appellant contends that the contested sentence is, on the one hand, vague and infringes the principle of legal certainty and, on the other hand, results in different treatment of the parties to the insolvency proceedings. It does not define the beginning of the period for lodging an appeal against the order by which the court rejected the application for bankruptcy for lack of assets and does not determine the status of the persons entitled to appeal after its annulment. Contrary to the appellant, which is another appellant, the appellants must, pursuant to the second sentence of Paragraph 12a (5) of the Second Act on bankruptcy and compensation, demonstrate their legitimacy to lodge an appeal by "supporting 'a cash claim on the debtor. The contested sentence also does not mention whether and in what way the rights of such persons are limited by the fact that they enter the proceedings only in this part. According to the appellant, pursuant to § 12a (5) of the Second Act on bankruptcy and compensation, the appellants are not limited in their procedural rights to the state of the proceedings at the time when their appeal was brought to the court because they are not subject to such a restriction (contrary to" other applicants').

The objection relating to the uncertainty of the text of the contested sentence is linked to the requirement for the predictability of the law. As a general rule, the indeterminity of a provision of legislation must be regarded as contradictory to the requirement of legal certainty and hence the rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution), only if the intensity of such uncertainty excludes the possibility of determining its normative content by means of the usual interpretative procedures [cf. In other words, a certain degree of uncertainty is a logical consequence of the nature of the rule of law as a general measure governing the conduct of legal entities. The Constitutional Court recalls the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR '), according to which the required degree of accuracy of the law depends mainly on the nature of the relations it regulates, but also on the number and nature of its addressees. It is considered natural that the courts" complement "legal standards that cannot explicitly take into account the richness of relations and situations to be applied. However, the degree of accuracy and predictability of the law must be significantly higher where the law specifically allows public power to be incorporated into the rights and freedoms of the individual and opens up the scope for its unacceptable insolence, and in particular where public power is used in secret, without public supervision (see the ECLP finding in the Kruslin case against France, 1990, § 30).

The wider subject matter of the adjustment of the contested sentence (bankruptcy proceedings) does not give rise to any increased claims from the above aspects, so that it can be legitimately expected from the court that the possible ambiguity can be removed by interpretation.

The Constitutional Court considers that the appellant's objections can be largely overcome by a constitutional interpretation. The basis for his interpretation was the following. It is not possible to rely primarily on the assumption that the legislator, when adopting the provisions of § 12a (5) of the second Act on bankruptcy and compensation, had the intention to infringe Article 96 (1) of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that, by providing protection for the assets of a group of creditors who, on the basis of that group, will appeal against the decision to refuse bankruptcy for lack of assets and prove that they have a cash claim on the debtor, it would at the same time intend to grant him an unjustifiably different procedural position from that of the group of other creditors. This constitutionally conformal conjecture is evidenced by other parts of the text of the law. For example, the creditor who submits an application for bankruptcy must prove that he has a claim against the debtor (Article 4 (2) of the bankruptcy and settlement law). The same condition must also be met by the other appellant who accedes to the proceedings and who makes an application for bankruptcy before the court decides to declare bankruptcy (Paragraph 4 (4) in conjunction with Section 4 (2) of the bankruptcy and settlement law).

Therefore, the appellant's argument, based on a logical interpretation argument and contrario, that the unconstitutional nature of the contested sentence is, inter alia, not to determine the status of the person entitled to appeal after the annulment of the order by which the court rejected the application for bankruptcy for lack of assets and does not determine in what way the rights of those persons are limited by the fact that they enter the proceedings only at this stage, contrary to the explicit regulation of those issues in relation to "other applicants'. That argument cannot succeed in competing with a legitimate presumption that the legislator did not intend to legalise in a constitutional non-conformal manner and the obligation of the courts to achieve a constitutional interpretation in the proceedings. In the past, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that, in a situation where a provision of legislation allows for various interpretations, one of which is in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Czech Republic, while others are in conflict with them, there is no reason to repeal that provision. The task of all state bodies in the situation is to interpret the provision in question in a constitutional way [cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 96 (the finding was published under No 286 / 1996 Coll. and the Order of the Constitutional Court, Volume 6, No. 98)]. Although the law does not explicitly provide in the contested sentence that the creditor exercising the right of appeal is limited by the state of the proceedings at the time of its accession, it cannot be concluded that this situation is not limited. On the contrary, in accordance with the requirement of constitutionally consistent interpretation, it should be considered that a creditor who makes an appeal pursuant to the provisions of § 12a (5) of the Second Act on bankruptcy and settlement shall enter into the proceedings by lodging an appeal before an already pending bankruptcy proceedings in a similar manner to" other applicants' who also enter the proceedings after the beginning of the procedure. It should therefore be applied by analogy to the provisions of Paragraph 4 (2) of the part of the sentence behind the semicolon, according to which the state of the proceedings applies to the other applicant at the time of his accession.

It is also possible to remove the doubts of the parties to the appeal period by means of a formal interpretation. Proceedings shall be considered as a whole, including appeal proceedings. Where it can be found that the appellant is entering the proceedings under way as a party to the proceedings with equal rights, he shall only be allowed a period of time to lodge an appeal until the procedure for the application for bankruptcy is still pending. The appeal may therefore be lodged only within a period to be calculated from the date of service of the judgment of the Court of First Instance (last) to the party concerned. The same conclusions are reached in principle both by Z. Krčmář himself in his commentary on the Act on bankruptcy and settlement (IFEC Praha, 2000, p. 38) and by the authors of the comments JUDr. Ing. Jaroslav Zelenka, Ph.D., and JUDr. Jolana Maršíková (Act on bankruptcy and settlement, commentary, LINDE Praha, a. s., 2002, p. 316).

The appellant further submits that the creditors who joined the proceedings may, in accordance with the provisions of the first sentence of § 12a (5) of the bankruptcy and settlement law, lodge an appeal without taking into account whether the claim is substantiated. If, by this argument, the appellant seeks to base its conclusions on the unconstitutional disadvantage of creditors who have not joined the proceedings and who, on the contrary, have to substantiate their claims on appeal (§ 12a (5) second sentence), it cannot be accepted. Any creditor who makes a claim for bankruptcy (Section 4 (2) of the bankruptcy and settlement law) has an obligation to prove his claim. If the same obligation is imposed on the specific category of creditors and the contested sentence, it is not proof of inequality, but rather equality within the category of creditors. The appellant's objection clearly relates not to the second sentence of Paragraph 12a (5), but to the sentence of the first of the same paragraphs and of the same paragraph, which prima facie allows "other appellants" within the meaning of Article 4 (4) of the bankruptcy and settlement law, which will set up its participation in the bankruptcy proceedings only after the relevant order has been issued, to bring an appeal against it without supporting its claim. However, the appellant did not contest this first sentence and the Constitutional Court has no reason to examine its interpretation specifically.

The Constitutional Court therefore did not agree with the arguments put forward by the appellant in the present proposal. It points out, however, that, according to its settled case law, it is bound only by the petition for initiating the procedure. However, it is not bound by its reasoning. Therefore, it is not contrary to its mission to examine the contested provision from other aspects [cf., e.g. the I. ÚS 89 / 94 (the finding was published in the Collection of Finances and Order of the Constitutional Court, Volume 2, Found No 58)]. In addition to the arguments set out in the present proposal, he therefore also addressed the contested sentence from the point of view that the creditor should, at the same time as the appeal, demonstrate his claim, which must be a cash claim. It also took into account the possible violations of the ratified and declared international treaties on human rights and freedoms by which the Czech Republic is bound. As already stated in its finding, inter alia, in its sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 36 / 01 (found under No 403 / 2002 Coll. and published in the Collection of Finals and Resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 26, Found No 80), the constitutional establishment of the General Incorporation Standard, thereby overcoming the dualistic concept of the relationship between international and national law (Constitutional Law No 395 / 2001 Coll.), cannot be interpreted in the sense that it would lead to the elimination of the reference point of the ratified and declared international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms for the assessment of national law by the Constitutional Court, with possible derogatory consequences. The scope of the concept of constitutional order cannot be interpreted solely with regard to Article 112 (1) of the Constitution, but also with regard to Article 1 (2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court confirmed this conclusion in another of its decision-making practice [cf. sp. zn. I. ÚS 752 / 02 (the finding will be published in the Collection of Found and Order of the Constitutional Court, Volume 30)].

The Constitutional Court reiterates one of the main objectives of the bankruptcy and settlement law, which is to protect the rights of creditors of the debtor who is in bankruptcy. Under the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the bankruptcy and settlement law, the debtor or any creditor is entitled to apply for bankruptcy. The creation of a bankruptcy situation (Paragraph 1 (2)) is linked indiscriminately to the obligations of the debtor or creditors in cash or in non-money. Only required to be "payable '. Using the teleological and systematic interpretation of the bankruptcy and settlement law (Section 1 (2) is included in its" preliminary provisions'), a group of creditors is subject to the condition of "maturity 'of their claims within the meaning of the contested sentence.

Any natural or legal person shall have the right to use his property peacefully (Article 1 (1) of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, hereinafter referred to as the Additional Protocol). The use of rights and freedoms granted by the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must be ensured without discrimination based on any reason such as sex, race, skin colour, language, religion, political or other thinking, national or social origin, membership of a national minority, property, gender or other status (Article 14 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).

The "payable claim 'is a property value within the meaning of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol, as it fulfils the conditions laid down by the ECHR case-law on the concept of" legitimate expectations', which the creditor must have that his claim against the debtor will be realised and transformed into an effective exercise of property rights (the claim is fully detailed, up-to-date and enforceable) (see, for example, the decision on acceptability in Malhouse versus the Czech Republic of 13.12.2000, Part B; Gratzinger and Gratzinger against the Czech Republic of 10.7.2002, § 68 and 72).

In view of the established guarantees of the right to use and the protection of property, and the right not to be discriminated against peacefully while enjoying the right to use its property, it is not possible to accept that only creditors with due "cash" claims could be creditors entitled under the bankruptcy and settlement law. Creditors with non-cash claims cannot be dependent on the stage of the proceedings after the announcement of the bankruptcy, as Dr. Zelenka and Dr. Maršíková argue in their comments, p. 18. Their position would be discriminatory in relation to creditors with claims on money, as it would unjustifiably favour the protection of cash assets compared with non-cash assets. The relevant provisions of the bankruptcy and compensation law should be interpreted in accordance with the guaranteed rights of all creditors. The contested sentence, which admits the right to appeal against the order rejecting the application for bankruptcy because of a lack of assets specifically only to creditors with a claim of a cash nature, places creditors who are only able to prove a claim of a non-cash nature at a disadvantage. This introduces an inequality between creditors within the meaning of the contested provision which is not reasonably justified and of a discriminatory nature. Given the explicitly stated condition of the monetary nature of the claim, there is no room for its constitutionally consistent interpretation. The same view of the parties to the discriminatory nature of the contested sentence in that regard was also reached by Z. Krčmář in his comments on this law, although he did not apply it in the present proposal (Krčmář, Z.: Act on bankruptcy and settlement, IFEC Praha, 2000, p. 38).

The Constitutional Court therefore, for the reasons set out above for contradiction with the provisions (Article 1 (1) of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 14 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the contested provision of § 12a (5), second sentence, of the Act on bankruptcy and settlement, expressed in the word "cash ', pursuant to § 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, repeals the date of the declaration of findings in the Collection of Laws. In the remainder, he rejected the proposal in the light of the above considerations (Paragraph 70 (2) of the Act cited).

According to Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the judge JUDr. Eliška Wagner took a different view on the decision.