The Constitutional Court found No. 181 / 2012 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court of 3 May 2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 11 on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state institutions and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended
Valid
181
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 3 May 2012, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 11 in plenary composed of František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Vladimir Krórka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jan Musil, Jiří Mucha, Jiří Nykodém, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Dobrný and Michaela Židlická on the proposal of the Municipal Court in Brno to abolish the provisions of point 2 of Article 2. Part of First Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain other requirements of the prosecutors and on the amendment and addition of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll., on the salary and remuneration of the duty in the budget and in certain other organizations and bodies, as amended by Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other matters relating to the function of the representatives of the State Government and of certain judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll.
as follows:
I. The provisions contained in Article 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., and expressed in the words "2.5 times" shall be repealed with effect from 31 December 2012.
II. Paragraph 3b (2) of the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities connected with the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., shall be deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.
III. The remainder is rejected.
Reasons
Definition and recap of the proposal
On 3 November 2011, the Constitutional Court received a request from the Municipal Court in Brno to abolish the provisions of Article 2 (2) of the Treaty. I part of the First Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain other requirements of the state's prosecutors and on the amendment of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll., on the salary and remuneration for the duty of office in the budget and in certain other organizations and bodies, as amended, on the salary and other matters connected with the performance of the officials of the State's courts and of certain judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 305 / 2002 Coll. The proposal in question was supplemented by the appellants' submissions received by the Constitutional Court on 8 November 2011 and 26 March 2012, containing annexes, in particular the information published by the Czech Statistical Office, the Ministry of Finance, contained in the report by the Council of Europe on the status of remuneration of judges and prosecutors as well as in the public media. In addition to the proposal submitted to the Constitutional Court on 26 March 2012, the appellant also extended the petition to the application for annulment of the provisions of Paragraph 3b (2) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll.
The Municipal Court in Brno submitted the application in accordance with Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, after having concluded, in the context of its decision-making activities in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the Constitution), that:
• Article 4 (2) I part of First Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain other requirements of the prosecutors and on the amendment and addition of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll., on the salary and remuneration for the duty in budgetary and certain other organisations and bodies, as amended, on the salary and other matters associated with the performance of the officials of the State Government and of certain judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll.
• Paragraph 3b (2) of the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities connected with the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll.,
which are to be used in the resolution of sp. zn. 35 C 35 / 2011 are contrary to Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Articles 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution, Article 2 (1) of the Constitution, Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Protocol').
In that case, Case 35 C 35 / 2011, the Municipal Court in Brno is decided on the action against the Czech Republic - the Brno County Court of Justice, which seeks the payment of the amount of the difference between the claim for a salary within the meaning of § 28 to 31 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other requirements associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "Law No. 236 / 1995 Coll.," by extension of the Law on a flat-rate of expenses' (hereinafter referred to as "Reimbursement of expenditure '), under the Act No. 32 (a) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll.
In view of the original claim of the applicant in the proceedings before the Municipal Court in Brno, that court suspended the case in Case sp. zn. 35 C 35 / 2011 and, in accordance with Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, submitted to the Constitutional Court an application for annulment of the provisions of Sections 3 (1) and 3 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. The Constitutional Court decided on the proposal by the finding of 2 August 2011 in sp. zn.
The appellant now states in the Constitutional Court of the proposal under consideration that the provision of § 3b (1) of Law No. 236 / 1995 Coll. amended the pay base of the judges for 2011 to the amount of CZK 54005, with the abolition of the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11, where the pay base of the judges for 2011 no longer amounts to CZK 54 005 according to § 3b (1) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., and therefore the general regulation of the pay base of the judges as amended by Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. According to this provision, the salary base from 1 January to 31 December of the calendar year is 2.5 times the average nominal monthly salary of individuals in the non-business sphere, obtained according to published data of the Czech Statistical Office for the preceding calendar year, the level of the salary base for the relevant calendar year being declared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in the Collection of Laws by communication. This communication was published in the Collection of Laws on 16 September 2011 under No. 271 / 2011 Coll. and the amount of CZK 57 747,50 was set as the platform for judges for 2011. After the annulment of § 3b (1) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., as further stated by the applicant, the claimant's salary for January 2011 is CZK 78 000 and the reimbursement of expenses is CZK 3 200. Since in January 2011 a salary of CZK 73 000 was paid to the claimant, the difference between CZK 78 000 and CZK 73 000 is CZK 5 000. As regards reimbursement of expenses, this difference amounts to CZK 200 as a difference between CZK 3 200 and CZK 3,000. In the light of the above calculation, the appellant considers it clear that the application for January 2011 could be decided on as much as CZK 5,200 as the sum of the additional salary of CZK 5,000 and the reimbursement of expenses of CZK 200. The Municipal Court in Brno has therefore decided, in accordance with § 112 (2) o. s., to exclude the proceedings concerning the payment of CZK 5 200 for a separate procedure. The case concerning the difference between the salary of the claimant calculated in accordance with § 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., (so far depending on the salary base calculated as 2,5 times the average nominal wage in the non-business sphere of CZK 23099, which is CZK 57,747,50) and the salary actually paid by the claimants in January 2011 (derived from the salary base according to § 3b (1) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 54005 / 2010 Coll.). The case thus excluded was decided by the judgment of the Municipal Court in Brno of 11 October 2011, No 35 C 130 / 2011-113, in so far as the action was granted in that regard.
As already stated, after the payment of the September 2011 salary, the plaintiff extended the action for the additional salary and reimbursement of expenses for this month. Thus, for the month of September 2011, the claimant requests both payment and reimbursement of expenses for the period up to the publication of the Constitutional Court's finding of 2 August 2011 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11 and subsequent publication of the Communication of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on the level of the salary base for 2011, and for the period after the publication of the finding and communication. The difference in salary for September 2011 is CZK 17 754,50 and CZK 763,60 for reimbursement of expenses. By its order of 24 October 2011 No 35 C 35 / 2011- 125, the applicant accepted the change of action. The claimant, after the payment of the salary for January 2012, extended the application for a supplement to the salary and reimbursement of expenses for this month, amounting to CZK 17 100, which is the difference between the salary paid and the reimbursement of expenses determined according to the level of the salary base laid down in Section 3b (2) of the Wages Act 2012 to 2014 and the salary and reimbursement of expenses determined according to the salary base representing three times the average nominal monthly salaries of individuals in the non-business sphere for the preceding calendar year. By order of 14 February 2012 No 35 C 35 / 2011-168, the Municipal Court in Brno accepted the change of action. The resolution gained legal power on 24 February 2012.
The appellant relies on the statement that he requested the annulment of Paragraph 3 (3) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll. and Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., already in the proceedings brought by the Constitutional Court under sp. zn. In the appellant's view, that statement does not prevent the appellant from bringing the application in question after that provision is to be expressly applied to the applicant's case for a part of the defendant's claim for January 2011 and, in particular, for the claim for September 2011, for which the application under point 35 C 35 / 2011 has been extended and the amendment of which the appellant has granted final authorisation. The appellant concluded, in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, that the provisions of Article 3b (2) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., to be applied in the resolution of the case in question, are contrary to Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Articles 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution, Article 1 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Protocol.
The ground for the substantive illegality of the contested legal provisions depends on the recap of the relevant case-law of the Constitutional Court. In his view, the following basic thesis contains:
- the assessment of the constitutionality of pay restrictions against judges for a specific period of a particular year falls within the framework defined by the principle of judicial independence [the Constitutional Court's finding sp. zn.
- the constitutional position of the judges, on the one hand, and the representatives of the legislative and executive powers, in particular of the state administration, on the other hand, is different because of the principle of the division of power and the principle of the independence of the judges, which implies that the legislature has a different margin of discretion in terms of pay restrictions vis-à-vis judges as compared to the availability of such restrictions in other areas of the public sphere [Constitutional Court Opinion No 55 / 05 (paragraph 49)];
- intervention in the material security of judges guaranteed by the law must not be an expression of the legislature's indiscretions, but must be justified, based on the principle of proportionality, by exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial situation of the State, even if this condition is fulfilled, taking into account the differences in the function of the courts and officials of the legislature and executive, in particular the administration of the State; Such intervention must not give rise to any cause for concern as to whether it does not affect the limitation of the dignity of judges, for example if the expression of the constitutionally inadmissible pressure of legislative and judicial power is not the expression of the Constitutional Court's finding of the Constitutional Court (point 49);
- the principle of an independent judiciary is one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law within the meaning of Article 9 (2) of the Constitution [Constitutional Court finding sp. zn.
- the legislature's arbitrary intervention in the area of material protection of judges, including in the context of pay restrictions, must be placed under the framework protected by the principle of independence for two reasons. The independence of judges is primarily conditional on their moral integrity and professional level, but is also linked to their adequate material collateral. The second reason for subjecting the prohibition of arbitrary interference in the material security of judges (pay restrictions) to the principle of their independence is to exclude the possibility, possibly oppression of legislative or executive decision-making powers. In other words, to exclude arbitrary interference in the material security of judges as a possible form of "penalisation" of judges by the legislature and executive, and thus the form of coercion on their decision-making [the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
- the pay ratios of judges in the broad sense are to be stable, not a variable with which it calculates this or that of the government group, for example, because it appears that the fees of judges are too high compared to those of civil servants or to another professional group. Efforts for such equality deviates from the category of constitutionality, a political objective which does not support the constitutionally understood principle of equality [the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
- a measure where the judge is withdrawn or reduced by the claim component of the remuneration should be regarded as a salary restriction, without such withdrawal or reduction being compensated by an increase in another claim component of the remuneration [the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zl.
- another form of pay restriction should also be considered as a freeze of the statutory increase in the income of judges or of other constitutional officials, for example, a "permanent" salary freeze would undoubtedly be regarded by the Constitutional Court as a step constitutionally inadmissible. The pay ratios of judges in the broad sense are to be stable, as long as there are no exceptional exceptional circumstances of the State [the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 13 / 08 of 2.3.2010 (N 36 / 56 SbNU 405; 104 / 2010 Coll.; paragraph 41); similarly, the finding of the sp. zl. ÚS 55 / 05 (paragraph 55)];
- a significant element of the guarantee of adequate material security for judges in terms of the principle of the division of state power into legislative, executive and judicial powers and the requirement of their mutual balance should also be considered as a direct link between the salary of the representatives of the legislature and executive on the one hand and the salary of the judges on the other hand. The construction of the Law on the salary of representatives of state power, which, with the help of the uniform salary base and the legal coefficients laid down by law, guarantees that, together with the increase in the salary of legislative and executive officials, the legal salary of judges will automatically increase, thus constitutes an important, built-in insurance in the legal order, that the ratio in the material security of the representatives of individual powers will be maintained in the future [Constitutional Court finding sp.
The appellant points out that the Constitutional Court has also remained in its most recent case-law [see the findings of the sp. zn. Col. ÚS 22 / 09 of 7.9.2010 (N 186 / 58 CollNU 633; 309 / 2010 Coll.), paragraph 40.
In favour of the conclusion on the unconstitutionality of the contested legal provisions, the Municipal Court in Brno also refers to a number of international documents. First of all, it points out the recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers of 17 November 2010 on the CM / Rec (2010) 12 judges (Annex 5) [http: / / www.coe.int], which replaced the earlier Re Recommendation (94) 12. It follows from Articles 53 to 55 concerning the remuneration of judges that:
- the basic rules governing the remuneration of judges must be laid down by law,
- the remuneration of judges must express their role and responsibility and be at a sufficient level,
- the maintenance of a reasonable level of remuneration should be ensured at the time of sickness and maternity,
- the pension of judges should be in reasonable relation to the former salary,
- there should be special legal provisions preventing the salary of judges from falling.
From other international documents, the appellant draws attention to the report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), adopted from 12 to 13 March 2010 (Annex 6 - Part III, Article 6) [http: / / www.venice.coe.int], which states: "The Venice Commission considers that the financial evaluation of judges must be consistent with the dignity of their profession and that adequate evaluation is a prerequisite for protecting judges against undesirable external influences... The evaluation level should be determined taking into account the social circumstances in the country and compared with the rating rate of senior officials. 'Finally, in the framework of a comparative analysis, the conclusions of the Advisory Committee of Judges in the framework of the activities of the Council of Europe, Conseil consultatif de juges européens (CCJE) of 2001 (Opinion No 1 (Avis No 1)), in which (points 61 and 62) the need for legal provisions to prevent the reduction of the salary of judges and to ensure that their value is maintained in relation to life costs (http: / / wcd.coe.int /).
In a further part of its proposal, the Municipal Court in Brno takes note of the development of the legislation on the material security of judges, in particular the development of its intentions, as well as the change of relations in relation to the material security of employees in the public administration. The material security of judges by salary and multipurpose reimbursement of expenses was enshrined in Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., in the 2nd half of the 1990s, with the judge's salary being constructed as the product of the salary base and the coefficient expressing its seniority, the reimbursement of expenses was determined by a share of the salary base of 5,5%. The salary base was derived from the highest fare of the Ministry official as double. The appellant accentuates the fact that the principle followed by this regulation, which was raised when discussing this concept of the remuneration of judges, was, among other things, the principle of the continuity of pay relationships between different functions and the principle of equal and automatic movement of salaries and other elements of the national and civil servants. At the same time, it was assumed that "often undignified and politically misused negotiations on the amount of the salary in Parliament will fall once and for all '(stenorecord of the 34th meeting of the PCR, PS 1993- 1996, part 6 / 32 - Annex 9). In 2002 [Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll., on the amendment of the laws relating to the adoption of the Act on the Service of Civil Servants in Administrative Offices and on the Remuneration of These Employees and Other Servants in Administrative Offices (Staff Act), the so-called accompanying Act on the draft Staff Act, the Government's proposal submitted to the Chamber of Deputies as a print 794 - Annex 10] was amended (with effect from 1 January 2004) by creating a triple of the average salary in the non-business area for individuals for the previous year according to published data of the CSU (§ 3 (3) of the Act on Salary). The appellant states on this change that the result was a decline in the judge's salary in relation to the public salary, and that, according to him, the reasons which led to a strong reduction in the pay of judges and employees in the public sphere (from the original session to about 4.3 to 3.0) were never convincing and that Parliament did not actually address them at all. The press 794, in its explanatory memorandum to Article XXXV, stated that the link between the ministerial salary tariff and the constitutional base led to differences in salary increases and, in particular, to the proposed Staff Act, which was intended to significantly strengthen the conditions of service in the administration and to the" corresponding civil servants' valuation '. While maintaining the existing way of establishing the salary base, the salaries of constitutional officials would automatically increase "without changing the conditions for the performance of their functions." Therefore, a change was proposed "to establish a stable link between the salaries of constitutional officials and wage developments in the non-business sphere. In relation to the possibilities of pay differentiation... it is possible to consider a reasonable relation of the salary base to the average wage in the non-business sphere of three times." The municipal court notes, however, that the basic precondition for reducing the salary base and changing its structure was not fulfilled at all: the Staff Act has not yet become effective and the civil servants of the administration are kept under their obligations in the terms of the Labour Code. However, the level of the salary base has not been reassessed. According to the appellant, the construction of a salary base as three times the average salary of individuals in the non-business sector for the previous year (i.e. with a two-year time lag) represented a significant impact on the level of the judge's salary, but in the situation after the great flood of 2002 it may have appeared to be an acceptable intervention for future developments in the remuneration of judges. The change was related to the change to the 16-class remuneration system of officials whose highest rates increased from CZK 18570 to CZK 27700 between 2002 and 2004 (Government Decree No. 330 / 2003 Coll., on the pay ratios of employees in public services and administration), and the maintenance of the original salary base system would lead to its corresponding growth, which, as the appellant states, did not want to accept executive power. In his view, therefore, the salaries of judges have been left to the same level since 2002, so that the salary base will fall in the necessary manner, and he considers it to be a sign that in the explanatory report to print 133, this restriction is called the "evolutionary method of correcting the erroneous salary base'.
The appellant further analyses the declared legislative purposes of the contested legislation. Based on the outline of the development of the first decade after 2000, the question is, to what extent are the intentions to fix the pay relationship of constitutional officials and public sector employees at the level of three times that were honest and real. Doubts about the fact that at the time the actual intention for the future of the salaries of all constitutional officials was to humiliate much more in order to achieve nivelization in the result of the following: According to Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., which laid down exceptional measures for 2004 in determining the amount of the salary and some compensation of the expenses associated with the performance of the office of representatives of the State and of some state institutions, MEPs, judges and prosecutors, the amount of the additional salary of these persons for the first half of 2004, and which amended some related laws (Government draft press 392) were to remain frozen until 2006, and from 2007 onwards, the link to the average salary in the non-business sector - the argument was referred to the need for "solidarity with the consequences of the implementation of public finance reform '. In his view, the real reason was that the state budget at the time did not have the amount of funding to finance the transition to the 16- class remuneration system in the form envisaged by its authors (also the Staff Act did not become effective). Therefore, the" solidarity "of constitutional officials whose salaries were to be frozen by 2007 was promoted. In fact," only' was frozen between 2002- 2004, as at 1.1.2005 The Senate's amendment to the draft bill on the abolition of all forms of additional salaries ensured the defreeze of the salary base and full application of the three-fold rule (another procedure was not even possible, as wage growth in the non-business sector recorded high pace, so the salary base fell to three-fold very quickly during 2003 and 2004). This Act (No 626 / 2004 Coll., on the amendment of certain laws following the implementation of the reform of public finances in the field of remuneration) was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 26.11.2004, and the Government has already submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 8.12.2004 a proposal (print 839) of the Act, the purpose of which was to fix the level of pay achieved after thawing 1 January 2005 for another three years - in relation to judges - (2005, 2006, 2007), even to other officials before 1 January 2005. The [explanatory report on the press 839 (Fourth Election)] was thus to be ensured "that, since 2006, there would be no further difficult and justifiable deepening in proportion to the level of pay of those persons to the detriment of those who will not increase their salary base in 2005 '. The" austerity' measure in the remuneration of employees in the public sector was, according to the appellant, only apparent, since the rate of growth in the average salary in the non-business sector between 2002- 2007 (which was the period then planned by restrictions for constitutional officials) was between 5% and 10% annually. The public administration salary increased from CZK 20 490 to CZK 22 307, i.e. CZK 1,817 (8.9%) between 2004 and 2005, with an increase in average salary from CZK 22 978 to CZK 25 824 (CZK 2,846, 12.4%) for the central office apparatus. The highest fees for the remuneration of officials of ministries under Government Decree No. 330 / 2003 Coll. grew from 27700 to 33,250 CZK between 2004 and 2006 (by CZK 5,550, i.e. 20%). Thus, according to the appellant, the fact was quite different from the reasons which were intended to result in the freezing of the salary of constitutional officials in the years 2002-2007 (public salaries increased at high rates), and even fundamentally different from the intentions that the legislator had in changing the concept of a salary base to 1 January 2004; the labour law has not become effective and the extent of the duties and limitations of officials who were to find a reflection of their salaries has not made significant changes.
However, the Chamber of Deputies interrupted the debate on the bill (press 839) and did not return to it, but the debates at that time (2005), according to the City Court in Brno, showed the consequences of the government's constant pressure on repeated interference in the salaries of constitutional officials (the appellant draws attention to the fact that Members of the government criticised the conceptual lack of clarity and absence of any analyses). Further intervention in the remuneration of judges was carried out by Article XLVIII of Act No. 261 / 2007 Coll., on the stabilisation of public budgets, in the form of an "exceptional measure in determining the amount of the salary and certain reimbursement of the expenses of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities and judges in 2008 to 2010 '. This" emergency measure' consisted of freezing the salary base at the level reached on 31 December 2007 and suspending the rule contained in Section 3 (3) of the Salary Act (three times the session) for the defined period 2008-2010. The method of establishing the salary base was described by this Act (explanatory note - print 222) as automatic indexation, which will not be used "for the period laid down for the consolidation of public finances" (print 222 / 0, part 2 / 22). The structure of the salary base, which depends on the amount of the judge's salary and the multipurpose compensation, based on the principle of three times the average salary of individuals in the non-business sphere for the previous year, was thus suspended for a predetermined period of three years until 31 December 2010. The salary base was CZK 56 847 (Communication of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs No. 582 / 2006 Coll., on the declaration of the level of the salary base for determining the salary and certain reimbursement of expenses pursuant to Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, in 2007).
From the point of view of constitutional legal argument, the appellant contends - based on the outline of the development of the material security of judges after 1995 - that is, first and foremost, a legitimate expectation. It is based on the statement that the provision of Section 3 (3) of the Salary Act (laying down the rule for the teaching of a salary base as three times the average salary in the non-business sector for the previous year) was incorporated into the Salary Act No 309 / 2002 Coll. with effect from 1 January 2004, as part of it for a period of seven years, as a rule which replaced the original construction binding the salary base with the highest fare of the Ministry official. Since the adoption of Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll. so all judges (but also other constitutional officials) enjoyed a legitimate expectation that this already reduced level of their income was socially accepted and that it would be provided to them as part of material security within the framework of judicial independence. If this level was then suspended for a predetermined period, the judges had a legitimate expectation that the end of that period would again be the recipients of the salary which would guarantee the socially stable session. The Chamber of Deputies approved the government proposal submitted to it on 12 October 2010 on 10 December 2010, i.e. 20 days before the expiry of the three-year moratorium, reducing the session to 2.5 times - in absolute terms from CZK 69 297 (average salary in 2009: CZK 23 099 x 3 = CZK 69 297) to CZK 57 747. The Senate approved the bill six days later on 16 December 2010 and the President of the Republic signed it the following day after delivery on 17 December 2010. According to the appellant, the legislator's procedure documents concerns about the possible late adoption of this law. The impact on this legitimate expectation occurred just days before the end of the period after which the expected relations would return. The law was declared on December 30, 2010, when there was only one day left to restore expected relations.
According to the Municipal Court of Brno, the legislature thus affected the legitimate expectations of judges within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol by reducing the salary base's remuneration to the average wage in the non-business sphere, within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22 June 2004, Broniowski v Poland (Complaint No 31443 / 96, Reports 2004-)) and Article 1 of the Constitution (which implies the principle of legitimate expectation as part of a democratic rule of law).
If the real intention of executive power was to reduce the level of remuneration of constitutional officials far more than it suggested in 2002, the appellant said that it should have given prior notice, on the basis of clear analyses, of where it was going to bring the level of pay of judges and, consequently, freeze the level achieved for years. However, the power of the legislature could not establish a certain level of the salary base (three times the average salary in the non-business sphere), creating legitimate expectations that it is a genuine and genuine intention (for seven years), and then, a few days before the renewal of the original services, essentially abolish the general adjustment of the salary base and replace it with ad hoc absolute figures for four years; from the point of view of time, the legislator had and could have done so much earlier (probably in 2002, when it redefined the rules if it was its true and genuine intention).
According to the City Court of Brno, the expectations of judges were realistic, completely legitimate and very strong (supported by flights of pay and other restrictions in the field of material security, as will be pointed out in another part of the proposal). Thus, the legislature, by reducing the salary base's remuneration to the average wage in the non-business sphere, has affected the legitimate expectations of judges within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol and Article 1 of the Constitution (principle of legitimate expectations as part of a democratic rule of law). The appellant is further convinced that this intervention was not sufficiently justified by the public interest. Any interference with the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Constitution must pursue a legitimate objective. According to the explanatory memorandum and the stenographic records from the examination of the draft law (press 133, Senate press 9), the amendment of Section 3 (3) to the salary law was incorporated as a pre-emptive policy for the consequences of a possible derogatory ruling by the Constitutional Court (the appellant expresses in this connection a wonder of the conviction of the executive and probably the legislator that it is possible to create a "material core" of the salary law, which will be outside the reach of the Constitutional Court). It already considers this objective to be grossly contradictory with the principle of democratic rule of law (to present and adopt laws as safeguards against possible intervention by the Constitutional Court). It refers to the finding of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. Following the derogation found in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11 for 2011, this reduced salary base of 2.5 times the average wage in the non-business sector for 2009 is to be applied again between 2012 and 2014, but the provisions determining the ad hoc salary base are to be applied at an amount lower than in 2011 (as stated by the appellant, but according to the finding of the Constitutional Court, the Pl. ÚS 16 / 11 cannot be assessed in the complex of changes brought by Act No 425 / 2010 Coll.). The City Court in Brno somewhat ironically recalls at this point that the intention to save in all areas financed by the state budget, declared by the explanatory memorandum to print 133 (government bill), is, in itself, undeniably a worthy intention; In order to be constitutional, it must be demonstrated that the normative instrument conforms to the stated purpose and is consistent with the need (possible pluralism of possible normative means in relation to the intended purpose and their subsidiarity in terms of limitation of the Constitution of a Protected Value).
The salaries of judges were frozen in 2002- 2005 and then again in 2007- 2010. According to the City Court in Brno, the restrictions, if they are indeed to be restrictive and not permanent interference in the security of judges, must be relatively short-term and, after the reasons for which they were introduced, must lead to a return to the values originally set. According to the appellant, the standard means chosen by the legislature (three times the salary base to 2.5 times, that is to say 16.6%) shows clear characteristics of arbitrage, which is contrary to the principles of the rule of law, since it has been chosen as a "policy" against the deregation of the provisions of the Constitutional Court and lacks proportionality in relation to remuneration measures in the non-business sphere. It further states that according to data from the Czech Statistical Office in 2011, 10% less than the previous year was allocated to remuneration in the public domain, estimated to decrease the nominal average salary in the non-business sector by around 1%, and 0.8% in 2010. It considers these to be the first negative effects of austerity measures in the area of public administration in remuneration, but it considers these effects to be non-discriminatory in relation to judicial power, given the restrictions on judicial authority from 2000 onwards, given the economic situation of the Czech Republic by 2010 and 2011, the development of a pay-based relationship and the average pay of individuals in the non-business sector in the period 1996- 2014, the development of a relationship between the average salary of judges and the average salary (calculated) in the non-business sector in nominal and real terms in the period 1997- 2010 and, finally, the development of remuneration of officials of central government officials according to media published data.
On the basis of the above, the appellant notes the Government's assertion as the promoter of Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. in the explanatory memorandum (print 133), according to which the so-called salary base "is reasonably higher than in previous years' (until 31 December 2010 the frozen base was CZK 56 847, the base under Section 3 (3) of the Salary Act from 1 January 2011 is CZK 57 747,50), and concludes that the nominal difference + CZK 900,50 after years of stagnation means a deep decline in the real value of the salary, in addition for a period of a single year with a vision of returning to previously frozen value for a period of another three years, the trend in the salary of the judges does not change. According to the appellant, the Government did not in any way justify (in addition to quantifying the costs of the state budget linked to the renewal of the legal salary base mechanism as three times the average public salary) why it considers such an intervention (a reduction of the base by almost 17% if we are considering a base of three times the amount achieved in 2005) to be necessary and necessary for legal and long-term legitimate relations.
The Brno Municipal Court believes that by 2011 (starting in 2002) no group of civil servants has contributed to stabilising public finances or to reforming them or to resolving the consequences of the economic crisis of recent years, as the judges have done. The savings amounted to billions of crowns, each judge contributed in the order of hundreds of thousands; saving on the salary of the judge of the district court since the beginning of the 6th year of the counted practice is CZK 425 100 for 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (according to the appellant's estimate, the savings of all about 3,000 judges were at least CZK 1.3 billion for the period in question). The Court of Justice cannot, in his view, be held to be disrespecting the principle of solidarity, which until 2011 was manifested solely by judges and other constitutional officials. He regards the long-term trend in reducing the level of judicial pay as a populist gesture. The appellant is of the opinion that, for decades of continuous interference in the remuneration of judges, the matter can no longer be viewed only by simple primacy of nominal numbers; the decline in relations as reflected in this proposal leads to a deep real decline in the level of judicial remuneration, as the only group of persons remunerated from the state budget. It is intended to be a group where the availability of intervention is much more limited than that of other groups. Moreover, the appellant submits that the delay in the level of pay of judges for the salaries of senior civil servants leads to a direct conflict with the thesis set out in the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. pl. ÚS 55 / 05, according to which the ratio achieved in the material security of representatives of individual powers is to be maintained in the future. Contrary to this argument, the salaries of senior civil servants are generally higher than those of a judge at the beginning of his career (a judge of the Court of First Instance with eight years of practice), they are higher than those of other constitutional officials, which according to the appellant shows the collapse of the system of remuneration of constitutional officials as a whole, which is one of the reasons why the years of continuing salary suppression (fall from 3 to 2.57 between 2007-2010) and now its nominal reduction by one-off measures (reduction by 16.6%). In relation to the public administration pay restrictions for the period 2011, the appellant contests their inequality with regard to areas where restrictions did not take place or where wage volumes were increased (education and health).
Law No. 236 / 1995 Coll. was adopted, inter alia, to stabilise the situation of the judiciary in connection with the departure of judges to more lucrative legal professions. The result after 15 years is, as demonstrated in its proposal by the Municipal Court in Brno, a fall in the salary base and average public salary from 4.38 in 1996 to 2.5 in 2011, i.e. 43%, i.e. almost half.
The appellant also points out another argument to the alleged disproportion of the relation between the level of judicial and public pay. If the provisions of Paragraph 3 (3) of the Salary Act use an indication of the average salary of natural persons for the determination of the salary base, it makes the salary base dependent on the data which was essentially abandoned for statistics in 2009 and does not take into account the length of the working time of employees, it therefore suffers from distortion. The average salary of a judge was calculated on the basis of the gross salary paid against the conversion of the Judges. The year 1997 was elected as a starting point in view of the beginning of the new remuneration of judges, the increase in prices is shown by the Czech Republic. The fluctuations in the judge's average salary curve are due - in the appellant's view - to the payment of so-called additional salaries for 2002, 2003, 2004 in 2003 and 2005 as a result of the findings of the Constitutional Court. It follows from these figures that, if the 1997 session between the average non-business salaries and the average judicial salaries were to be maintained, a salary base of 3.4 times that should be set. If the 2005 session (when the salary base was temporarily defrosted) was to be maintained, the applicant considers that the salary base should be increased to 3.2 times the average salary. According to him, judges were affected by an unprecedented decline in the real value of the average salary by 2010 compared to the average salary in the non-business sector - between 2005 and 2010, the average salary in the non-business sector rose to 106% (if 2005 is 100%), while the average salary of the judge decreased to 82% in 2010. No other public employee was affected by such a decline in the real value of income for work. This development is considered by the appellant to be relevant for the assessment of proportionality of the reduction of the salary base as at 1 January 2011. The maintenance of a three-time session considers it a guarantee that the decline in the remuneration of judges will be partially halted.
The appellant recalls the Government's Programme Statement, in which he "sees the function of judge as the peak of all legal professions', and in contrast to this thesis, puts data on the relationship between the judge's salary and public salaries. The judge of the District Court with eight years of practice was supposed to have a monthly salary of CZK 54 600 in 2011, after the intervention of the Constitutional Court by finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11 the amount of this salary in 2011 is CZK 58 400, is to be CZK 57 500 in 2014. In relation to the average public salary achieved in these years, it will be 2.5-2.3 times. The average salary of a college student in 2010 according to the CSU data was CZK 45909, the average salary of a lawyer was CZK 51,244 according to the CSU data, which means that the judge's salary is only slightly above these average salaries. Data on the true level of central government salaries lead the appellants to hypothesise that the salaries of senior officials of ministries (directors, senior directors and deputy ministers) normally exceed the salary of judges twice or three times. The fees awarded to these officials amount to hundreds of thousands to millions in total - according to the figures from the public media, the Ministry used more than CZK 100 million in 2011 only for half-yearly fees (a 5% reduction in the judicial salary base in 2011 was expected to bring CZK 104.5 million). The state final account for 2010 available at www.mf.cr (part C. Report on the results of state budget management), according to the applicant, shows that there was no significant decrease in the average salary against 2009 (-0,8%) for central government in 2010. According to CSU data, the average salary of a student in the class was CZK 86 198 in 2010. In general, average salaries of persons with higher education increased by 32% between 2002 and 2009 (from CZK 31 835 to CZK 46 801), while the above-mentioned salary of a judge with eight years of experience in the period 2002- 2009 shows a growth of 10% lower (CZK 47 000 in 2002, CZK 57 500 in 2009); Thus, the salary of a judge did not increase at a rate as high as that of college students in general.
Another supporting argument of the City Court's proposal in Brno is a reference to other restrictions to which the judges are subject: It is a reduction in disease security from 1 January 2011 (according to Section 10 of Article XVII of Act No. 347 / 2010 Coll., amending certain laws relating to austerity measures under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), which lacks consideration for the nature of the work of the judge, whose cases are challenged for discussion and judgment, taking into account the principle of the legal judge regardless of his absence due to illness or leave. It also concerns the taxation of the multipurpose compensation and its submission to social security insurance (pursuant to § 6 (10) of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., on income taxes, as amended by Act No. 346 / 2010 Coll.), as opposed to compensation, for example, under § 6 (7) (c) of the cited Act, which is enjoyed by an employee and which is not subject to tax. In this context, the appellant also points to an increase in the so-called ceilings on social security contributions from 2010 and 2011 (pursuant to § 15b of Act No. 589 / 1992 Coll., on social security contributions and contributions to state employment policy, as amended by Act No. 362 / 2009 Coll. and Act No. 347 / 2010 Coll.), resulting in a decrease in the net income of part of the judiciary in 2010 and 2011. The appellant draws attention to the maximum extent of the limitation of a judge's personal life from all national employment relationships, in particular the prohibition on replacing a loss of income by other work activities.
On top of the argument of the need for restrictions as a result of the ongoing economic crisis, the appellant states that in January 2012 the Ministry of Finance published a macroeconomic prediction of the Czech Republic, according to which it achieved an increase in the average nominal wage in 2011 of about 2.2%, in 2012 the Ministry of Finance expects an increase in the average wage by 2%, in 2012 GDP is projected to grow slightly by 0.2%, in 2013 economic output should increase by 1.6%. The appellant accentuates the fact that it does not underestimate the consequences of developments in the euro area, but underlines that, in the case of the protection of judges, these are long-term interventions (not responding to current developments), cumulated (a combination of long-term salary freeze, a reduction in the salary base and other security restrictions) and lacking any proportion in relation to public remuneration. It is also not known to the appellant that any state in the geopolitical neighbourhood of the Czech Republic would proceed to similar long-term restrictions against judges.
It draws on all of these facts as a result of the reduction of the social prestige of the judicial profession, and at this point refers to the findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 12 / 10 and Pl. ÚS 16 / 11, according to which... "the nivulation in its consequences leads inevitably to the descent of the judicial state within the middle class, its income degradation in relation to other legal professions and to the reduction of its necessary social prestige."
In relation to the alleged unconstitutionality of the provisions of Section 3b (2) of the Salary Act, the appellant further states that the legislator has chosen an explicit, fixed, ad hoc method for this purpose: for the years 2012- 2014 it is an amount of CZK 2 higher than it was in 2008- 2010 and CZK 898,50 lower than in 2011. In this context, it refers to the opinion by which the Constitutional Court, in the decision sp. zn. The method chosen for regulating the remuneration of judges refers to the view contained in the sp. zn. It states that the legislator has designed pay restrictions differently in the past; a typical method, for example, was that it suspended the application of the general rule for the construction of a salary base and determined that the level of the salary base achieved would apply for a certain number of years (so-called freezing). However, this is another situation in the present case - the legislature, which states in § 3b (2) of the Law on the salary specific, with absolute figures expressed in terms of the value of the judicial salary base, created an individual act against the designated addressees for a defined period (without specifying how they reached the defined amount). This is a situation which, according to the appellant, the Salary Act adopted in the mid-1990s wanted to explicitly prevent, i.e. eliminate situations where the ad hoc legislature, for example, every year, according to the current political mood, will determine how the judge will be rewarded. Moreover, in the present case, it is clear to him that it is an adjustment which corresponds to the period of time.
Finally, the appellant also makes a comparative argument: It refers to the 2010 report of the Council of Europe on judicial European systems involving all Member States, which contains the 2008 data [available at www.coe.int / (System judiciaires européens, édition 2010)] and which describes in Section 11.3 the remuneration status of judges and prosecutors. Table 11.11 of this report compares the judge's gross income at the beginning of his career with an average gross wage. The average sessions in the Council of Europe are 2.5, the Czech Republic has a value of 2.1 in 2008, below the average of the Council of Europe: higher values are those of Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia. In many countries of the Council of Europe, judges enjoy various types of additional benefits (special pensions, housing-related compensation, reduced taxes, special types of life or health insurance, drivers' cars, representation costs or other types of benefits). Compared to this, the appellant considers 5.5% reimbursement of expenses for representation and literature of Czech judges to be non-discriminatory. Another decline in the level of judicial remuneration is seen as a degradation of the Czech Republic as a country for 20 years trying to restore the values of a democratic rule of law.
The comparative argument also includes a reference to the case law of the European Constitutional Courts. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland admits interference in the salaries of judges only in a situation in which the Polish Constitution prohibits the general debtor of the State [that is, in a situation where the public debt would exceed 3 / 5 of the value of the annual gross domestic product (Decision C 12 / 03)]. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in the Found sp. zn. PL. ÚS 12 / 05 declared the inconstitutionality of the law (s), which, for several years (2003- 2006), delayed the effectiveness of the law according to which the judges received another salary. The principle of legitimate expectations, clarity, stability and legal certainty arising from the general principle of the rule of law cannot, in the view of the Constitutional Court, be referred to as' temporary 'if the interventions take several years. This argument was also used by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia (sp. zn. 2009- 11-0), in a significantly worse economic situation than in our country and in a situation where the relationship between the judge's salary at the beginning of his career and the average salary showed a more favourable trend than in the Czech Republic [according to the report of the Council of Europe - CEPEJ 2010 - Annex 8].
The appellant is convinced that the legislator, by intervening in the level of the salary base, has violated most of the former Constitutional Court's maximum limits in relation to judges: he has not respected the different disposition of the judiciary; he has violated the principle of proportionality; the political objective was to try to reduce the pay of the judicial authority against executive power; and the intervention in the salary base has violated the principle of legitimate expectations as a principle of an immaterial democratic state. This restriction was then not discussed with the court. For that intervention in Article 3 (3) of the Salary Act, it considers that the State is obliged to ensure that judges and material independence, in conjunction with Article 1 (1) of the Constitution, in conjunction with Articles 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution, Article 1 of the Charter, as well as Article 1 of the Protocol, are bound by the obligation to ensure that the judges are both legally independent and materially, as a guarantee of impartial and fair decision-making, which further implies the principle of legitimate expectation and the right to good law, as well as Article 1 (1) of the Charter, which provides for equality in law, since the legislature has adjusted the judge 's circumstances with a view to impotence in consequence.
As regards the legal effects of the proposed derogation, the Municipal Court in Brno states that in the present case it is a situation similar to the one which the Constitutional Court considered in the sp. zl. He is convinced that in relation to the intervention in § 3 (3) of the Salary Act by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. it is necessary to talk not only about the amendment of the law, but about the material of the ad hoc departure from the generally established rules clearly defined by the previous text of the law. The general rule of the salary base was not to be applied until 2015, unless it was to come into effect as a "policy" against the intervention of the Constitutional Court (which actually occurred and the "policy" came into effect for 2011). Moreover, to conclude the law as a "policy" against the Constitutional Court without any necessary discourse with the judiciary (a fundamental change in the salary base was not discussed with the judiciary) means to resign from the constitutional conformity of the legislative process. It is therefore of the opinion that the conditions for the deregation of the derogation are met (i.e. the abolition of the amendment made in relation to § 3 (3) of the Salary Act by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll.). It considers that such a procedure is not hindered by the reasoning of the finding of page Pl. ÚS 16 / 11, in which the Constitutional Court assessed similar arguments, but having regard to the conclusions reached at the time on the applicant's active legitimacy. However, these arguments can only be raised in relation to the newly incorporated provision of Paragraph 3b (1) of the Salary Act, which was annulled by the Constitutional Court. That is why the petition is formulated eventually; In the event that the Constitutional Court does not share the view of the appellant on the deregulation of the amendment carried out by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. (primary petition), it is proposed in that case to abolish the limit of multiple of the average salary in the non-business sphere effective for 2011 (possible petit), thereby opening up an area for legislators to change this constitutionally non-conformal regulation for the judicial sector.
As regards the temporal consequences of a possible deregulation finding, the appellant adds that between its declaration and the necessary act of the legislature, the underlying reasons for the finding should apply and the salary base of the judges should be determined as three times the average salary in the non-business sphere for the previous year, when, in his view, the base was also explicitly addressed in previous decisions by the Constitutional Court [cf. Sf. Sf. Sp. Pl. ÚS.
At the same time, the appellant proposed that the Constitutional Court should, in accordance with Article 39 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., rule on the draft proposal as a matter of priority, with the argument of the legislature's repeated intervention in the direction of restrictions on the salaries of judges, its intensity, as well as the general impact on decisions on the high number of actions by judges on the payment of the remuneration and reimbursement of expenses for January 2011.
Recital of the essential parts of the party's observations
Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal in question to the Chamber of Deputies. In its observations of 20 December 2011, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Miroslav Nemcová refers to the facts already contained in the Chamber of Deputies's observations on the proposal for the annulment of the parts of Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. It further states that the draft law amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the functions of representatives of the State Government and of certain state authorities and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain formalities of the prosecutors and on the amendment and addition of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll., on the salary and remuneration of the on-call for duty in the budget and in certain other organisations and bodies, as amended, on the salary and certain formalities of the prosecutors, was submitted by the Government to the Chamber of Deputies on 12 October 2010 and was circulated as Parliament press 133. The draft law was discussed by the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Constitutional Law, whose proposals were not affected by the Government's proposed version of Paragraph 3 (3), as well as those of Members who spoke at the second reading on 7 December 2010. The bill was adopted in the final vote, in which the Chamber of Deputies gave its assent to the text of the bill by the number of votes out of 162 Members 147, 1 against. The Chamber of Deputies passed on 10 December 2010 a draft Senate law, which was discussed and approved at its meeting on 16 December 2010. The President of the Republic signed the Act on 17 December 2010. The Approved Act was delivered for signature to the Prime Minister and was declared in the Collection of Laws on 30 December 2010.
Finally, the President of the Chamber of Deputies notes that Law No 425 / 2010 Coll. was adopted after a properly implemented legislative process and it is up to the Constitutional Court to assess its constitutionality and to give its decision in connection with the submitted proposal by the Municipal Court in Brno to repeal the Act. On 25 April 2012, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic was served on the request of the Constitutional Court to supplement the proposal concerning the annulment of the provisions of Paragraph 3b (2) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of state power and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. The statement states that, when discussing this provision by the Chamber of Deputies, the text proposed by the Government was affected by the amendment of the Constitutional Legal Committee, which was not adopted at the third reading of the draft law when the 164 Members present voted in favour and 71 against its adoption. In addition, it refers to the observations made on 20 December 2011.
Pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. In his observations of 7 December 2011, his President Milan Štěch stated that the appellant, the Municipal Court in Brno, submitted on 3 November 2011 to the Constitutional Court - in the form of a possible - a proposal to repeal the provisions of the laws relating to the adjustment of the salary base for judges, consisting of a permanent change in the coefficient used in calculating the salary base (reduction from three times to 2.5 times). It is, in his view, a matter which follows the previous proposal, which was discussed at the Constitutional Court in the proceedings under point Pl. ÚS 16 / 11. That procedure included, among other things, a proposal to abolish the provisions of point 2 in Article I of Part One of Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., possibly the annulment of the provisions of § 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., which the Constitutional Court rejected with detailed reasoning that, in relation to those provisions, the appellant did not fulfil the conditions of active legitimacy laid down in Article 95 (2) of the Constitution at the time of the decision of the Constitutional Court. This situation was subsequently addressed in the proceedings brought before the General Court, where, in connection with the finding of the Constitutional Court, a separate procedure was ruled out by the Court, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an extension of the action by the applicant, and the court accepted the change of the action. According to the appellant, in the context of the current application for annulment of the contested legal regulation, it is - from the point of view of the applicant's active legitimacy - an application made after the legal regulation in question has to be explicitly applied to the applicant's case and the appellant concludes that the provision to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.
It is further noted that any changes to the statutory salary arrangements that took place under Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., as well as to its deliberations in the Senate bodies and at the Senate meeting, were already relevant in the Senate's observations sent under No 3740 / 2011 on 15 April 2011 in the case pending by the Constitutional Court under page 4 of the ÚS 16 / 11. The Senate's observations, accompanied by a short-term report from the Senate meeting, to which the draft law adopted under No 425 / 2010 Coll. was discussed and the Senate resolution on this draft law, are therefore referred to in the next Senate President. In conclusion, the President of the Senate expresses the conviction that it is up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the draft contested legislative provisions and to rule.
On 25 April 2012, the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic was served on the request of the Constitutional Court to complete the proposal concerning the annulment of the provisions of Paragraph 3b (2) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of state power and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. The President of the Senate refers in it to his original observations of 15 April 2011 on the original application by the Municipal Court in Brno concerning the case under point Pl. ÚS 16 / 11.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
According to the provisions of Paragraph 44 (2) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., the Constitutional Court may, with the consent of the parties, refrain from oral proceedings if it cannot expect further clarification of the case. In view of the fact that both the appellant, as served by the Constitutional Court on 16 April 2012, and the party to the proceedings in the letter of the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, served by the Constitutional Court on 25 April 2012, and the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, served by the Constitutional Court on the same day, expressed their consent to the termination of the oral proceedings, and given that the Constitutional Court considers that further clarification of the case cannot be expected from the hearing, the oral hearing in the present case has been abandoned.
Derogation of the provision of the contested legislation
Point 2 of Article I of Law No 425 / 2010 Coll. reads: "In Paragraph 3 (3), the word triple 'is replaced by the word 2.5 times'. '
Paragraph 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. provides: "The salary base is 2.5 times the average nominal monthly wage of individuals in the non-business sphere achieved according to published data of the Czech Statistical Office for the previous calendar year from 1 January to 31 December. The level of the salary base for the relevant calendar year shall be declared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in the Collection of Laws by communication. ';
According to the provisions of § 3b (2) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. read: "From 1 January 2012 until 31 December 2014, the salary base for judges is CZK 56 849."
Conditions for the applicant's active legitimacy
The application for annulment of the parts of Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. (or part of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll.), if they contain restrictions on the remuneration of judges (§ 3 (3), § 3b), together with the proposal for a priority decision in the present case under § 39 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., was submitted by the Municipal Court in Brno pursuant to § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended.
As already stated in the national case, in Case No 35 C 35 / 2011, the Municipal Court in Brno is decided on an action by the Court of Justice of the Regional Court of Brno seeking payment against the Czech Republic - the Brno County Court of Justice of the amount of the difference between the claimant's salary claim within the meaning of § 28 to 31 of the Salary Act and the claim for reimbursement of expenses within the meaning of § 32 (1) (a) of the same Act, according to the original claim for January, according to its extension and September 2011, and between the actual salary paid and reimbursement of expenses reduced with effect from 1 January 2011 by Act No 425 / 2010 Coll. The claimant extended the application for payment of the salary and reimbursement of expenses for this month after the payment of the September 2011 salary; Calls on both the additional salary and reimbursement of expenses for the period until the declaration of the Constitutional Court of 2 August 2011 sp. zn. By order of 24 October 2011 No 35 C 35 / 2011- 125, the applicant accepted the change of action. The claimant extended, after the payment of the salary for January 2012, the action for payment and reimbursement of expenses for this month, by the difference between the salary paid and the reimbursement of expenses determined according to the level of the salary base laid down in Section 3b (2) of the Wages Act 2012 to 2014 and by the salary and reimbursement of expenses determined according to the salary base representing three times the average nominal monthly salaries of individuals in the non-business sector for the preceding calendar year. By order of 14 February 2012 No 35 C 35 / 2011-168, the Municipal Court in Brno accepted the change of action. The resolution gained legal power on 24 February 2012.
The procedural condition of the active legitimacy of the General Court pursuant to § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, is such a position of the Law, or its individual provision, which is proposed to be annulled, on the subject of the tribal proceedings which give rise to decision-making reasons for the General Court's assessment of the case. The appellant relies on the statement that, when dealing with the case in question, Paragraph 3 (3) (for the part of the claim relating to the payment of the salary and reimbursement of expenses for September 2011) and Section 3b (2) (for the part of the claim relating to the payment of the salary and reimbursement of expenses for January 2012) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No 425 / 2010 Coll.
As is apparent from the description of the procedure in question at the General Court, the applicant's compliance with the conditions of his active legitimacy for the standard control procedure can be established both in relation to Sections 3 (3) and 3b (2) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. The provisions of Section 3 (3) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No 425 / 2010 Coll., in the assessment of the part of the claim relating to the payment of the remuneration and reimbursement of expenses for the month of January 2012, must then be applied to the part of the claim relating to the payment and reimbursement of expenses for the month of January 2012. These facts led the Constitutional Court to accept the extension of the petition as contained in the amendment to the application submitted to the Constitutional Court on 26 March 2012.
In relation to the point The Constitutional Court also notes that, in its established case-law, it has repeatedly taken the legal view that the amendment of the law does not have a separate legislative existence, but it becomes part of the amended legislation [the findings of sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 5 / 96 of 8.10.1996 (N 98 / 6 SbNU 203; 286 / 1996 Sb.), Pl. ÚS 33 / 01 of 12.3.2002 (N 28 / 25 SbNU 215; 145 / 2002 Sb.), Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 of 18.8.2004 (N 113 / 34 SbNU 165; 512 / 2004 Sb.), I. ÚS 504 / 10 of 21.3.2011, I. ÚS 1927 / 09 of 21.3.2011, Resolution sp. available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11 (see above)]. The Constitutional Court accepted the assessment of the amendment of the law in the case where its unconstitutionality is contested because of the absence of standard competence or because of failure to comply with the constitutionally prescribed procedure for its adoption and extradition [cf. the findings of sp. zn. These legal conclusions also fully affect the case under assessment. In the context of the assessment of the conditions of the applicant's active legitimacy to submit an application for annulment of the provision in question, they provide a basis for concluding that they are not fulfilled. For that Constitutional Court, the application by the Municipal Court in Brno to abolish the provisions of point 2 of Article 4 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 207 / 2009 shall be accompanied by the following: Also part of the first Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on grounds of apparent unfounded pursuant to § 43 (2) (a), (b) Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, rejected.
In addition to the argument of the appellant concerning the re-entry into force and effectiveness of the amended legal provision as an effect of the deregulation of this amendment by the Constitutional Court, reference should be made to the findings of sp. zn. I. ÚS 1696 / 09 of 8.2.2011 and I. ÚS 504 / 10 of 21.3.2011, which summarise in detail the previous case-law on the issue [contained in particular in the findings sp. zn. Pl. Pl. Pl. ÚS 5 / 94 of 30.11.1994 (N 59 / 2 SbNU 155; 8 / 1995 Sb.), Pl. ÚS 21 / 01 of 12.2.2002 (N 14 / 25 SbNU 97; 95 / 2002 Sb.), Pl. ÚS 2 / 02 of 9.3.2004 (N 35 / 32 Sb. In general, the Constitutional Court notes in the findings sp. zn. I. ÚS 1696 / 09 and I. ÚS 504 / 10: "There is no explicit regulation in the legal order of the Czech Republic to prevent the renewal of one repealed law, if the renewal is linked to the expression of the will of a state body other than Parliament; In general, it is therefore necessary to assume that one repealed law without its redetermination to restore the validity and effectiveness of the law cannot regain those characteristics. However, the Constitutional Court has made an exception to this principle, which also respects Parliament's sovereignty on this issue. As is apparent from the decision in point Pl. ÚS 2 / 02, the Constitutional Court has given Parliament time to reassess the issues covered by the law which was subsequently repealed by the law and to adopt appropriate legislation which respects fundamental rights and freedoms. In the judgment cited, the Constitutional Court also prejudiced the possibility that the legislature would not listen to the guardian of constitutionality and, in view of the specific situation - the protection of the fundamental right arising from legitimate expectations - provided for further legal consequences of its decision." From the point of view of the case under examination, the Constitutional Court concludes that the general rule resulting from the finding in point I.I. of the ÚS 504 / 10 (as well as from the previous case-law) affects it and that the conditions for the adoption of an exemption from that rule are not fulfilled. If the appellant wishes to reach a similar conclusion to that made by the Constitutional Court in the decision of the Constitutional Court on 2 / 02 of 2 / 02 ÚS, in which, following the annulment of the derogatory provision, it is noted that, contrary to the case of sp. zn. Part of Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., did not constitute a derogation.
Constitutional conformity of competence and legislative process
The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 68 (2) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., is required to assess whether the contested law, its individual provision, or any other law or provision thereof, has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner.
It was found from the Parliament's press and shorthand reports, as well as from the observations of the party, that the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft law in question at its third reading at its 9th meeting on 10 December 2010 by Resolution No 216, when 167 Members present voted in favour and 1 against.
At its third meeting held on 16 December 2010, by Resolution No 67, the Senate approved that draft law, as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, when 46 of the 68 Senators present voted in favour, 3 and 19 abstained.
The Law in question was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and was duly declared under No 425 / 2010 Coll. in the amount of 147 Collection of Laws, which was circulated on 30 December 2010 and became effective on 1 January 2011 pursuant to Article III.
The Constitutional Court recalls that the constitutional conformity of the competence and the legislative process was expressed authoritatively by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11. On the basis of the conclusions reached in the finding, as well as the recap of the procedure for the adoption of the law in question, the Constitutional Court notes that Law No 425 / 2010 Coll. in the absence of consideration of pay restrictions on judges and, therefore, certain forms of intervention in one of the components of judicial independence - the principle of the stability of the material security of judges, with representatives or representatives of independent justice, i.e. in the knowledge of the violation of the rules of democratic political culture, was not adopted in such an intensity of non-compliance with constitutional courts relating to the jurisdiction and legislative process, which would establish the reason for its deregulation. However, for the future, in cumulation with other circumstances, which are contrary to the principles of constitutional order, there is no derogation in this context.
Content compliance of the contested legal provision with the constitutional order (constitutionality of salary restrictions against judges)
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly addressed the issue of judicial salaries in the past. In his earlier case-law, he summarised in the sp. zn. Since it is evident that the parties are aware of this caselaw, the Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to recap it repeatedly in detail.
From the case-law of the Constitutional Court and from its comparison with the case-law of the European Constitutional Courts (see, in particular, the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland sp. zn. P 1 / 94 of 8 November 1994, C 13 / 94 of 14 March 1995, P 1 / 95 of 11 September 1995, P 8 / 00 of 4 October 2000, C 12 / 03 of 18 February 2004), on the constitutionality of the salary restrictions against judges, the following fundamental generalising thesis follows:
• the assessment of the constitutionality of pay restrictions against judges for a specific period of a particular year falls within the framework of the principle of judicial independence;
• the constitutional position of judges, on the one hand, and the representatives of the legislative and executive powers, in particular the administration of the state, on the other hand, is different due to the principle of the division of power and the principle of the independence of judges, which implies a different layout for legislators to pay restrictions on judges compared to those of such restrictions in other areas of the public sphere;
• intervention in the material security of judges guaranteed by the law must not be an expression of the legislature's indiscretions, but must be justified, based on the principle of proportionality, by exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial situation of the State, while taking into account, even if this condition is met, the differences in the function of judges and officials of the legislature and executive, in particular the state administration; Such intervention must not give cause for concern if the limitation of the dignity of the judges does not affect [see Recommendation No. (94) 12 of 13 October 1994 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers], or if it is not an expression of constitutionally unacceptable pressure of legislative and judicial power.
According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, the principle of independent justice is one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law (Article 9 (2) of the Constitution). The requirement of independent justice stems from two sources: the neutrality of judges, as a guarantee of fair, impartial and objective judicial proceedings, and the safeguarding of the rights and freedoms of individuals by a judge separated from political power. The independence of judges is guaranteed by the guarantees of a special legal status (which must include inconsistencies, irrevocability, integrity), guarantees of organisational and functional independence from the bodies representing legislative and, in particular, executive powers, and separation of the judiciary from legislative and executive powers (in particular, application of the principle of incompatibility). From the point of view of content, judicial independence is ensured only by the binding of judges by law, i.e. excluding any elements of subordination in judicial decision-making. The Constitutional Court has dealt with the fundamental components of the principle of independence of the judiciary in a comprehensive manner in the finding of point Pl. ÚS 7 / 02 of 18.6.2002 (N 78 / 26 SbNU 273; 349 / 2002 Coll.).
In accordance with the settled case law of the Constitutional Court, the legislature's intervention in the area of material protection of judges, including in the context of pay restrictions, must be placed under the framework protected by the principle of their independence for two reasons. The independence of judges is primarily conditional on their moral integrity and professional level, but is also linked to their adequate material collateral. This component of the principle of independence of judges was also enshrined in Recommendation No 94) 12 of 13 October 1994 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the independence, effectiveness and role of judges, according to which "ensuring the adequacy of the position and remuneration of judges with regard to the dignity of their profession and the workload '(principle III, paragraph 1b). A similar maximum is also contained in Article 6.1 of the European Charter on the Statute of a Judge, adopted by participants in a multilateral meeting organised by the Council of Europe on 8 to 10 July 1998, according to which professional judges have the right to a salary to be set in such a way as to protect them from pressure to influence their decisions and, in general, to influence their conduct in finding a right which could jeopardise their independence and impartiality. In this context, the Constitutional Court repeatedly points out the fact (see the finding in point sp. zn. The reason for the second subordination of the prohibition of arbitrary interference in the material security of judges (pay restrictions) within the framework of the principle of their independence is to exclude the possibility, possibly the coercion of legislative or executive decision-making power. In other words, to exclude arbitrary interference in the material security of judges as a possible form of" penalisation "of judges by legislation and executive, and thus a form of pressure on their decisions.
The Constitutional Court then expressed a thesis, which is also a key aspect of the assessment of the constitutionality of the contested provisions of the Salary Act: "The legislature's step, by which (would) not suspend the rate of increase in the salary of judges, but even a partial withdrawal of the level of material security already achieved, could hardly be addressed by the Constitutional Court in terms of democratic rule of law. In particular, this would be the case if such a severely unacceptable restriction would prove to affect only or, above all, the income ratios of the judges and not the income of other servants of the state at the same time."
The development of opinions on the issue of guarantees of judicial independence took place in parallel at the level of European institutions. In Recommendation CM / Rec (2010) 12 of 17 November 2010 on judges, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers laid down a requirement that the remuneration of judges should express their role and responsibility and be a sufficient barrier to the incentives aimed at influencing their decisions, and a guarantee of that purpose is regarded as a guarantee of a situation in which, among other things, judicial pensions are reasonable in relation to the former salary and in which there are special legal provisions preventing the reduction of the salary of judges (Article 54).
The explanatory memorandum to the draft contested law initially refers to the legislature's mechanism of determining the salary base of state officials as "unrealistic 'and requiring judges to have the principle of independence of the" evolutionary method of correction', with the objective of the legislative amendment being to: "in the context of the necessary austerity measures in public budgets to find a solution that would allow the salaries of representatives of all three state authorities to be reduced from the state budget but did not contradict the principles of proportionality of pay adjustment in judges who benefit from increased constitutional protection '. The whole complex of changes in the proportions of the material security of judges in relation to public administration employees is then described in the explanatory memorandum as" alleviating unjustified differences in pay levels and achieving proportionality when spending funds on salaries from the same source, i.e. the State budget. In no way can the proposed solution be seen as a restriction of the dignity of the judges or as an expression of the constitutionally unacceptable pressure of legislative power and of the power of the judiciary, since the salaries of judges will be highly high-standard even after the measures proposed are implemented, and the proposed measure will, to a much greater extent, affect the representatives of legislative and executive power. "In addition to the reasons for the adoption of the provisions of Paragraph 3b (2) of the Salary Act, the explanatory report states that" unlike the representatives, the salary base will return to the level of 2007-2009 with the judges'.
In relation to the complex of changes embodied in Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. by amendment implemented by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll. the subject of the present procedure on the control of standards is the assessment of constitutional conformity of the reduction of the salary of judges governed by the provisions of Sections 3 (3) and 3b (2) of the Salary Act by a reduction of the previous salary base.
In relation to the provisions of § 3 (3) and § 3b (2) of the Law in respect of the salary of the Constitutional Court, first of all, it is recalled that the statement of reasons for the 2000 European Commission's assessment report on the Czech Republic, which stated that "judges' salaries are relatively high ', while in other areas, such as police and administrative structures, the reference was made to a low level of pay, cannot be considered as impossible, since the relation between the salary base and the average salary of judges and the salary of the public administration and the average salary - according to the information provided by the appellant who were not in any way involved in the proceedings - was, as already stated by the Constitutional Court of First Instance, Pl. A judge with many years of experience receives only about 2 / 3 of the salary of better-paid senior civil servants and is nowhere near their average income. In 2003 the salary of the judge was CZK 47,000 and the average salary of the head of the department of the central administration was CZK 50 187. In 2009 the difference was CZK 57 400 (judge) and CZK 66 734 (director of the department).
In sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 02 of 11.6.2003 (N 87 / 30 SbNU 309; 198 / 2003 Coll.) The Constitutional Court noted on the margin of that trend that "the pay ratios of judges in a broad sense are to be stable, not a variable factor with which it calculates this or that of the government group, for example, because it finds that the fees of judges are too high compared to the salaries of civil servants or to another professional group '. As a result, the President of the Chambers of the Supreme Courts and the Presidents of the College of these Courts had a higher salary than the judges of the Constitutional Court (0,8% and 4,9% respectively in 2011, 6,2% and 10,4% respectively in 2012-2014).
The Constitutional Court may, on the fringe of the provisions of § 3 (3) and § 3b (2) of the Salary Act, only repeat the observation already made in the sp. v. Pl. The measures in relation to them then do not appear to be exceptional and proportional, but as a targeted process aimed at returning the judicial salaries to lower levels, thereby removing the legislative and executive powers made in the past, a mistake in establishing rules for calculating the judicial salaries in the mid-1990s. Such lack of approval is bound to lead, in its consequences, to the descent of the judicial state within the middle class, its income degradation in relation to other legal professions and to the reduction of its necessary social prestige. "Nor does it change the assertion of the legislator that the regulation contained in § 3b (2) of the Law on the salary of judges returns the salary base" ca. "to the level of 2007-2009. On the contrary, the restriction contained in the reduction of the coefficient for determining the salary base from three times the value of 2.5 times the average nominal monthly salary of individuals in the non-business sphere (Section 3 (3) of the Salary Act, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll.) constitutes an inadequate and only against judges targeted intervention, does not fulfil the conditions laid down by the Constitutional Court in the case-law already outlined for the acceptance of the restrictions on the salaries of judges.
The reduction in the salary of judges is accompanied by paradoxically contradictory facts: on the one hand, the legislator is justified by the need for public finance savings and by the reduction of disproportionality in relation to the salaries of public administration employees, on the other hand, by the long-term increase in public administration salaries (mostly linked to the provision of extraordinary remuneration or contract salaries) or by the non-reduction of such salaries.
Therefore, although the Constitutional Court clearly formulated a maximum prior to the adoption of the law, according to which the principle of equality in the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges can be accentuated before the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges under very exceptional circumstances, thus defining the scope of constitutional conformity of pay restrictions against judges, the legislator did not follow that maximum in the process of adopting Law No 425 / 2010 Coll. In the above circumstances, the argument on the necessary savings of public expenditure cannot be accepted through restrictions on the salary of judges, while the legal arrangements under examination lack any argument of "exceptional circumstances" which would justify the priority of the principle of equality in the field of restrictions on the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges against the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges.
Other moments can be considered as a form of income restriction against judges in the sense of the constitutional principle of equality, guarantees of independence and dignity of the position of judges, as well as recommendations from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM / Rec (2010) 12.
The provisions of § 157 to 163 of Act No. 361 / 2003 Coll., on the service relationship of members of the Security Corps, as amended (according to § 1 (1) of the quoted Act the Security Council means the Police of the Czech Republic, the Fire Rescue Corps of the Czech Republic, the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic, the Prison Service of the Czech Republic, the Security Information Service and the Office for Foreign Relations and Information), and the provisions of § 131 to 137 of the Act No. 221 / 1999 Coll., on professional soldiers, as amended, are enshrined by the Institute of Service Contribution. Section 110 (b) and Sections 112 to 121 of Act No. 218 / 2002 Coll., on the service of civil servants in administrative offices and on the remuneration of such staff and other servants in administrative offices (Staff Act), as amended by Act No. 445 / 2011 Coll., with effect from 1 January 2015 (Section 254 of the Act in question), provides that civil servants are entitled to social security, which includes a contribution for service years to retirement.
Thus, the judges of the General Courts and the judges of the Constitutional Court (and, mutatis mutandis, the prosecutors) remain the only "servants' of the State to whom such compensation is not granted, as well as social recognition for the performance of their duties. This deficit of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Judgments, Addresses and Government Administration of the Courts and on the amendment of certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judgments), as amended, Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, as well as Act No. 283 / 1993 Coll., on the Prosecutor's Office, as amended, constitutes a non-accesorial inequality in relation to the Judges of the General Court and the Judges of the Constitutional Court of First Instance, as well as a restriction of one of the guarantees of judicial independence (according to which the judges' pensions should be in reasonable relation to earlier salary). This national disproportion has its own pandana in the international disproportion (e.g. in relation to the status of judges of constitutional courts with the Czech Republic of comparable Central European countries of Poland and Slovakia - see Section 16a of the Národnej Council of the Slovak Republic no. 38 / 1993 Z. z., o organizácia Ústavný súd Slovenské republiky o konaní o konané prední, z 2000 r. nr. 48, poz. 552 i Nr. 53, poz. 638, z. 2001 r. Nr. 98, poz. 1070, z. 2005 r. Nr. 169, poz. 1417 oraz z.
On the basis of the grounds thus set out, it is necessary to consider the pay restriction against judges contained in the provisions of Sections 3 (3) and 3b (2) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 425 / 2010 Coll., as a contradiction with Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Article 82 (1) of the Constitution, and the plenary of the Constitutional Court decided to derogate from the legal provision in question, as set out in the operative part of that decision.
In view of the urgent discussion and decision-making in the present case, the Constitutional Court considers that the decision on the urgency of the case under Article 39 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, is irrelevant.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 181 / 2012 Coll., on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 01.06.2012 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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