The Constitutional Court found no 171 / 2009 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 7 April 2009, as amended by the Amending Order of 27 May 2009 on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 184 / 2006 Coll., on the withdrawal or limitation of property rights in respect of land or construction (Expropriation Act)
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
18.06.2009
171
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on 7 April 2009, as amended by the amending resolution of 27 May 2009, in plenary of the President of the Court of Paul Rychett and of the Judges of Stanislav Balík, František Duchona, Vlasta Formánková, Military Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Krářka, Jiří Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodma, Eliška Wagner and Michaela Židlická on the proposal of the Regional Court in Brno to abolish certain provisions of Law No. 184 / 2006 Coll., on the withdrawal or restriction of property rights or construction (Expropriation Act), in the event of an interpretative opinion on certain provisions of this Law, with the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Czech Republic as participants in the proceedings
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Definition of the case, arguments of the appellant, position of the parties
1. On 8 September 2008, the Constitutional Court received an application for annulment of Part of Act No. 184 / 2006 Coll., on the withdrawal or limitation of property rights to land or construction (Expropriation Act), namely:
- part of the provisions of Paragraph 28 (1) of the Expropriation Act, in the words "to be discussed in civil proceedings,"
- part of the provisions of Paragraph 28 (2) of the Expropriation Act, in the words "which the party to the proceedings requires to be dealt with in civil proceedings,"
- Paragraph 30 of the Expropriation Act.
2. In the event of a refusal, it is proposed that the Constitutional Court should at least give a constitutional conformal interpretation of the provisions of Sections 28 and 30 of the Expropriation Act in the form of an interpretative statement. It should answer the question whether, even after the contested provisions of the Expropriation Act have become effective, the interpretation previously held by the Constitutional Court in Resolution sp. zl.
3. The appellant stated that he has a number of procedures in department 35 C 37 / 2007 (35 C 32 / 2007, 35 C 33 / 2007, 35 C 34 / 2007, 35 C 335 / 2007, 35 C 36 / 2007, 35 C 37 / 2007, 35 C 39 / 2007, 35 C 40 / 2007, 35 C 41 / 2007, 35 C 50 / 2007, 35 C 1 / 2008, 35 C 4 / 2008, 35 C 7 / 2008, 35 C 15 / 2008, 35 C 16 / 2008, 35 C 19 / 2008, 35 C 25 / 2008). The calculations are made as a result of decisions taken by the administrative authorities which did not decide on the expropriation and the proposals in question were rejected on the basis of the legal opinion that additional expropriation is excluded in the case of the buildings implemented. According to the appellant, this view contradicts the conclusions adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court in judgment No 5 As 11 / 2003-66 (NSS Reports No 9 / 2005, No 630), where the opposite is said. However, before its own judicial decision, the appellant considers that the issue of jurisdiction must be resolved. The management of those file marks does not concern private-law disputes concerning the amount and possible distribution of compensation, but the expropriation itself as a public-law interference in property law, which, at least in the appellant's view, should be subject to review in the administrative judiciary. Nevertheless, in a series of cases referred to above, the administrative court rejected the action in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 46 (2) of the Administrative Rules, stating that after 1 January 2007 it belonged to civil proceedings. In the case sp. zn. 35 C 33 / 2007, the Special Chamber established under Act No. 131 / 2002 Coll., which, in its resolution on the matter of the jurisdiction, determined that the competent decision on the action against the decision of the Regional Office on the establishment of a substantive burden was the court in civil proceedings. This conclusion is also binding on the appellants. It must therefore apply the above-mentioned provisions of the Expropriation Act, although it is convinced that they are contrary to the constitutional order. Consequently, the applicant imports its active identity.
4. The legislation in question, possibly its interpretation adopted by the Special Chamber, is, in the view of the appellant, in direct conflict with the existing case law of the Constitutional Court (namely by resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 14 / 06), the Supreme Administrative Court (namely by order of extended Chamber No. 47 / 2003-50), and the Special Chamber established under Act No. 131 / 2002 Coll. (specifically by order No. 81 / 2004-12). It underlines the interpretation in question, according to which it is necessary to distinguish between those procedures which are the object of the expropriation or of the compulsory restriction of property rights by a substantive burden established by an administrative act and those which are the object of a dispute over property law. The first category of cases is a decision-making in a public, not a private, case-law case and therefore the jurisdiction of administrative courts is given. On the contrary, the jurisdiction of civil courts shall apply to disputes concerning the amount and, where appropriate, the distribution of compensation. In cases referred to by the appellant for the amount or distribution of the compensation (that is to say, the concept of private law) is not the case, but typical questions of public law.
5. The rule of law is contrary to the constitutional principles of division of power in the state, when expropriation would be dealt with by civil courts instead of state administration as a result of criticised practice (as a whole). They do not have the option of cancelling the administrative decision and returning the case to it for further proceedings with a binding legal opinion. Thus, the administrative part of the expropriation procedure would be effectively circumvented. The appellant is concerned that the administrative authorities will simply dispose of their 'playback' to civil courts in matters of expropriation. In doing so, effective judicial control of the authorities discussing and deciding these cases can only be carried out through the administrative justice system, which is to say by cancelling the defective decisions and returning the cases for further consideration. The contested legislation questions the very sense of the administrative justice system in the Czech Republic. Finally, the administrative authority is not even a party to the proceedings under Part Five of the Civil Code, so the court cannot impose an obligation to pay the costs. This results in a rule of law contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '), which provides for judicial review of administrative decisions.
6. Furthermore, the appellant points out the contradiction with Article 38 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms guaranteeing the prohibition of the withdrawal of a case to a lawful judge. Originally, he was an administrative judge with sufficient options to make amends, newly a civilian judge with completely insufficient remedies. It is also affected by the right of the parties to discuss the matter without undue delay (Article 38 (2) of the Charter), when the cases were previously dealt with by administrative courts, but have not ended meritoriously, merely handed them over to the civil courts, with the length of time already served being lost in the administrative judiciary.
7. Finally, the appellant draws attention to the contradiction with the prohibition on retroactivity, in so far as the new legal regulation and decisions made before the date of its effectiveness are concerned.
8. The proposal, as has already been mentioned, aims to abolish the marked parts of the Expropriation Act, possibly to give their constitutionally consistent interpretation in the form of an interpretative statement. According to the appellant, the Constitutional Court should thus clarify whether, even after the entry into force of the provisions of the Expropriation Act in question, the interpretation previously made by the Constitutional Court (in the resolution sp. zn.
9. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, in its observations on the content of the proposal after the recap of the adoption of the Expropriation Act, merely stated that the legislature had acted in the belief of compliance of the contested legislation with the constitutional and legal order. The assessment of the constitutionality of the regulation leaves complete consideration to the Constitutional Court.
10. The Senate of Parliament of the Czech Republic described in detail the process of adopting the bill on expropriation with emphasis on the debate that took place on the proposal in the upper chamber of Parliament. The Senate had no reservations about the provisions of the law which were challenged by the proposal under examination. It also leaves the decision to the discretion of the Constitutional Court without having supported the proposal in argument or in favour of its rejection.
Derogation of the contested provisions
11. Paragraph 28 (1) of the Expropriation Act reads: "The regional court is competent at first instance to bring proceedings for expropriation to be dealt with in civil proceedings." The words "to be heard in civil proceedings" are proposed for annulment.
12. Paragraph 28 (2) of the Expropriation Act reads: "The action which a party to proceedings requires to be dealt with in civil proceedings must be brought within 30 days of the decision of the expropriation office being given within 30 days of the legal authority; the following paragraph is added: The words" which a party to proceedings requires to be dealt with in civil proceedings' are proposed for annulment.
13. Paragraph 30 of the Expropriation Act is proposed to abolish the whole and reads: "Unless otherwise provided for in that Act, civil proceedings in matters of expropriation under the Civil Code shall be carried out."
Conditions for the applicant's active legitimacy, constitutional conformity of the legislative process
14. The application was lodged by the Regional Court in connection with the proceedings pending before it, and the proposed provisions of the Expropriation Act must be applied to the annulment. Its active legitimacy is therefore based on the provisions of § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court).
15. The Constitutional Court, within the meaning of Paragraph 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has dealt with the manner in which the Expropriation Act was adopted and issued; the contested provisions have not changed since the state in which the law became effective. It follows from the relevant website (www.psp.cz) that the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic approved the draft law on expropriation as approved by the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic at its 54th meeting of 14 March 2006, when 117 of the 170 Members present voted for it. Although the President of the Republic did not sign the law and returned it to the House, it remained on it (the vote took place on 25 April 2006 at the 55th session of the House).
16. The Constitutional Court stated that the Expropriation Act was adopted by a constitutional legislative procedure, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared in the Collection of Laws on 11 May 2006.
Own review
17. The Constitutional Court considered the proposal and concluded from the following conclusions that there are no grounds for the annulment of the contested provisions of the Expropriation Act.
18. It should first be recalled that the Constitutional Court is an institution for the protection of constitutionality [Article 83 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (the Constitution)]. In its proceedings for the repeal of laws and other legislation, it acts as a so-called negative legislator and its task is to assess the constitutionality of the contested legislation or its defined parts, possibly to assess whether the contested legislation can be interpreted and applied in a constitutional manner. In doing so, the Constitutional Court is not - and this is particularly important for the case under consideration - entitled to assess the appropriateness or effectiveness of the rule of law, since it is always the legislators who have jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court considers that, in the present case, it is not a case of conflict of law with the constitutional order, but a confrontation of the law or the legislature chosen by the judicial control of the activity of the public administration on that section, and an idea of legal practice (or part of it) as to how this legislation should look in order to best reflect the views of legal teaching.
(A)
19. If the Constitutional Court follows individual objections from the appellant, it must first deal with the contested dispute with the existing case-law itself, the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Special Chamber established by Act No. 131 / 2002 Coll., on the ruling of certain jurisdiction disputes.
20. It must be pointed out that the answer to the question, namely which of the judicial branches is to review the relevant acts, has not been clear from the outset, and the nature of the decision on the compulsory restriction of property law has become a frequent subject of judicial judgment. The Supreme Administrative Court has repeatedly expressed its views on the case in connection with the establishment of a material burden under § 91 (3) of Act No. 151 / 2000 Coll., on telecommunications and on the amendment of other laws, and under § 17 (3) of Act No. 13 / 1997 Coll., on roads. At first, he stressed (as did the regional courts governing the administrative judiciary) the fact that the decision on the compulsory restriction of property rights interfered with the owner's private law (that is, the ownership law). As a decision in private law, therefore, according to the original case law of the Supreme Administrative Court, it was not subject to review in the administrative justice system, but rather to judgment in civil proceedings.
21. This view was later overcome by the decisions referred to by the appellant - by the extended Senate of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12.10.2004 No 4 As 47 / 2003-50 and by the subsequent decision of the Special Chamber established by Law No 131 / 2002 Coll. No. Konf 81 / 2004-12 of 5.5.2005. The decisions are based on the view that, although the decision of the administrative authority on the expropriation and / or the establishment of a substantive burden is undoubtedly affecting property law, the nature of such intervention must always be examined, since the limitation or termination of the right of ownership can take place both on the basis of a private and public law. In order to determine whether a case is to be dealt with and decided in civil or administrative justice, the private or public nature of the interference with property law is decisive, but not the legal nature of the property law itself. If the applicant has contested a decision on expropriation or a compulsory restriction on property rights by establishing a substantive burden, the question of property law itself is not the subject of legal proceedings (there is therefore no dispute on property law), but is the subject of a review of the decision on expropriation or of a compulsory restriction on property law. The nature of the title shall be determined for the purpose of establishing civil or administrative jurisdiction. As a criterion for assessing the private or public nature of the operative part of the expropriation or the establishment of a material burden, the Supreme Administrative Court opted for a method of legal regulation expressing the nature and extent of the participation of legal entities in the formation of its content. The private legal method of legal regulation is generally a method of equality; the public legal method of legal regulation is, on the contrary, vertical. Deciding on a compulsory restriction on property rights is a second category, since a compulsory restriction on property rights is decided regardless of the will of the debtor.
22. The Constitutional Court referred to these conclusions (and referred to them in the preamble) in the appellant referred to in resolution sp. zn. He also stated that the private or public nature of the interference in property law, not the legal nature of the property right itself, was decisive in determining whether a case would be discussed and decided in civil or administrative justice. In the particular case under examination, he therefore concluded that the review of the administrative decision on the establishment of a material burden, issued pursuant to Article 17 (3) of Act No. 13 / 1997 Coll., on road, falls within the substantive competence of administrative courts, not general courts.
23. However, these legal interpretations and conclusions concern legislation from before the adoption of the Expropriation Act. At that time, the issue of the expropriation and limitation of property ownership rights was dispersed into several legal standards, with the centre of gravity in Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act). None of the procedural issues of the judicial review of the expropriation rules were specifically addressed, so it was treated entirely under the general rules of the judicial review of administrative decisions. The determination of the power to decide on the substance of the case was in the dualism of the judicial review of the acts of the public administration of cases of interpretation by competent judicial institutions - in particular the Supreme Administrative Court and the Special Chamber established under Act No. 131 / 2002 Coll.
24. By adopting the Expropriation Act, the legal status of the initial judicial review under the decisions given to it has fundamentally changed. The power to discuss and decide these matters has been conferred on the courts carrying out civil proceedings. The interpretation of the expropriation proceedings to date was still unsustainable. The logical response was then the decision of the Special Chamber established pursuant to Act No. 131 / 2002 Coll., which, by order of 8.6.2007 No. Konf 4 / 2007-6, published under No. 1312 / 2007 Coll., NSS, appointed a court in civil proceedings as competent to give an action against the decision of the Regional Office on the establishment of a substantive burden; the same decision was taken later on in similar cases, sp. zf 34 / 2007, sp. zn. He stated that on 1 January 2007 the Expropriation Act, which amended the substantive and procedural issues of the withdrawal or restriction of property rights, including the rules on expropriation proceedings, was in force. The examination and decision of the expropriation case has been expressly entrusted to the courts in civil proceedings pursuant to Part Five of the Civil Code. This power is based on the fact that the expropriation act itself was issued before the effective date of the law.
25. The Constitutional Court states, moreover, that the Special Chamber acted in a constitutional manner when the decision-making of the relevant conflicts of competence was adapted to the new legislation. Such a procedure is in line with the principle of division, since the courts provide protection for rights in the manner laid down by law (Article 90 of the Constitution). The expression of legislative and judicial power and their mutual balancing is also an imperative, according to which the judge is bound by law and by an international treaty, which is part of the rule of law (Article 95 (1) of the Constitution). In other words, the law is determining for the court, not the opinion of teaching or practice on the nature of the expropriation act. The criterion of the review of the Law by the Constitutional Court is its compliance with the Constitution, not whether it corresponds to the opinion of the doctrine. The fact that the legislature deviates from the way legal practice looks at it on a permanent basis does not without further contradiction such regulation with constitutional order. A different interpretation would contradict the position and mission of the judiciary and would unduly affect the balance of relations between the legislature and the judiciary.
26. It can be noted, as an additional argument, that the Constitutional Court does not consider that there is an unconstitutional or change in the practice of decision-making in the context of unchanged legislation, as a result of the alleged infringement of the new legislation. He stated (e.g. the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 613 / 06, http: / / nalus.ujud.cz /) that the case-law cannot be without development and is not excluded from being supplemented not only by new interpretative conclusions but also changed. In view of the need to maintain the principle of predictability of judicial decision-making, particularly when it comes to the practice of the highest judicial instance also called upon to unify the case-law of the lower courts, the legislation in force prescribes specific and binding rules on the taking of decisions in situations where their existing caselaw is to be overcome. All the more so, according to the Constitutional Court, it cannot be described as a preserved modification of procedural procedures.
(B)
27. The contested principle of the division of power in the state, or the principle of the division of private and public relations and their judicial protection, is as follows:
28. The evaluation of this objection has already been indicated above by the Constitutional Court. Article 2 (1) The Constitution is the source of all state power to the people and exercises it through the authorities of power legislative, executive and judicial. The constitutional definition of the legislative power (Article 15 (1) of the Constitution) gives the legislator wide scope to decide how the institute specifically modifies it. Therefore, the opinion of the application practice is not bound by its reasoning. If it decides to change a rule, even if it is experienced in the public awareness, it is only political responsibility for such a decision. The appellant must realise that justice is a realist of a uniform, normally expressed state will. Other than the weight of its expert arguments, it cannot influence the form of the law. Nor can the Constitutional Court, which is merely a negative legislator, do so, only in connection with the control of the constitutionality of the law, not with its "doctrine purity." In the present case, it is not a case of omission by a legislature who is in breach of fundamental rights, but rather of his intention to regulate in a certain way the judicial control of expropriation proceedings.
29. The appellant's objection that the contested legislation contravenes the principle of the division of public and private law relations and their judicial protection can only be commented on as long as it lacks a full constitutional dimension. In the view of the Constitutional Court, private and public law is currently not separated by a "Chinese wall '. The legal order of the Czech Republic is based on the dualism of public and private law. However, this distinction between two large areas of law based on classical Roman law cannot be taken dogmatically. A view of the characteristics characteristic of the area may be changed and changed, which is also illustrated by the above-mentioned evolution of the assessment of the nature of the expropriation decision or the forced restriction of property rights. In any event, the Constitutional Court is not the one who could interfere with the transfer of legal institutes from one area to another with its derogation powers.
30. The division of relations into public and private law in connection with the subsequent judicial review was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in its decision sp. zn. IV. ÚS 349 / 03 of 26.2.2004 (U 8 / 32 CollNU 501). The case concerned the decision to delete the mark and the Constitutional Court, in response to the dispute over the stamp agenda, stated, inter alia: "The Constitutional Court would go beyond its competence if it had taken a decision on the division of the administrative justice agenda according to the public and private legal nature of the relations which are the subject of the dispute. It is a matter of general justice to find a line between a set of public and private relations. It can be indistinct.... The Constitutional Court, as a judicial authority called upon to protect a specific category of fundamental rights only after the failure of other administrative and judicial authorities, does not feel the need to resolve that legal and theoretical dispute. The scope of public and private law is a matter of simple, not fundamental, human rights, whether substantive (the right to property under Article 11, the right to the results of creative intellectual activity under Article 34 or other rights), or procedural (the right to judicial and other legal protection under Article 36 and other Charter). ';
31. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that constitutional parameters must show the judiciary as such. From the point of view of the guarantees of the fundamental rights of the parties to the expropriation proceedings, which is primarily the case under the Constitutional Court, it is irrelevant whether judicial protection will take place under the rules of the administrative or civil order. In the end, these fundamental rights can be equally well protected or neglected by the second branch of the current Czech administrative justice.
C)
32. To the appellant's conviction that the contested regulation is contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter:
33. Article 36 (1) The Charter may be invoked by any person in accordance with the procedure laid down in his or her right in an independent and impartial court and in specified cases by another authority. The appellant referred to in the second paragraph of that Article gives anyone who claims that he or she has been shortened in his or her rights by a decision of a public authority the opportunity to appeal to the court to examine the legality of such a decision, unless otherwise provided for by the law. However, decisions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, the protection of which is enshrined in the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, must not be excluded from the judicial review. According to paragraph 4 of that Article, the conditions and details of the review are governed by law. The law which addresses in the case under consideration the question of the power to review the administrative decision issued is the Expropriation Act. The requirement of the Charter for the form of the rule is therefore fulfilled and it is possible to talk about improvements in this respect compared to the situation prior to the adoption of the Expropriation Act; a clear determination of the jurisdiction of the court to carry out the proceedings increases the legal certainty of its parties.
34. As has already been said, the Constitutional Court interprets the Charter of the Guaranteed Right of Judicial Protection materially, in the sense that it depends on the actual fulfilment of its content, and it is irrelevant whether the protection is actually provided by courts in the judicial or administrative sector. It is about maintaining the benefits of judicial review. It is therefore the task of the Constitutional Court to ensure that the party (essentially) receives legal protection against an act of public authority, but whether it will be in the system of judicial courts in civil proceedings or administrative courts, it is indecisive, since the boundary of public and private law is not a matter of fundamental human rights and freedoms (by analogy, the finding of sp. zn.
35. The judicial review of the expropriation acts is guaranteed and modified - even if not in the applicant's opinion and (at least) part of the professional public is ideal. Thus, the infringement of Article 36 (2) of the Charter, which does not provide any further details as to the procedural arrangements for the review of a decision by a public authority, cannot be raised.
D)
36. The objection to the infringement under Article 38 of the Charter:
37. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of that provision of the Charter, no one may be removed from his legal judge, the jurisdiction of both the court and the judge being determined by law. Paragraph 2 of the provision guarantees everyone the right to have their case dealt with publicly, without undue delay and in its presence and to be able to comment on all the evidence carried out. The public may be excluded only in cases provided for by law.
38. The constitutional imperative, according to which no one must be removed from his legal judge, is to protect against the manipulation of the occupancy of the present court. It is intended to prevent accidental or even purposeful decision-making in a particular case of ad hoc to a court or judge or senate that would otherwise not be subject to such decision-making. Practically, it is about assigning an agenda according to predefined general rules. Only a court of law can be a judge of a legal court, a court which has jurisdiction to hear the case and which is competent (in fact, locally, functionally).
39. Where the power to review acts under the Expropriation Act has provided for a law, that is to say a general law, the power to review acts under the Law on Expropriation for the courts carrying out civil proceedings is excluded from the concept of violating the right to a legal judge; the rule applies without reference to a particular participant and (or) a particular case. It is essential (cf. Findings sp. zn. In the present case, the Constitutional Court did not find the contrary and was not, in the end, objected.
40. Neither could the Constitutional Court consider the reasons for the proposal, nor could it be argued that the right to discuss the case was infringed without undue delay, since the new designation of competence lost the time of the participants already served in the administrative judiciary. Although the Constitutional Court is right here to the appellant that delays in the marked right of a participant may occur. However, these cases will have to be assessed individually. However, even a positive conclusion on delays in individual proceedings cannot lead to the deregulation of the contested legislation; the solution can only be the State's responsibility for handling its agenda. Moreover, this argument has a short-term impact on the appellant, since such delays may only concern proceedings initiated and not completed before the Expropriation Act is effective.
(E)
41. To the alleged violation of the prohibition of retroactivity:
42. Legal science recognizes retroactivity by right and retroactivity by wrong. True retroactivity involves cases where the rule of law also reflects the establishment of a legal relationship and claims arising from it before it is effective. Incorrect retroactivity is that the legal relationships of both substantive and procedural law which arose under the validity of the old law are, in principle, governed by that law until the new law is effective; However, after its effectiveness, it shall be governed by new law. As regards procedural standards, it can generally be concluded that, if the application (application), lodged under the law previously in force and at the same time admissible under that law, would subsequently be rejected by the Court as inadmissible as a result of a change in legislation. Such a procedure would mean that negotiations under the original rules of law would become legally irrelevant on the basis of the application of the legislation of a new (more precisely, on the basis of the new legal situation) (see, by analogy, resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 526 / 03 or I. ÚS 673 / 03, http: / / nalus.ujud.cz /). However, this is not the case now under examination where judicial control is maintained, only transferred to "another college."
43. In the present case, the question at all is whether the retroactive application of the contested provisions can be discussed. With the express legal regulation of the judicial review of expropriation or the designation of a court having jurisdiction to bring proceedings, the legislator came up with a situation where only the case law dealt with this issue. So it is not about changing or replacing existing legislation, but it is about changing the decision-making practice, when the new rule already has an explicit basis in the law.
44. In any event, it should be taken into account that it is a procedural law problem where, after the new procedural regulation has taken effect, the procedural arrangements continue to be followed accordingly, with the procedural effects of the earlier acts being maintained), unless the transitional provisions provide otherwise. Also, in the case under consideration, the procedural effects of the actions taken are maintained, so that the parties have not been prepared for the possibility of judicial review by the entry into force of the Expropriation Act, but are instructed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Paragraph 46 (2) of the Administrative Rules on the possibility of bringing an action to the court of substance. In other words, neither the right to review administrative decisions nor any other procedural right is removed or narrowed to the parties as a result of the new regulation, so they are not in a worse position than when they brought the original action (see, mutatis mutandis, resolution sp. zn. III. As in the case currently under examination, the legislature followed the adoption of the Administrative Rules of Procedure (§ 129 (2); the regulation did not raise any doubts between the parties to its constitutionality. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has already dealt with cases where this transitional provision has been applied (although it has not been confronted with an objection quite identical to the one currently under consideration), without having considered it necessary to deal more closely with the temporal scope [e.g. the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 117 / 05 of 5.10.2005 (N 190 / 39 SbNU 27) or resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 59 / 04, http: / / nalus.ujud.cz /].
45. The principle of negotiation does not apply in the abstract control of standards, and the Constitutional Court is therefore not bound by the grounds for the proposal, but is, on the contrary, obliged to examine the contested provision also from a point of view of compliance with constitutional law other than that for which the appellants challenge it. However, he did not find any violations of any other rules.
46. The reasons put forward led the Constitutional Court to conclude that the proposal under examination must be rejected under the provisions of Paragraph 70 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.
47. The oral hearing was abandoned under Paragraph 44 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act as it could not be expected to further clarify the case and all participants agreed to this procedure.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Court of First Instance took a different position on the decision of Judge Eliška Wagner.
*) NB: Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 43, p. 13, p. 645
*) NB: Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 29, Found No. 33, p. 279, published under No. 101 / 2003 Coll.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 171 / 2009 Coll., as amended by the Amending Order of 27 May 2009 concerning the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 184 / 2006 Coll., on the withdrawal or limitation of property rights to land or construction (Expropriation Act) |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 18.06.2009 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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