The Constitutional Court found No 153 / 2004 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 11 February 2004 on the application for annulment of the provisions of § 243c (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
07.04.2004
153
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
On 11 February 2004, the Constitutional Court decided in plenary on the proposal of minors J. and P. B., represented by the mother of M. B., to repeal the provisions of § 243c (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended,
as follows:
Paragraph 243c (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, is deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.
Reasons
By application submitted to the Constitutional Court on 2.9.2002 (sp. zn. IV ÚS 582 / 02), the complainants - minors J. B. and P. B., represented by the mother of M. B., legally represented by JUDr. A. J., demand that the Constitutional Court annul the order of the Supreme Court of 19.6.2002 No 33 Odo 360 / 2002-127, judgment of the Regional Court of Prague of 22.1.2002. No 28 Co 11 / 2002-111 and judgment of the Regional Court in Příbrami of 17.10.2001 No 11 C 165 / 97-81.
Together with the constitutional complaint, the complainants submitted a proposal to repeal the provisions of § 243c (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter "o.s. ').
The Fourth Chamber of the Constitutional Court, after having stated that the application of the contested provision had brought about one of the facts which were the subject of a constitutional complaint, i.e. that the conditions laid down in § 74 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law ') had been fulfilled and that the application for annulment of § 243c (2) o. s. o.
The appellants consider the provisions of § 243c (2) o. s., allowing the Supreme Court not to justify a decision of appeal at all, to be contradictory to everyone's right to a fair trial, in particular Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention '). This Convention is, in their view, a treaty pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), thus directly binding and takes precedence over the law. In support of their view, they argue by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular drawing attention to the judgment of 21 January 1999 in García Ruiz v Spain, which clearly states that" According to settled case law of the Court of First Instance, reflecting the principle of the proper conduct of justice, judicial decisions must, to a sufficient extent, state the reasons on which they are based.' Furthermore, the appellants point out that the scope of this obligation may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Ruiz Torija and Hiro Balani against Spain, 1994, Higgins and others against France, 1998). Finally, they refer to the conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights that, although Article 6 (1) obliges the courts to justify their decisions, this commitment cannot be understood as requiring a detailed reply to each argument (see Van Hurk against the Netherlands, 1994). Thus, when rejecting the appeal in principle, the Court of Appeal may limit itself to accepting the reasoning of the lower court (see Helle v Finland, 1997).
The appellants are of the opinion that, in the two headings of the cases covered by the contested provision of Paragraph 243c (2) (b), when the Supreme Court may waive the reasoning, it is not merely a procedural decision in the case (for example, refusal by late filing or lodging by an unjustified person), but the Court of Appeal must provisionally resolve the question concerning the substance of the case and conclude that it is not a matter of fundamental legal importance or that the appeal is manifestly unfounded. It must therefore deal with matters of substantive law. If it is then one of the main tasks of the Supreme Court to work on the harmonisation of the case-law of the lower courts by its interpretation of the law in individual cases, then, according to the appellants, this role must be fulfilled, even if only by a brief but clear reference, such as the decision of the Supreme Court in a similar case. However, it is difficult to talk about fulfilling this role when the complainants do not even know why it is not a matter of fundamental legal importance, or why the appeal is manifestly unfounded. The appellants therefore conclude that, if the law of the Court of Justice does not justify a decision at all, although the Convention establishes in Article 6 (1) the right of each party to the proceedings to provide sufficient evidence of the reasons on which the decision is based, it directly infringes the right to a fair trial. No justification can ever be sufficient.
In the observations requested by the Constitutional Court under Section 69 of the Act, the two chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic stated the following:
In particular, the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic stated that it was not possible to take a qualified opinion on the submitted proposal without expressing any wider consideration of the tasks of the judiciary, as well as the limits given to it by constitutionally guaranteed human rights and freedoms. Due to the dissatisfaction of the Czech society with the work of the judiciary as well as the unfavourable view of its results by the European Communities, one of the steps was taken in 2000 to remedy this negative social phenomenon by adopting Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. The law in its entirety represented not only significant interference in the modification of the Czech civil process, but was also conceived and presented as an important contribution to the reform of the Czech judiciary at all. The declared objective of Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. was, inter alia, to remove unnecessary delays in the activities of the courts. On the basis of this, the legislature's efforts to provide legal means to the courts can also be retroactively generalized and, in a way, forced to behave in such a way as to show all the characteristics of a fair trial in relation to the parties to the dispute. The incorporation of the contested Section 243c (2) into the Civil Code may also be regarded as a legislative instrument of the intended purpose, without forgetting that the effect is significant both for the court (removal of unnecessary formalism) and for the parties (shortening of the length of the process).
According to the Constitution, courts in a democratic rule of law based on division of power are called primarily on to provide protection for subjective rights in the legal manner. If the legislator has defined the Supreme Court as the Supreme Court of the General Judicial Tribunal, and under the law "imposed" on it to ensure the legality and unity of decision-making, it is clear that, if the Supreme Court is to fulfil its task, it must also have adequate legal means to do so. In the context of the instance procedure of decision-making in the matter, such a means is an institution of appeal. The appeal is exceptional in the nature of the case, which allows the Supreme Court to carry out the above tasks, but only if it is not an unrivalled instrument, i.e. only another in a row. Therefore, the Civil Code lays down, inter alia, a number of the formal and material conditions for its admissibility [for example, in § 237 (1) (c) and, mutatis mutandis, in § 238 and 238a of the Civil Code, the material condition of admissibility is the conclusion by the Court of Appeal that the case itself is of fundamental legal importance and, in § 243b (1) of the Civil Code, that it is not an unfounded matter at first sight]. It is therefore concluded from the above that the contested provision of Paragraph 243c (2) of the Civil Code, which is ideally based on the strengthening of the principle of the effectiveness or economy of the civil process, is, from a legislative point of view, a provision which formally implements that principle to the effect rather than "provisions primarily protective '.
According to the Senate, the appellants cannot be accused of reducing their constitutionally guaranteed protection of the right to a fair trial as a result of the application of § 243c (2) (c), by allowing the Supreme Court, in legally defined cases of inadmissibility, to waive the grounds for its refusal. Decisions taken pursuant to Article 243c (2) CS, i.e. those which do not contain a detailed analysis of the grounds for refusal in the statement of reasons, do not in itself mean that the matter has not been properly dealt with and properly regulated. In accordance with its legal tasks and legal means, the Supreme Court will always provisionally conclude whether the case, or the decision of the Court of Appeal, is of fundamental importance in law and therefore of relevance to the decision-making activities of the courts at all, and not only for a specific case (after all, the law itself in § 237 (3) CS "justifies' when the case or decision of the Court of Appeal is not considered to be essential in law). However, such a decision is consumed by its subsequent procedure. A similar course of action is taken by the court, even if the appeal is admissible but manifestly unfounded. If the Supreme Court considers that it refuses the application without stating the reasons, it shall state in writing why it did so. In any event, the party to the proceedings shall know the reason for the inadmissibility of the notice. On this issue, it can only be added that the Supreme Court, as a court of order or from the point of view of the matter of the law, the extraordinary court is bound by the law on courts and judges by internal control mechanisms against possible undesired fragmentation, such as decisions in large chambers of colleges.
The Senate also recalled that the appellants invoke Article 6 of the Convention, but cite Article 10 of the Constitution as already invalid. By means of the "new 'version of Article 10 In relation to international law, the Czech Republic has applied for the principle of moderate monism with the so-called application priority of international treaties, where the international treaty provides for something other than law. For this reason, the impossibility of using the legal basis of the above mentioned Convention for the proposal for the repeal of the relevant provisions of the Treaty can be contested, since the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) fully covers the issue of the right to a fair trial in its Title Five. Finally, the Senate stated that it had no doubts about the conformity of the contested provision with both the constitutional order of the Czech Republic pursuant to Article 112 (1) of the Constitution and, at the time, express verbis of the constitutionally recognised category of international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 10 of the Constitution.
The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic first recalled in its observations how Article 6 (1) of the Convention is interpreted, particularly in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It pointed out that the specificities of justice in the various Contracting States must be respected and therefore neither the means by which the "right to trial 'should be implemented nor the methods of organisation of the judiciary are required. In its view, the requirements of Article 6 (1) of the Convention are in accordance with Articles 36 and 38 of the Charter in our national law, providing, in accordance with Article 36 (4) of the Charter, details, inter alia, of the Civil Code. The complainant contested § 243c (2) was incorporated by Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. The text of the amendment was adopted in accordance with Article 10 of the Constitution and having regard to Article 6 (1) of the Convention, including the case-law of the European Court of Justice relating to that provision. The main aim was to remove unnecessary delays from the activities of the courts (Article 38 (2) of the Charter) so that the courts decide on rights and obligations within a reasonable time (Article 6 (1) of the Convention). In this context, however, the House drew attention to the fact that the appellants state that the Convention is a treaty under Article 10 of the Constitution, hence" directly binding and takes precedence over the law'. Cited version of Article 10 However, the Constitution is invalid as it was amended by Constitutional Law No 395 / 2001 Coll. with effect from 1 June 2002.
The House further stated that if the Court of First Instance finds, pursuant to Article 243c (2), that the contested decision is not of legal importance or is not admissible pursuant to Article 237 (1) (c) or similar application of that provision in Sections 238 and 238a, it would reject such an application. Since the reason for the refusal of an appeal is obvious, the resolution on refusal of an appeal does not need to contain a justification; the reasons for the order shall be given by the court if it is necessary to unify the decision-making activities of the courts. For the same reasons, the order rejecting the appeal under Paragraph 243b (1) need not be justified.
Finally, it is stated that the law was passed by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies on 12 January 2000, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities, and was duly declared. In this state of affairs, the Chamber of Deputies believes that the law adopted is in line with the Constitution and our rule of law.
The Constitutional Court also asked for an opinion on the submitted proposal by the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court (Sections 48 (2) and 49 (1) of the Act).
The Ministry of Justice took the view that the contested provision constitutes an exception to the general interpretation of the preamble to the order by which the Court of First Instance takes its decision on the substance of the case, within the meaning of Sections 169 (4) and 157 (2) and (4) respectively. In principle, the Court of First Instance would merely repeat the relevant provisions of the law, which give very clear criteria for the refusal of an application - either it is not a decision which is of fundamental legal importance or it is manifestly unfounded. The admissibility of an appeal as an exceptional remedy in cases referred to in § 237 (1) (c) o. s. However, this consideration is very narrowly limited. If the contested decision of the appellate court is correct, in accordance with the caselaw and otherwise impeccable, there is neither sufficient factual evidence to justify it to the extent that it is envisaged in particular by Article 157 (2) (c) of the EC Treaty.
The Ministry also pointed out that the appeal is an extraordinary remedy, which is only admissible when the law provides for it (not based on the principle of universality, as is the case with the appeal), and its purpose is, in addition to the decision-making of individual cases, to influence the unification of the caselaw. If the Court of Appeal finds that an appeal is not admissible pursuant to Article 237 (1) (c) CS, since the contested decision does not have a legal basis, or that the appeal is manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 243b (1) CS, it assumes that the decision of the appellate court is correct and that, even in the light of its reasoning, the court of appeal does not have any reason to supply anything. The fact that such a resolution does not justify the refusal of an appeal cannot be contrary to the right to a fair trial, because the possible reasoning of the order of the appeal court could only point to the correct conclusions of the appellate court. Therefore, there is no procedural economic justification for such a resolution at all, since the dispute was resolved by the Court of Appeal correctly and the reasoning of the Court of Appeal cannot be of benefit in this situation either to the parties or to the harmonisation of case law. For these reasons, the Ministry of Justice is satisfied that the content of § 243c (2) o. s., which does not require the court to justify its order, cannot be regarded as a breach of the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
The Supreme Court, in its Opinion of 28 March 2003, referred in part to the observations made by the President of the Chamber in the context of the proceedings on a constitutional complaint, which decided to appeal to a particular case in which it was held that the contested provision does not contradict the right of a participant to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention. The contested provision of o.s. on the fact that, in the cases provided for, the order of refusal of appeal is not justified, was enshrined in the Civil Code in order to accelerate and reduce the appeal procedure before the Supreme Court. In doing so, it must be seen that this procedure is an extraordinary appeal procedure, so that it does not in any way interfere with the principle of the two-instance civil procedure (the Supreme Court is the third instance in this case), and the European Union and most of its states consider that two judicial proceedings are sufficient. It cannot be considered that the contested provision interferes with the constitutional right of a participant to a fair trial, as it fulfils the requirement of speeding up and streamlining judicial proceedings in cases where, by unnecessarily justified decisions of appeal (more or not devoid of character), the Supreme Court has the capacity to unify judicial practice and to decide on matters of major importance. The arguments of complainants referring to the specific case law of the European Court of Human Rights apply to the Court of Appeal, not to the Court of Appeal.
Finally, the Supreme Court's opinion states that the views expressed are also consistent with the rationalisation trend in civil court proceedings in Germany and other EU states.
After examining the arguments put forward by the appellants and considering the above observations and opinions, the Constitutional Court concluded that the application was justified. It was based on the following considerations.
It can be attested to the objections of the two chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as well as of the Ministry of Justice, that the arguments of the appellants overlook the fact that, with effect from 1 June 2002, the issue of Constitutional Law No 395 / 2001 Coll. laid down the application priority of international treaties in the legal order of the Czech Republic, resulting in the impossibility of referring to the original wording of Article 10 of the Constitution. Nor can the Supreme Court be accused of the fact that the specific judgments of the European Court of Human Rights referred to by the appellants relate more to the requirements imposed on the justification of decisions of the court of appeal or appeal. However, that reasoning error does not in itself render the proposal unfounded.
It is clear from the observations of the two chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic, as well as from the expert opinions of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, that the main objective of the application of the contested provision by Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. is to remove unnecessary delays in the activities of the courts, in particular to facilitate the position of the Supreme Court, namely compliance with the requirements of Article 38 (2) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention as regards the decision of the courts within a reasonable and reasonable time. Such an objective is undoubtedly legitimate, but the means to achieve it should not conflict with the right of a party to fair, equal and agreeable treatment.
The Constitutional Court has already expressed the requirements to be applied to decisions of general courts in a number of its decisions. First of all, he stated that the independence of decision-making of the general courts takes place within a constitutional and legal procedural and substantive framework. The procedural framework is primarily the principles of a sound and fair process, as they result from Article 36 et seq. of the Charter and Article 1 of the Constitution. One of these principles, which is part of the right to due process, as well as the concept of the rule of law (Article 36 (1) of the Charter, Article 1 of the Constitution) and excluding any libel in decision-making, is the duty of the courts to justify their judgments (page III of the ÚS 84 / 94, Collection of Finals and Order of the Constitutional Court, Volume 3, Found No 34, p. 257). In Case C-176 / 96, the Constitutional Court took the view that if one of the purposes of judicial jurisdiction is to be met, namely the requirement of "education to maintain the law... respect for the rights of fellow citizens' (§ 1 of the Civil Code), it is essential that decisions of general courts not only correspond to the law in substance and be given for full respect of the procedural standards, but also that the reasoning given in relation to the law required by the law in respect of the law, as a non-separable part of the" procedure '- the constitutional criteria of the Charter (Article 38 (3) of the Civil Code) should not only correspond to the law in full respect of the rules of procedure and, i.e. the law required by the law, which is justified upon the grounds of the judgment. Similarly, as in the factual field, and in the area of insufficiently interpreted and well-founded legal arguments, similar consequences arise for incompleteness and, in particular, inconclusive decisions, which, however, is contrary not only to the requested purpose of the court proceedings, but also to the principles of a fair trial (Article 36 (1) of the Charter), as the Constitutional Court understands.
For the present case, the finding, sp. zn. III. ÚS 206 / 98 (Collection of findings and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 11, Found No 80, p. 231 et seq.) is also relevant, in which the Constitutional Court stated that part of the constitutional framework of the independence of the courts is their duty to ensure equality in the rights arising from Article 1 of the Charter. Therefore, equality in rights in relation to the ordinary courts constitutes, among other things, the right to the same decision in the same cases, while excluding any preference in the application of the law.
On the other hand, however, the Constitutional Court also stated in its caselaw that the right of appeal was not guaranteed by the Constitution, and this extraordinary appeal, which makes civil and criminal proceedings available to the parties, therefore goes beyond the constitutional rules of procedure (Resolution No 18, p. 381).
In spite of the fact that the constitutional order does not give rise to a right of appeal, or to another so-called exceptional remedy, the Constitutional Court considered it a key assessment of whether the legislature's choice of procedure sufficiently eliminates any insolence in the application of the law, which is undoubtedly part of the rule of law. In other words, whether the fact that a procedural institution goes beyond the constitutional requirements is sufficient in itself to conclude that it is not necessary to lay down the criteria resulting from the present case-law of the Constitutional Court to justify a decision on such a device, or that those criteria are neither necessary nor proportionate. Another question to which the Constitutional Court had to answer was whether the limitation of the right of the complainant to know (in certain cases), for which reasons the Supreme Court rejected his proposal, was proportionate to the objective pursued, or whether it could at all serve that objective.
The explanatory memorandum to the provisions of § 243c (2) CS states that, since the cause for which the Supreme Court rejects the appeal is obvious, there is no need to justify the decision. In the same spirit, the two chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic and the opinion of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court were also heard. However, according to the Constitutional Court, this argument is unconvincing, as the "manifest" cause is de facto expressed only by reference to the text of the relevant provision. Therefore, the appellant will not know, albeit briefly, why the Supreme Court did not consider the issue referred to him in the appeal as a matter of fundamental legal importance, or why he considered the submissions made manifestly unfounded. In this regard, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court is irreparable, which could perhaps stand up if the Supreme Court were indeed the last judicial body to deal with the matter. In view of the position of the Constitutional Court and of the European Court of Human Rights, however, the absence of any justification makes it impossible to assess, even in gross terms, the reasons for the decision and, if the case is brought before them, the obligation of the Supreme Court to justify its decision (in fact retrospectively).
Within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is for each State to regulate the judicial system and the relations between its various stages. If so-called extraordinary remedies had not been allowed at all, such an arrangement would undoubtedly have stood up from this point of view and from a constitutional point of view. On the other hand, when such funds are admitted, their adjustment in the legal state should in principle be the same for all types of legal proceedings or differ only if there are reasonable grounds for doing so. However, the comparison of the elements which must include the decision on the appeal in civil and criminal proceedings, or those required by the administrative rules in the decision on the appeal, implies substantial differences, the rationale of which is not apparent to the Constitutional Court.
If rejected By the Supreme Court of Appeal in criminal proceedings, the law requires him to briefly state the reason for the refusal, referring to the circumstances relating to the legal ground for refusal (§ 265i (2) of the Rules of Procedure). The comment on the Code of Criminal Procedure then refers to the fact that the characteristic character - concise - will necessarily affect the reason for the refusal of the application. They shall request a more comprehensive statement of reasons, stating in the comment, the reasons set out in Article 265i (1) (b), (c) and in particular (f), if it is to be answered why a question is not of fundamental legal importance. It is therefore apparent from the comparison with the requirements for the reasoning of the decision on appeal in civil proceedings that, in principle, a case of the same nature may be decided by the Supreme Court in a completely different manner in the light of the requirements for the reasoning of its decision. It follows from the comparison of the different requirements for the reasoning of the decisions of appeal with those for the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court on the appeal, that the administrative rules in Paragraph 55 (4) make it possible not only to justify a resolution which does not terminate the proceedings and which does not impose an obligation on anyone. The judgment does not know this law without justification (§ 54). Since the provisions of Section 120 of the Administrative Rules apply mutatis mutandis to the appeal proceedings under Title I of Part Three of the Administrative Rules, it can be concluded that the decision on the appeal must always be justified by the Supreme Administrative Court.
It is clear from the foregoing that, in the various proceedings before the courts of the same State, in a procedural situation, if not identical, it is very similar (a party is seeking the annulment of a final judgment on the grounds of an error of law, or that the highest body of the system of courts is asked to raise a question which the party considers to be a fundamental and not yet resolved), the party cannot be treated differently without clear reasonable grounds for such action.
The argument that a refusal of appeal in civil proceedings without justification will contribute to the decision-making of the courts within a reasonable time (which is undoubtedly a legitimate objective) will also not stand, according to the conviction of the Constitutional Court. The limitation of the right of a party to appeal in civil matters to know the reason why the Supreme Court has decided as it has decided can serve the declared objective at least (if at all). The statement of brief reasons on which the Supreme Court has relied on its negative judgment (e.g. by citing the judges of that court, who have dealt with the case and whose change or deviation has not been found by the Court of First Instance) cannot significantly burden the Supreme Court and therefore not significantly affect the overall duration of the proceedings; Therefore, the limitation of the rights of the party to the appeal appears to be a manifestly disproportionate objective pursued. In this context, the view expressed in the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Delcourt case (1970 A 11, § 25), according to which the right to the proper functioning of justice is so important in a democratic society that it is impossible to sacrifice suitability. Justice must not only be pursued, but must also be seen to be pursued.
For the reasons set out above, the plenary of the Constitutional Court decided to abolish Article 243c (2) EC for its contradiction with the principles of the rule of law (Article 1 of the Constitution) as well as with the principle of equality (Article 1 of the Charter), as interpreted by the Constitutional Court in its previous case-law, and did not find any grounds to defer the enforceability of that decision.
President of the Constitutional Court:
v. JUDr. Holländer v. r.
Vice-President
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 153 / 2004 Coll., on the application for annulment of the provisions of § 243c (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended |
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| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 07.04.2004 |
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| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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