What is Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll.?

Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the Amendment of Certain Acts (Act on the Protection of Competition) — Law on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition).

When it became Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. effectiveness?

Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. became effective 01.07.2001.

Is Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. still valid?

Yes, Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. is still valid and effective.

How many times was it Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. amended?

Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. has 21 time versions of the text.

Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll. - Law on the Protection of Competition and...

143

THE LAW

of 4 April 2001

on the protection of competition and on the amendment of certain laws (competition law)

Parliament has decided on this law of the Czech Republic:

ČÁST PRVNÍ

PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

HLAVA I

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

§ 1

Preliminary provisions

(1) This Law provides for the protection of competition in the market for goods and services ("goods') against its exclusion, restriction, other distortion or threat (" disturbances').

(a) agreements between competitors (§ 3 (1)),

(b) abuse of the dominant position of competitors;

(c) by combining competitors; or

(d) public authorities in the exercise of public administration, local authorities in the exercise of self-government and in the delegated exercise of public administration and public interest authorities in the delegated exercise of public administration ("public authorities").

(2) This Act implements the relevant European Union23), following directly applicable European Union24), and further regulates the procedure for applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty"), the authorities of the Czech Republic and certain issues of their synergies with the European Commission1 (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") and the authorities of the other Member States of the European Union in the procedure provided for in Council Regulation (EC) on the implementation of the competition rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation" of the Council on the control of concentrations of undertakings 1b).

(3) (c) competitors who, on the basis of a special law or a decision given under a special law, provide services of general economic importance shall be subject to that law only if its application does not make it impossible to provide such services.

(4) That law shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings concerning competitors whose conduct could affect trade between Member States of the European Union pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty.

(5) This law also applies to the conduct of competitors abroad which distorts or threatens to distort competition in the Czech Republic.

(6) This law shall not apply to the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, the effects of which are manifested exclusively on the foreign market, unless the international agreement to which the Czech Republic is bound results otherwise.

(7) Furthermore, this law does not apply to the protection of competition against unfair competion.2)

§ 2

Definition of certain terms

(1) Competitors under this law are natural and legal persons, their associations, associations of such associations and other forms of grouping, even if such associations and groups are not legal persons if they participate in or may influence their activities, even if they are not entrepreneurs.

(2) The relevant market is the market for goods which, in terms of their characteristics, price and intended use, are identical, comparable or interchangeable in the territory in which the competitive conditions are sufficiently homogeneous and clearly distinct from neighbouring territories.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, the communication of reservations shall mean written notification to the parties of a potential distortion of competition in which the Office of Competition (hereinafter referred to as "the Office ') shall communicate a description of the action, indicate the main evidence, communicate the legal qualifications and administrative penalties it intends to impose.

HLAVA II

COMPETITION AGREEMENTS

§ 3

(1) Agreements between competitors, decisions of their associations and concerted practices (hereinafter referred to as "agreements"), the object or effect of which is to distort competition, are prohibited and invalid, (4) unless otherwise provided for in this or in a separate law, or unless the Authority authorises an exemption from this prohibition by implementing legislation. Agreements which have a negligible impact on competition are not considered prohibited.

(2) Agreements prohibited under paragraph 1 shall, in particular, prohibit agreements the object or effect of which is to distort competition because they contain provisions on:

(a) direct or indirect determination of prices and, where appropriate, other commercial conditions;

(b) restrictions or controls on production, sales, research and development or investment;

(c) the distribution of the market or sources of purchase;

(d) that the conclusion of a contract is to be linked to the acceptance of further transactions which are not, in substance or according to commercial practices and principles of fair trade with the subject-matter of the contract;

(e) the application of different conditions to individual competitors in the same or comparable transactions which disadvantage certain competitors in competition;

(f) that the parties to the agreement will not trade or otherwise cooperate economically with or otherwise cause harm to non-competitors (group boycott).

(3) If the reason for the prohibition concerns only part of the Agreement, only that part shall be prohibited and invalid. However, where the nature of the agreement, its content, its purpose or the circumstances in which it took place shows that it cannot be separated from the other content, the whole of the agreement shall be prohibited and invalid.

(4) The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements which:

(a) contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic development and provide consumers with a fair share of the benefits resulting therefrom;

(b) not impose on competitors restrictions which are not necessary to achieve the objectives referred to in (a);

(c) do not allow competitors to exclude competition in a substantial part of the market for goods the supply or purchase of which is the subject of an agreement.

§ 4

Block exemptions

(1) The prohibition provided for in Article 3 (1) does not apply to agreements which cannot affect trade between Member States of the European Union pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty, but fulfil the other conditions laid down by block exemptions adopted pursuant to Article 103 (1) of the Treaty for the implementation of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty by the relevant Commission or Council Regulations ("Union block exemptions") or by the exception in the field of agriculture (5).

(2) The Authority may also allow block exemptions for other types of agreements where it is demonstrated that the distortion of competition to which the block exemption would result is outweighed by advantages for other market participants, in particular consumers.

(3) By decision of an individual competitor, the Authority shall withdraw the benefit of the exemption provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 if, as a result of market developments, an agreement subject to such an exemption would not fulfil the conditions laid down in Paragraph 3 (4).

§ 5

Horizontal and vertical agreements

(1) Agreements between competitors operating at the same level of the goods market are horizontal agreements.

(2) Agreements between competitors operating at different levels of the goods market are vertical agreements.

(3) Mixed agreements between competitors that operate simultaneously at the same horizontal level and at different vertical levels of the goods market shall also be considered as horizontal agreements; in doubt, it is considered to be a horizontal agreement.

§ 7

(1) If the Office finds in the proceedings in cases referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5 that a prohibited agreement has been concluded, it shall state this in the decision and shall prohibit the implementation of the agreement for the future by this decision.

(2) The Office may suspend the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 and decide to accept commitments jointly proposed by the parties to the proceedings of the Office in favour of maintaining effective competition, the fulfilment of which will remove the concerns of its possible distortion. In such a decision, the Office may also lay down the conditions or obligations necessary to ensure that those obligations are fulfilled. Commitments may not be proposed in proceedings concerning the conclusion of a classified horizontal agreement or concerted practices aimed at distorting competition.

(3) Obligations referred to in paragraph 2 may be proposed in writing by the parties to proceedings to the Office no later than 15 days after the date on which the Office served them with a notice of reservations; the subsequent proposals shall be taken into account by the Office only in cases of special consideration. The parties to proceedings shall be bound by their proposal against the Office and between each other and, where appropriate, against third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the decision of the Office referred to in paragraph 2, comply with the Agreement as originally adopted.

(4) Once the decision referred to in paragraph 2 has become final, the Office may reopen the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 if:

(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 2 have changed substantially;

(b) competitors act in breach of their obligations under paragraph 2; or

(c) the decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall be made on the basis of false or incomplete evidence, data and information.

HLAVA III

DOMINANT STABILITY AND REDUCTION

§ 10

(1) The dominant position on the market is that of a competitor or together more competitors (joint dominance), which allows their market power to behave to a large extent independently of other competitors or consumers.

(2) Market power referred to in paragraph 1 The Authority shall assess, on the basis of the value expression of the quantities of supplies or purchases on the market of the goods concerned (market share) achieved by a competitor or by a competitor with common dominance in a period which is examined under this law and by other indicators, in particular the economic and financial strength of competitors, legal or other barriers to entry for other competitors, the degree of vertical integration of competitors, the structure of the market and the size of the market shares of the closest competitors.

(3) If the indicators referred to in paragraph 2 do not prove otherwise, the dominant position shall not be deemed to have been taken by a competitor or competitors with a common dominant position who have reached a market share of less than 40% in the period under examination.

§ 11

(1) Abuse of a dominant position on the detriment of other competitors or consumers is prohibited. The abuse of a dominant position is in particular:

(a) direct or indirect enforcement of unfair terms in contracts with other market participants, in particular enforcement of transactions which, at the time of conclusion of the contract, are manifestly disproportionate to the consideration granted;

(b) tying consent to the conclusion of a contract on condition that the other Party also withdraws other transactions which are not related to the subject-matter of the contract in substance or according to commercial practice;

(c) the application of different conditions in identical or comparable transactions to individual market participants which are disadvantaged in competition;

(d) stopping or restricting production, sales or research and development at the expense of consumers;

(e) the long-term offer and sale of goods at excessively low prices which have or may have the effect of distorting competition;

(f) a refusal to grant other competitors access to their own transmission networks or to similar distribution and other infrastructure facilities owned or used by a dominant competitor on other legal grounds where, for legal or other reasons, other competitors cannot, without the co-use of such facilities, operate on the same market as dominant competitors who do not demonstrate that such co-use is not possible for operational or other reasons or cannot be reasonably demanded of them; The same shall apply mutatis mutandis to refusal of access to other competitors for an appropriate remuneration for the use of intellectual property or access to networks owned or used by a dominant competitor on a different legal basis where such use is necessary for participation in competition in the same market as the dominant competitors or in another market.

(2) Where the Office finds that a dominant position has been misused in the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1, it shall state that fact in the decision and shall prohibit such conduct for the future by this decision.

(3) The Office may suspend the proceedings referred to in paragraph 2 and decide to accept commitments which the parties to the proceedings of the Office have jointly proposed in favour of maintaining effective competition, the fulfilment of which will remove the concerns of its possible distortion. In such a decision, the Office may also lay down the conditions or obligations necessary to ensure that those obligations are fulfilled.

(4) Obligations referred to in paragraph 3 may be proposed in writing by the parties to proceedings to the Office no later than 15 days after the date on which the Office served them with the communication of the reservations; the subsequent proposals shall be taken into account by the Office only in cases of special consideration. The parties to proceedings shall be bound by their proposal to the Office and to each other and, where appropriate, to third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the Office's decision pursuant to paragraph 3, proceed in the manner which is the subject of the Office's reservations.

(5) Once the decision referred to in paragraph 3 has become final, the Office may reopen the procedure and issue the decision referred to in paragraph 2 if:

(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 3 have changed substantially;

(b) competitors act in breach of the obligations referred to in paragraph 3; or

(c) the decision referred to in paragraph 3 shall be made on the basis of false or incomplete evidence, data and information.

HLAVA IV

COMPETITION

§ 12

Definition of terms

(1) The merger between competitors takes place by mergers of two or more of the market of previously independent competitors.

(2) Furthermore, it shall be regarded as a concentration of competitors under this law where one or more entrepreneurs or one or more persons who are not an entrepreneur but who control at least one competitor are able to directly or indirectly control another competitor or part thereof, in particular through the acquisition of participating securities, commercial or member interests or by a contract or other means enabling them to control such competitor or part thereof.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a part of a competitor is also understood as a set of assets of a competitor which serves to carry out its activities and which can be clearly attributed to turnover achieved by selling goods on the relevant market, even if it does not form a separate branch of the plant.

(4) For the purposes of this Act, a check shall mean the possibility of exercising, on the basis of legal or factual facts, a decisive influence on the activity of another competitor or part thereof, in particular on the basis of:

(a) the right of ownership or the right of use for the plant of a controlled competitor or part of a controlled competitor; or

(b) rights or other legal elements which give decisive influence to the composition, voting and decision-making of the authorities of the controlled competitor.

(5) The combination is also the creation of a competitor, which is jointly controlled by several competitors and which has long been performing all functions of a separate economic unit (hereinafter referred to as the "jointly controlled competitor ').

(6) To the extent that the establishment of a jointly controlled competitor setting up a concentration pursuant to paragraph 5 is intended to achieve or result in the coordination of the competitive behaviour of its competitors which remain independent on the market, such coordination shall be assessed in accordance with the criteria set out in Section 3.

(7) Two or more connections which are contingent upon each other and which are related in substance, time and staffing, are considered to be one single link.

(8) A bank's qualifying participation in a legal entity resulting from the repayment of the share issue rate by offsetting the bank's debt to that legal entity shall not be regarded as a concentration of competitors if that qualifying holding is held for the duration of the rescue or financial reconstruction of that legal entity for a maximum period of 1 year. It is also not considered to be a concentration of competitors where competitors that are providers of investment services acquire temporarily, for a maximum period of 1 year, the shares of another competitor for the purpose of selling them, unless they exercise voting rights associated with those shares in order to identify or influence the competitive behaviour of the controlled competitor. On a proposal from a bank or a competitor that is an investment service provider, the Authority may extend the period of 1 year if the applicant demonstrates that the purpose for which he has acquired participation in another competitor could not be achieved during that period for objective reasons.

(9) The transfer of certain powers of the statutory authorities of competitors to persons engaged in activities under special legislation, such as liquidator8) and the insolvency truster9) is also not considered to be a link between competitors.

§ 13

Communication from competitors subject to the Authority's authorisation

The concentration of competitors shall be subject to the authorisation of the Office if:

(a) the total net turnover of all merging competitors achieved in the last completed financial year in the Czech Republic market is more than CZK 1.5 billion and at least two of the merging competitors each achieved in the last completed financial year in the Czech Republic market a net turnover of more than CZK 250 million; or

b) Net turnover achieved for the last completed financial year on the Czech market

1. in the case of a merger pursuant to Article 12 (1), at least one of the parties to the merger,

2. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (2) by a competitor or parts thereof over which control is obtained; or

3. in the case of a merger pursuant to Article 12 (5), at least one of the competitors establishing a jointly controlled competitor

is higher than CZK 1 500 000 000 and at the same time the worldwide net turnover achieved during the last completed financial year by another connecting competitor is higher than CZK 1 500 000 000.

§ 14

Calculation of turnover

(1) The net turnover of the merging competitors is the net turnover achieved by each competitor only in the activity which is the subject of their business. If competitors are not entrepreneurs, the net turnover is only the turnover achieved in the activity to which they were set up or normally carried out.

(2) Net turnover

(a) by all competing competitors;

(b) persons who will check on the merging competitors after the connection has taken place and persons who are controlled by the merging competitors;

(c) persons controlled by a person who will check on the merging competitor after the connection has taken place; and

(d) persons controlled jointly by two or more of the persons referred to in points (a) to (c).

(3) The share of turnover achieved by the sale of goods between the merging competitors and the persons referred to in paragraph 2 (b), (c) and (d) shall not be included in the common net turnover of the merging competitors.

(4) If only part of the competitor is merged, only the part of the turnover achieved by the merging part of the competitor is included in the net turnover.

(5) If there have been two or more connections between the same competitors over a period of 2 years, such links shall be considered as one.

(6) For banks and credit and other financial institutions, with the exception of insurance undertakings, (11) net turnover means the sum of the proceeds, in particular interest income, securities and equity, fees and commissions and profits from financial operations. For insurance undertakings, net turnover means the sum of premiums written under all insurance contracts concluded.

§ 15

Initiation

(1) The procedure for authorising a concentration shall be initiated on a proposal.

(2) The joint application for the authorisation of a concentration shall be submitted by all competitors who, pursuant to Article 12 (1), (2) and (5), intend to merge with a merger, are to be able to directly or indirectly control another competitor or to establish a part of it or to establish a jointly controlled competitor.

(3) Application for authorisation of a concentration

(a) may also be submitted before the conclusion of a contract establishing a concentration or before obtaining control of another competitor by other means;

(b) it must contain reasons and documents certifying the facts relevant to the concentration; the details are laid down in the implementing legislation (Section 26 (1)).

(4) The procedure for authorisation of a concentration shall be initiated on the date on which the application for authorisation of a concentration containing all the elements referred to in paragraph 3 was received to the Office. If the draft does not contain such elements, the Office may, on the basis of an assessment of the supporting documents received, issue only a written opinion as to whether the concentration is subject to authorisation under this law and the proposal should be supplemented.

§ 16

Procedure

(1) The Authority shall immediately notify the initiation of the procedure for the authorisation of a concentration in the Trade Bulletin and electronically through the public data network, setting a time limit for the submission of objections to that concentration.

(2) Following the initiation of the procedure, the Authority will assess whether the concentration is subject to its authorisation. If the Office is not subject to a concentration of authorisation, it shall issue a decision within 30 days of the initiation of the procedure. In cases where the concentration is subject to an authorisation by the Authority but does not result in a significant distortion of competition, the Authority shall, within the same period, issue a decision authorising the concentration. If the Authority finds that the concentration raises serious concerns about significant distortions of competition, in particular because it creates or strengthens the dominant position of the merging competitors or of any of them, it shall notify the parties in writing within the same time limit and inform the parties that it continues the proceedings.

(3) If the Office has not given a decision on the application for authorisation of a concentration within the time limit referred to in paragraph 2 or has not informed the parties in writing that, for the reasons set out in paragraph 2, it has continued the procedure, the Office has authorised the concentration by the expiry of that period.

(4) The Authority may, under the conditions laid down in the Merger Regulation (13), request the Commission to carry out the procedure and to examine the concentration itself. Pending the Commission's decision whether to assess such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the procedure. If the Commission decides to consider such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the proceedings.

(5) If the Office notifies the parties in writing pursuant to paragraph 2 that it is continuing the procedure for the application for authorisation of a concentration, it shall take a decision within 5 months of the initiation of the procedure. If the Authority has not given a decision on the concentration within that time limit, it shall allow the concentration to expire.

(6) The Office may invite a party in writing to provide further information necessary for the decision to authorise a concentration or to provide further evidence of such facts. The period from the date of service of such an invitation to the party to the proceedings to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not be counted against the time limits laid down in paragraphs 2 and 5. Where a decision of the Office on an application for authorisation of a concentration is annulled by the President of the Office or by a court, the time limits referred to in paragraphs 2 and 5 shall run again from the date on which the decision of the President of the Office or of the Court of Justice becomes final.

(7) The concentration may be registered only after the decision of the Office authorising the concentration has become final.

§ 16a

Simplified clearance procedure

(1) A simplified proposal for the authorisation of a concentration, containing the particulars referred to in Article 15 (3) (b) (hereinafter referred to as "simplified procedure"), may be submitted where:

(a) none of the competitors involved are active on the same relevant market, or their combined market share is less than 15%, and none of the competitors are vertically downstream on the relevant market in which another of those competitors is active, or their market share is less than 25% on each such market; or

(b) the competitor shall have sole control over another competitor or part thereof, in which he has so far participated in joint control.

(2) The Authority shall immediately notify the initiation of the simplified procedure in electronic form through the public data network and shall set a time limit for the submission of objections to the concentration; Paragraph 16 (1) shall not apply.

(3) If the Office is not subject to a concentration of authorisation, it shall, within 20 days of the initiation of the procedure, give a decision on the matter. In cases where the concentration is subject to an authorisation by the Authority but does not result in significant distortions of competition, the Authority shall, within the same period, issue a decision authorising the concentration; the reasons for the decision include the names of the merging competitors, the relevant market or, where applicable, the sector in which the merging competitors operate and the reasons for which the decision was given in the simplified procedure. If the Office finds that the concentration could raise serious concerns about significant distortions of competition, it shall, within 20 days, invite the parties to submit a full application for authorisation of the concentration; the time limit for the decision pursuant to Article 16 (2) shall begin to run from the date of receipt of the complete application for authorisation of the concentration of the Office.

(4) If, within the time limit referred to in paragraph 3, the Office does not give a decision that a concentration is not subject to its authorisation or to a decision authorising a concentration or does not invite the parties to submit a complete application for authorisation of a concentration, the Office shall authorise the concentration by the expiry of that period.

(5) The Office may invite a party in writing to provide further information necessary for the decision to authorise a concentration or to provide further evidence of such facts. The period from the date of service of such an invitation to the party to the proceedings to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not be counted against the time limit referred to in paragraph 3.

(6) Unless otherwise provided by this law, the simplified procedure under the general provisions on assessment of concentrations shall be followed.

§ 17

Assessment of connection

(1) When deciding on a proposal to authorise a concentration, the Authority shall assess in particular the need to maintain and develop effective competition, the structure of all links between the markets concerned, the share of the merging competitors in those markets, their economic and financial strength, the legal and other barriers to the entry of other competitors into the concentration of the markets concerned, the possibility of choosing suppliers or customers connecting competitors, the development of supply and demand in the markets concerned, the needs and interests of consumers, and research and development, the results of which benefit the consumer and do not prevent effective competition.

(2) The decision to authorise a concentration shall also apply to such restrictions on competition as the competitors indicated in the application for authorisation of a concentration and which are directly related to the concentration and are necessary for its implementation.

(3) The Authority will not authorise the concentration if it would result in a significant distortion of competition on the relevant market, in particular because it would create or strengthen a dominant position between competitors or one of them. If the combined share of the merging competitors in the relevant market does not exceed 25%, their concentration shall be deemed not to result in a significant distortion of competition unless the opposite is demonstrated in the assessment of the concentration.

(4) The Office may make the clearance of the concentration conditional on the undertakings proposed by the merging competitors before or during the opening of the procedure for authorisation of the concentration, but not later than 15 days after the communication of the reservations to the last party to the proceedings has been received. The Office shall take account of subsequent proposals for commitments or amendments to their content only in cases of special consideration where they are received by the Office within 15 days of the end of the period referred to in the first sentence of this provision. If the merging competitors propose such commitments during the first 30 days of the procedure, the period referred to in Article 16 (2) shall be extended by 15 days. If the merging competitors propose these commitments after having been informed by the Authority, pursuant to Article 16 (2), that the procedure is continued, the time limit for the decision under Article 16 (5) shall be extended by 15 days. Where the Authority makes the clearance of the concentration conditional on the fulfilment of commitments proposed by competitors, it may, by decision, lay down the conditions and obligations necessary to ensure that those commitments are fulfilled.

§ 18

Deferred execution of the concentration

(1) Before the submission of an application to initiate proceedings pursuant to Paragraph 15 (1) and before the legal power of the decision of the Authority authorising the concentration, the concentration must not be carried out by a competitor.

(2) The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the execution of a concentration which is to take place on the basis of an offer to take over participating securities or on the basis of a series of transactions in securities admitted to trading on the European regulated market (19), resulting in a check being obtained from different entities, provided that an application for the initiation of proceedings has been made without delay pursuant to Article 15 (1) and that the voting rights attached to such securities are not exercised; This shall be without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4.

(3) The Authority may decide, on a proposal from competitors, to authorise an exemption from the prohibition on the implementation of concentrations referred to in paragraph 1 if they or third parties otherwise suffer serious damage or other serious harm. An application for an exemption may be submitted by competitors at the same time as the full application for a concentration authorisation pursuant to Paragraph 15 (3) (b) or at any time during the procedure. The proposal shall be written, reasoned and shall imply the extent to which an exemption is requested. The Office may invite the parties to the proceedings in writing to provide further evidence for the decision granting the exemption or for such facts. The period from the date of receipt of such a call to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not count against the time limits referred to in paragraph 4.

(4) The application for an exemption referred to in paragraph 3 shall be decided by the Authority without delay, not later than 30 days after its receipt. In deciding to authorise an exemption, the Authority shall take into account, in addition to damage and other damage, the consequences of the exemption on competition in the relevant market. If the Authority has not taken a decision within that period, the exemption shall be granted. The Office may also decide to grant an exemption in relation to certain acts covered by the application; in the rest, the Office shall reject the proposal. The Authority may lay down conditions and restrictions in the decision authorising the exemption in order to maintain effective competition.

(5) Where the Authority finds that the concentration has been carried out contrary to the Authority's final decision, it shall decide on the measures necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market. To that end, the Authority shall, in particular, require competitors to sell the competitor or part of the competitor over which they have been able to control it or to cancel the contract on the basis of which the concentration took place, where appropriate, to implement other appropriate measures necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market. The Authority may issue such a decision even if it finds that a concentration has taken place without a request for initiation pursuant to Article 15 (1). The imposition of a measure to restore competition does not preclude the parallel imposition of a fine under § 22 (1) (d), (e) or (f) or § 22a (1) (d), (e) or (f).

§ 19

Repeal of the clearance decision

(1) The Office may revoke the decision authorising a concentration if it finds that it has authorised the concentration on the basis of supporting documents, data and information for which the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the case are the responsibility of the parties and which have been found to be wholly or partly false or incomplete, or the authorisation has been obtained by the parties to the proceedings having misled the Office or failing to comply with the conditions, restrictions or obligations which the Office has made conditional on the authorisation.

(2) The procedure for the annulment of the decision authorising the concentration may be initiated by the Authority within 1 year of the finding of the facts referred to in paragraph 1, but not later than 5 years after the occurrence of the facts.

HLAVA IVa

SUPERVISORY TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES

§ 19a

(1) In the exercise of public authority, the public authority must not, without justified reasons, distort competition, in particular by:

(a) favour a particular competitor or group of competitors;

(b) exclude a particular competitor or group of competitors from competition; or

(c) exclude competition on the relevant market.

(2) The Office shall not supervise the activities of public authorities referred to in paragraph 1 which:

(a) carried out in the form of decisions or other acts under the administrative or tax rules; or

(b) the granting of public aid, including small scale aid (22).

(3) If the Office finds that there has been a distortion of competition in proceedings under paragraph 1, it shall state that fact in the decision.

(4) The Authority may suspend the procedure referred to in paragraph 3 and decide to accept the commitments proposed by the Authority's public administration in order to maintain effective competition, the fulfilment of which will remove the concerns of its possible distortion. In such a decision, the Office may also lay down the conditions or obligations necessary to ensure that those obligations are fulfilled.

(5) The obligations referred to in paragraph 4 may be proposed in writing by the public authority to the Office no later than 15 days after the date on which the Office has delivered the notice of reservations to it; the subsequent proposal shall be taken into account by the Office only in cases of particular concern. The public authority shall be bound by its proposal to the Office and, where appropriate, to third parties, and shall not proceed from the submission of the application to the Office's decision pursuant to paragraph 4 in a manner which is the subject of the Office's reservations.

(6) Once the decision referred to in paragraph 4 has become final, the Office may reopen the procedure and issue the decision referred to in paragraph 3 if:

(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 4 have changed substantially;

(b) a public authority acts in breach of the obligations referred to in paragraph 4; or

(c) the decision referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made on the basis of false or incomplete evidence, data and information.

(7) Where the distortion of competition is committed by a local authority in the exercise of its own administration or in the delegated exercise of its administration, the Office shall send the competent authority responsible for the exercise of supervision under the special legislative act 19a) the final decision referred to in paragraph 3 and, at its request, the administrative file.

HLAVA V

OFFICE

§ 20

Scope

(1) The scope of the Office is governed by specific legislation. 14) The Office in addition to powers under other provisions of this Law

(a) monitor whether and how competitors fulfil their obligations under this law or by decisions of the Office under this law;

(b) ensure that public authorities do not distort competition;

(c) publish proposals for the authorisation of the concentration of competitors;

(d) publish its final decisions.

(2) In cases where the situation on individual markets indicates that competition is distorted, the Authority shall carry out an examination of competition conditions on such markets (hereinafter referred to as "sectoral investigations') and propose measures to improve them, in particular by issuing reports containing recommendations for improving competition conditions.

(3) In carrying out the surveillance referred to in paragraph 1 (a) or (b) and in carrying out the sectoral investigations referred to in paragraph 2, the Office shall act mutatis mutandis in accordance with Article 21e, 21f and 21g and may initiate an ex officio procedure.

(4) Where infringements of the obligations laid down in Articles 3 (1), 11 (1), 18 (1) or 19 (a) (1) are found, the Authority may impose corrective measures designed to restore effective competition on the market and may set a reasonable time limit for them to be fulfilled. The imposition of a remedy measure does not preclude the parallel imposition of a fine pursuant to § 22 (1) (b), (c) or (d), § 22a (1) (b), (c) or (d) or § 22aa (1) (b).

(5) The Office may, on the basis of an international agreement forming part of the rule of law, provide the competition authority of the requesting State, upon request, with supporting documents and information, including information containing commercial, banking or similar legal secrets, in order to enforce competition law in the requesting State, provided that the level of protection of such information in the requesting State is comparable to protection in the Czech Republic.

(6) The Office shall issue an annual report on its activities under this Act, inform the Government and Parliament thereof and publish it on its website. The annual report shall include in particular information on the number of administrative procedures opened and completed, the appointment and removal of the President and Vice-Presidents and the amount of the Office's revenue, including changes to the previous period.

(7) The Office shall provide the price authority, on request, with information obtained in carrying out the sectoral investigations referred to in paragraph 2 for the purpose of assessing the development and regulation of prices or the existence of a more favourable economic position under the Price Act.

§ 20a

(1) The Authority has the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in individual cases where the conduct of competitors could affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty. To that end, it shall be entitled to:

Citation	Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the Amendment of Certain Acts (Act on the Protection of Competition)
Regulation Type	-
Author	-
Collection	Code of Laws

Date of Promulgation	27.04.2001
Effective from	01.07.2001
Effective until	-
Status	Valid

Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll.

Law on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition)

Contents