Found No 14 / 2026 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 24 in the case of an application to declare inconstitutionality § 24a (1) of Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended by Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
10.02.2026
14
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 10 December 2025
sp. zn.
On behalf of the Republic
On 10 December 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled under point Pl. ÚS 38 / 24 in plenary, composed of the President of the Court of Josef Boxy and the judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Josef Fiala, Milan Hulmák, Veronica Christian, Zdeněk Kühn, Kateřina Ronovská, Dita Řepková, Martin Smolk, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal (Judge of the Rapporteur), Jan Winter and Daniela Zeman on the motion of the Supreme Administrative Court to declare inconstitutionality § 24a (1) of Law No 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended by Act No 17 / 2022 Coll., with the Parliament as a party to the proceedings,
as follows:
I. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE
II. The constitutional requirement of equal treatment in relation to the right of residence arising from Article 1, in conjunction with Article 30 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, requires that Article 24a (1) of Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended by Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll., Act No. 456 / 2022 Coll. and Act No. 407 / 2023 Coll., be interpreted as allowing the right to a housing allowance also to a lessee who uses construction for individual or family recreation for permanent housing.
Reasons
Definition of the case and wording of the contested provision
1. In the present case, the Constitutional Court is concerned with excluding tenants of buildings intended for individual or family recreation from the area of authorised persons from the right to a housing allowance in the context of the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination between entities in legislation. The Constitutional Court decides on the proposal of the Supreme Administrative Court, to which the case of the unsuccessful applicant for the housing allowance, which he and his family live in the same building in the rental.
2. The contested provision was introduced into the legal order by Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll., amending Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended. The contested provision of § 24a (1) of the Act on State Social Aid, as amended by Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll., reads: "The right to a housing allowance for the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022 shall also be granted to the owner who uses the building for individual or family recreation for permanent residence if he fulfils the conditions laid down in § 24 (1). Paragraph 24 (2) of the first and second sentences, paragraphs 3 and 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis. In order to determine the level of housing costs and the normative housing costs, the provisions laid down in paragraphs 25 to 27 for owners of flats shall apply mutatis mutandis. '
3. The draft Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll. was discussed as an amendment to Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act on State Social Support") in a state of legislative emergency in an abridged act. The original government proposal did not contain the contested provision nor its significant equivalent. During the negotiations, the bill was supplemented by an amendment by Mr Kanykovsky, which introduced the contested provision. According to the reasons for the amendment, "for a limited period of this year, it was proposed to extend the range of persons who may be entitled to a housing allowance to the owners of individual or family recreation buildings using it for permanent housing. Limitation of entitlement to owners of buildings for individual or family recreation is proposed in order to minimise the use of a housing allowance based solely on income and housing costs. '
4. The contested provision has been amended by Act No. 456 / 2022 Coll., amending Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended, Act No. 110 / 2006 Coll., on Life and Existence Minimes, as amended, and Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on Aid in Material Needs, as amended, by the same conditions as for entitlement to housing allowance in relation to buildings intended for individual or family recreation continue to apply for the period from 1.1.2023 to 31.12.2023. The same wording followed the amendment of § 24a (1) of the Act on State Social Support by Act No. 407 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended, Act No. 73 / 2011 Coll., on the Labour Office of the Czech Republic and on the amendment of the related laws, as amended, Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on Aid in Material Emergency, as amended, and some other laws, when the specified time limitation was abolished. The whole head of the third part of the Third Act on State Social Support including the Housing Contribution, including Section 24a, was subsequently repealed by Act No. 152 / 2025 Coll., amending certain laws in connection with the adoption of the Act on the Benefit of State Social Assistance, with effect from 1 October 2025. With effect from the same day, Act No. 151 / 2025 Coll., on the Benefit of State Social Assistance, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Law on the Benefit of State Social Assistance") provides for a housing component as part of the State Social Assistance Benefit (so-called Superbenefit), the purpose of which is similar to that of the present Housing Contribution.
5. From the judicial and administrative files submitted, the Constitutional Court found that the origin of the case before the Supreme Administrative Court was as follows. The tenant of the holiday building in Brno applied for a housing allowance. Among other things, the lease agreement provided evidence of its legal title for use of the construction and stated that it lived there with its species and its three children. The competent construction office has confirmed that the construction complies with the hygienic and technical requirements of Section 24a (2) of the State Social Aid Act. The administrative authorities rejected the application, stating that the contested provision gives entitlement only to the owners of buildings intended for individual or family recreation.
6. The Regional Court in Brno ("the Regional Court") dismissed the applicant's subsequent action by judgment of 27.3.2024 No 41 A 15 / 2023-26. It did not find the inconstitutionality of the contested provision to be in breach of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights ("the Charter '). He carried out a so-called discrimination test and found that (1) it was unequal treatment, because tenants and owners of recreational buildings are in a comparable situation for the purposes of the housing allowance and (2) the tenants are denied good. 3) The group of tenants of buildings for individual and family recreation cannot be described as being in any way stigmatized or historically persecuted, this distinguishing mark does not in any way concern dignity and was therefore not a distinction for suspicious reasons under Article 3 (1) of the Charter, but finally (4) it was not a distinction between arbitrary (constitutionally prohibited): although the" abuse "of the contribution (to which was pointed out in the draft law) contained a blank argument, which was rather indicative of arbitrage, it was possible to deduce similarity of the contested provision with the construction of the supplement to housing under § 33 and the following Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material distress, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as" the Act on aid in material emergency ")." It appears there in the same way as the contested provision limits the benefit of recreational buildings only to their owners. It is widely known that the housing supplement was widely abused by the owners of the hostels. The response to such abuse is a legitimate objective whose limitation of the housing allowance is capable of being achieved only by the owners of recreational buildings.
7. The applicant lodged a complaint against the judgment of the Regional Court. The Supreme Administrative Court of the Court of First Instance suspended the proceedings for the appeal brought under point 4 of the Ads 65 / 2024 and proposed to the Constitutional Court that the contested provision be unconstitutional.
Arguments of the appellant
8. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the contested provision contradicts Article 1 of the Charter as an arbitrary distinction between entities in law. It did not dispute that the different treatment was not based on any suspicious criterion under Article 3 (1) of the Charter. He pointed out, however, that it is known from practice that the tenants of recreational buildings will also be able to obtain a housing supplement, according to § 33 (6) in conjunction with § 33a (4) of the Act on aid in material distress. The housing allowance scheme does not contain a similar "detention 'provision. The housing allowance cannot therefore be compared with the housing supplement. Some similarities between these benefits do not justify that the legitimate objective of the contested provision is perhaps to prevent abuse by the owners of the accommodation.
9. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the legislator has also already responded to the abuse of benefits in hostels by introducing a standard of housing quality. The buildings for individual or family recreation are also not a hostel. Other reasons for different treatment between owners and tenants of buildings intended for individual or family recreation were not found by the Supreme Administrative Court. No explanation was found in the documents of the draft Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll. The different treatment therefore lacks any identifiable legitimate objective. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore contends that the contested provision is unconstitutional.
Observation of the party, reply of the applicant
10. The Constitutional Court called on the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, acting on behalf of Parliament as a party to the proceedings, to comment on the application to initiate proceedings [Paragraph 69 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court"]. He also called on the Government and the Ombudsman to inform within the legal period of time whether they were entering the proceedings (as interveners) and, if necessary, to comment on the proposal (§ 69 (2) and (3) of the same law).
11. The Chamber of Deputies, in its observations, summarised in detail the course of the legislative process of adopting Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll., in which it did not identify any defects. According to her, the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in line with the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the Constitution) and the rule of law.
12. The Senate, in its observations following the recap of the legislative process in this Chamber of Parliament, noted that there was support in the debate for an extension of the entitlement for tenants of the apartment and the owner of the building for individual or family recreation. Concerns have been raised to meet the conditions for discussing the draft law in the abridged negotiations. Even when discussing subsequent amendments to the contested provision, the debate at the Senate plenary did not affect the equality between owners and tenants of recreational buildings. According to the Senate, when discussing the draft law No. 17 / 2022 Coll. it was carried out within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.
13. The Government has indicated that it will not exercise its right to intervene. The Ombudsman communicated the same information.
14. The Judge-Rapporteur sent the observations received to the Supreme Administrative Court and to a possible reply. The Supreme Administrative Court has stated that it will not apply the reply.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
15. According to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, if the Court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. The Court's active legitimacy to file such an application depends on the subject matter of the proceedings and the legal qualification of the case. The Court of First Instance may make an application for annulment only of a law (or provision thereof) which is to be used directly (immediately) in order to resolve the pending proceedings. The condition of direct use is fulfilled if the application of the law (or its individual provision) is necessary, unavoidable, is not only hypothetical or given by the broader context of the case [paragraph 10 of the judgment of 4.6.2025 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 24 (226 / 2025 Coll.) or paragraph 7 of the order of 10.9.2025 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 28 / 25]. If the Constitutional Court had concluded that this condition had not been fulfilled, the appellant would not have been actively authorised to file it, that is to say, a proposal made by "someone manifestly unjustified '[Paragraph 43 (1) (c) of the Constitutional Court Act].
16. The Constitutional Court considers the conditions of the active legitimacy of the Supreme Administrative Court to submit the current application for the declaration of inconstitutionality § 24a (1) of Act No. 117 / 1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended by Act No. 17 / 2022 Coll., to be fulfilled. On the basis of the documents submitted, the Constitutional Court has verified that the decision on the appeal is a key consideration of the constitutionality of the contested provision, the application of which is based on the previous judgment of the Regional Court and the decision of the administrative authorities.
17. Furthermore, the proposal of the Supreme Administrative Court cannot be considered inadmissible pursuant to § 66 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court [cf. the findings of 10.1.2001 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 2000 (N 5 / 21 SbNU 29; 78 / 2001 Coll.) and of 6.2.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 06 (N 23 / 44 SbNU 279; 84 / 2007 Coll.)]. Although the contested provision expired before the application was served on the Constitutional Court, the case pending by the Supreme Administrative Court remains applicable. The relationship between the applicant and the administrative authorities is a vertical relationship: a possible removal of the alleged inconstitutionality of the contested provision would remove the legal barrier to entitlement to the housing allowance. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court had refused to deal with the constitutionality of the applicable contested provision, it would have acted in breach of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and the principle of concentrated constitutional justice under Articles 83 and 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
18. The Constitutional Court will therefore proceed to assess the compliance of the contested provision with the constitutional order, namely (a) whether it has been adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence laid down, (b) whether the constitutional procedure for its adoption and extradition has been complied with and (c) whether the contested provision complies with the constitutional order in terms of content (§ 68 (1) and (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court).
Abandonment of oral proceedings
19. The Constitutional Court concluded that there was no need to conduct oral proceedings in the case as it would not have brought further clarification of the case. It therefore decided without having ordered oral proceedings (Section 44 of the Constitutional Court Act).
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provision
20. Both chambers of Parliament have described in their observations the course of the legislative process, which corresponds to public information. None of the parties indicated any shortcomings in the legislative process and even in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court raised no doubts as to the constitutionality of the adoption of the contested provision. The contested provision was adopted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner.
A substantive review of the contested provision
21. However, the Constitutional Court found that the contested provision contradicts the constitutional order in terms of content. The contested provision constitutes an inequality which cannot be justified by any legitimate objective: this arbitrary inequality in access to the right to housing as part of the right to adequate security in material need is contrary to Article 1 in conjunction with Article 30 (2) of the Charter.
22. This conclusion was reached by the Constitutional Court in the spirit of the present case-law, using a discrimination test which failed to pass the contested provision. Although the Constitutional Court found the inconstitutionality of the contested provision to be unconstitutional, it did not express it in a derogatory statement, since this procedure would not eliminate unconstitutional unequal treatment and would in contrast to the purpose of the constitutional review, the Constitutional Court would fully remove the effects of the provision establishing a right to a housing allowance in relation to buildings intended for individual or family recreation. According to the principles of settled caselaw, the Constitutional Court therefore resorted to rejecting the proposal and formulating an interpretative statement.
General considerations
23. The contested provision, together with Article 24 of the Act on State Social Aid, laid down the conditions for entitlement to the housing allowance, including the definition of a number of eligible entities. Under the legislation effective until 30.9.2025, the owner or tenant of the apartment (§ 24 (1) of the same Act) and the owner of the building intended for individual or family recreation (the contested provision) were entitled to the housing allowance.
24. The housing allowance was part of the addressed state welfare system as a social benefit. By this contribution, the State implemented its obligations under the right of residence, which can be derived from Article 30 (2) of the Charter, interpreted in the light of Article 11 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [Found of 2.4.2025 sp. zn. The Supreme Administrative Court relies on its claims on the inconstitutionality of the contested provision in the application for Article 1 of the Charter and the principle of equality and the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination in law.
25. The current issue therefore concerns access to a constitutionally guaranteed social right to adequate security in material distress and the principle of equal treatment.
The assessment of social rights
26. For social rights, the law (Article 30 (3) of the Charter) determines their specific form and can only be invoked within the limits of the implementing law (Article 41 (1) of the Charter). Therefore, the assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the statutory regulation of social rights by the Constitutional Court leaves the legislature to an increased degree [paragraphs 38 et seq., of 7.12.2021 sp. zn.
27. However, the freedom granted by the legislature pursuant to Articles 41 (1) and 30 (3) of the Charter is not unlimited. The legal definition of the conditions for the exercise of social rights must not conflict with fundamental constitutional principles, nor interfere with the very nature of these fundamental rights. The basic constitutional principles include, inter alia, respect for the trust of individuals in the rule of law and its stability (prohibition of retroactivity) [finding of 4.6.2025 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 (272 / 2025 Coll.)] or the principle of equal treatment, either in the context of the prohibition of arbitrary (Article 1 of the Charter) or as a prohibition of qualified cases of discrimination (Article 3 (1) of the Charter, but this is not the case, see below).
To assess the principle of equality
28. If there is a basis for the principle of equality, the Constitutional Court consistently sees equality as a relative category, not absolute. The constitutional order of the Czech Republic does not prohibit any inequality. It is unacceptable to create inequality arbitrarily or to construct inequality so that it constitutes an intervention in one of the fundamental rights. The reason for the different treatment, i.e. the distinctive character established, and the specific right or good to which the different treatment relates, is crucial. This is also the case with the claims made by the Constitutional Court to justify the legitimacy (justification) of the different treatment [paragraphs 41 et seq., of 23.4.2025 sp. zn.
29. Consideration in the equality category can only be given in a relationship between at least two entities in the same or comparable position. While it is generally not difficult to determine whether the legislation treats two situations differently or equally, the key step for applying the general principle of equality is to determine whether the two situations with which the law treats them differently are indeed comparable, i.e. whether they are relevant. This requires an analysis based on the criterion of relevance: in other words, in order to speak at all about the principle of equality, it must be a different regulation of comparable situations [paragraphs 89 and 90 of the finding of 22.1.2025 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 18 / 24 (45 / 2025 Coll.)].
30. When (subsequently) differentiating the intensity of the constitutional review of an infringement of the principle of equality, the Constitutional Court considers it essential to clarify the reason for the different treatment, namely the distinctive character established. In the case of different treatment for so-called suspicious classification, or those relating to the personal characteristics of an individual having a close relationship with the protection of human dignity (Article 3 (1) of the Charter), very strict claims must be made to justify the different treatment. Conversely, if different treatment (distinguishing character) is a criterion normally and strictly applied in a particular area of legal regulation (for example, the amount or structure of income in tax legislation), even if different treatment would affect another fundamental right, the intensity of the constitutional review will be lower [paragraphs 72 et seq., of 20.11.2024 sp. zl. ÚS 16 / 24 (6 / 2025 Coll.)].
31. Depending on the distinguishing character and the substance concerned by the different treatment, the last element of the test shall be differentiated to different degrees of intensity. The lower intensity (in the "scheme" of Article 1 of the Charter) corresponds to the category of "rationality," that is to say, it is sufficient that the modification pursues a legitimate objective and is able to achieve it or contribute to it, without necessarily being the best, most appropriate, most efficient or most wise solution [point 47 of the decision of 28 February 2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 23 (94 / 2024 Coll.)].
32. The case law of the Constitutional Court understands the principle of equality under Article 1 of the Charter as a prohibition of arbitrariness in distinguishing bodies in legislation. The Constitutional Court found infringement of that provision in the context of the principle of equality, for example, in the distinction between two comparable groups of jobseekers based only on randomness [points 253 and 253], and the subsequent finding of 27.11.2012 sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 (N 195 / 67 SbNU 333 / 90; 437 / 2012 Sb.]] in the interpretation which creates a different treatment of the beneficiaries of the claim, taking into account only the randomness in the form of the time of death in the course of proceedings of such a claim [point 22 of the opinion of 6.12.2016 sp. It is therefore apparent that the categories of reason and prohibition of arbitrariness overlap in the context of Article 1 of the Charter: it is always a requirement of a identifiable elementary factual justification (justification) of different treatment and exclusion of randomness.
33. The intensity of the higher, stricter (in the "scheme" of Article 3 (1) of the Charter) then corresponds to the category "proportionality" in the sense of the principle of proportionality (paragraphs 68 et seq., of 22.1.2019 sp. zn. At that time, the Constitutional Court would have used a (stricter) proportionality test (paragraphs 83 et seq. of the decision sp. zn.
Property as a suspected reason for distinguishing pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the Charter
34. Arguments in proceedings before the Regional Court have affected the potential suspect of the distinguishing criterion referred to in Article 3 (1) of the Charter in the form of property. The so-called suspicious criteria are designed to reflect a certain vulnerability and connection to human dignity; either the grounds expressly listed in Article 3 (1) of the Charter or the grounds falling within the relatively open category of "other status'. The concept of" other status' is then intended to cover only criteria similar to or close to those specifically laid down in the provisions mentioned and not any conceivable situation. This should be based on the individual's personal choice, reflecting his or her personality characteristics, such as religion, religion or political views, or reasons based on personal characteristics or personal characteristics that an individual cannot choose, such as gender, race, colour, national or social origin, gender, age or disability [point 108 of 28.6.2016 sp. zl. ÚS 18 / 15 (N 121 / 81 SbNU 889; 271 / 2016 Coll.)].
35. In the currently referred finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 18 / 15 The Constitutional Court did not find a suspicious criterion for distinguishing the amount of income as a tax base: the criterion of the tax base is a morally neutral, in no way and priori suspect and for tax legislation common and essentially necessary [analogy to paragraph 52 of the judgment of 27 February 2018 sp. zl. ÚS 15 / 17 (N 33 / 88 SbNU 457; 69 / 2018 Coll.)]. The Constitutional Court then added that, in view of the parallel operation of Article 1 of the Charter with a broader scope than Article 3 (1) of the Charter, it is not necessary to interpret the reasons for the distinction in the form of a "different status' in any way.
36. In point 151 of the finding of 11.2.2020 sp. zn. The Charter would be a distinguishing criterion relating to property problematic in a situation where the legislation would otherwise affect "rich" and otherwise less wealthy. Similarly, the Constitutional Court stated in paragraph 133 of the decision of 11.2.2020 sp. zn. With regard to Article 3 (1) The Charter would be a problem primarily of the so-called property prices (by analogy Kühn, Z. In: Kühn, Z. et al. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Comment. Praha: Leges, 2022, p. 338).
37. It follows from the above that the context in which the different treatment takes place should be seen for a distinction on grounds relating to property. According to the circumstances of the case, the Constitutional Court examines whether the distinction between the individual's assets is indeed a suspect ground under Article 3 (1) of the Charter, in particular since, in certain legal areas (tax law, social security law, etc.), the distinction may be in some way related to the individual's property by a common, necessary or neutral distinguishing mark.
Application of general bases to the present case
38. The Constitutional Court has therefore accepted the assessment of the present case. Since the Supreme Administrative Court objects to infringement of the prohibition of unequal treatment, the Constitutional Court will test discrimination. This test also corresponds better to the nature of the problem raised by the Supreme Administrative Court.
39. The contested provision under the Constitutional Court constitutes an intervention into the right to adequate security in material need (the right to housing). This conclusion may seem paradoxical: the substance of the problem is not, for example, the denial of the right of a group of entities to which the legislation still granted entitlement. Anyone who is not entitled to a housing allowance could then claim that in his situation there is interference in his rights. Of course, such a concept does not stand up to the Constitutional Court. The problem with the contested provision is that entitlement to the housing allowance does not include, without any reason, persons who are in a comparable life situation to those who are entitled to the same benefit. Therefore, the nature of the intervention lies in unequal treatment. Therefore, the Constitutional Court considers it more appropriate to carry out a discrimination test, not a rationality test as a "classic 'intervention in social law.
Discrimination test
40. The contested provision gives entitlement to a housing allowance in relation to buildings intended for individual or family recreation (recreational buildings), only to the owners of such buildings. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, a comparable group is to be a set of tenants of the same recreational buildings, who, like owners, use the same building for permanent housing. The tenants are therefore not entitled to the housing allowance because of another legal title to use the case.
Are there comparable groups of individuals?
41. For the context, it should be noted that, in relation to the apartment, both owners and tenants of the apartment were entitled to the housing allowance under the legislation at the time (Section 24 (1) of the State Social Aid Act). In this way, the right to the housing allowance has been conceived for a long time, in fact since the entry into force of the Act on State Social Support. As stated in the explanatory memorandum to the same law, the housing allowance replaced the rent allowance under Act No. 319 / 1993 Coll., on the rent allowance, as amended, which belonged only to persons residing or using an apartment or living room under a lease contract.
42. It is therefore clear that, from the logic of the case, the legislation on the housing allowance concerned a set of entities which in some way, in normal forms satisfy their need for housing. Whereas, until recently, the housing allowance concerned only apartments, the contested provision extended the claim also to buildings intended for individual or family recreation, but only to the owners of such buildings. According to the Constitutional Court, the legislature has indicated that it also considers housing in other buildings to be common in addition to housing, if they meet the specified technical and hygienic requirements (§ 24a (2) of the Act on State Social Support).
43. There is therefore a set of subjects who use the building to satisfy their need for individual and family recreation. According to the Constitutional Court, no relevant differences can be found in this set in terms of housing function depending on the legal title of the individual using his or her residence. Whether it is rent or ownership, the owner of the residence has a legitimate title for its use. It is undoubtedly true that the legal institutes of lease and ownership are, of course, different from private law. However, it should be noted that the purpose of the housing allowance is to compensate for the high cost of housing for low-income households. Therefore, the Constitutional Court does not consider the difference in ownership and rental institutions relevant in the context of the housing allowance: the aspect of the function which both legal institutes perform towards housing appears to be a key criterion of relevance. Legal rental and property institutes perform a comparable function in relation to the social housing institution, whose housing allowance is used to regulate. Comparability also shows that the apartment between the rent and the ownership of the housing allowance has not been distinguished or distinguished.
44. Moreover, the regional court also argues that both tenants and owners of recreational buildings may find themselves in a situation where their housing costs reach a threshold relevant to the right to adequate security in material distress compared to their property situation. It is also notoriety that rental housing is a normal form of housing. The Constitutional Court therefore considers, in the context of the housing allowance, the owners and tenants of buildings intended for individual or family recreation as part of a comparable set of entities. At the same time, the tenants of buildings are generally in a worse property situation than their owners, and can therefore be considered more necessary through the prospect of social rights.
Is these groups treated differently here and to their weight?
45. The tenants of buildings intended for individual or family recreation who use this building for permanent housing, unlike the owners of the same buildings, are not entitled to a housing allowance. The tenants are therefore treated differently and to their weight. The different treatment relates to the fundamental right to adequate security in material distress pursuant to Article 30 (2) of the Charter (including the right to reside). Therefore, it is not a "any 'distinction between legal entities, but rather access to fundamental rights.
What is the reason for the different treatment, the distinguishing sign?
46. Different treatment is based on a different legal title for the use of recreational construction. The Supreme Administrative Court, the Regional Court, and, moreover, the applicant in the main proceedings, do not claim that the different treatment relates to any of the suspected reasons referred to in Article 3 (1) of the Charter. Even the Constitutional Court did not deal more closely with differences based on a suspicious criterion.
47. It can be accepted that the difference in treatment in the present case affects property: a different position lies with the owner of a particular thing, another one who uses it on the basis of a rental relationship with the lessor, i.e. who does not own it, and is therefore in a socially less favourable situation. However, in the light of the conclusions set out below to justify such treatment, it is not necessary to question whether there is (albeit indirect) discrimination on the basis of property, which would be reflected in a stricter review intensity (proportionality).
48. For the sake of completeness, it can also be noted that, in the contested provision, intervention in the essential core of the right to housing as part of the right to adequate security in a material emergency cannot be identified. In point 100 of the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 24 The Constitutional Court has identified the essential content of the right to housing under Article 30 (2) of the Charter as the right of persons who are in material need because of a lack of funds to ensure a basic dignity in housing. However, in view of the nature of this law and its definition in international and national law, the legislator has considerable discretion in choosing the means to ensure its minimum content (e.g. in kind, social benefits).
49. According to the Constitutional Court, the housing allowance is part of the essential core of the right to housing. The Constitutional Court takes account of the fact that, at the time of the contested provision's effectiveness, the housing allowance, together with the housing supplement, represented (and continues to represent) practically the only systemic provision of the right to reside (cf. Stojan, K. Housing: Human Law, or individual merit? In: Antoš M.; Wintr, J. Constitutional framework of ownership, business and social rights. Praha: Leges, 2023, p. 173 and 182).
50. Nevertheless, the contested provision under the Constitutional Court does not interfere with the very essential core of the right to housing. The effect of the intervention is not to limit the already existing levy. On the contrary, the contested provision was adopted as part of the amendment which extended the range of beneficiaries. Until then, the housing allowance did not concern buildings intended for individual or family recreation. It should be respected that the legislator has wide scope to determine the specific form of the housing allowance system, if it is not subject to significant restrictions. It must therefore also be up to the legislature, as it specifically sets a threshold which is understood as material distress, beyond obvious excesses. The contested provision therefore concerns an institute which represents the essential core of the right to housing, but the nature of the intervention and the circumstances of the adoption of the contested provision exclude the conclusion that, in the context under consideration, the contested provision actually affects the implementation of the essential content of that right. Testing the contested provision by the principle of proportionality would not take into account the context of the matter.
Is different treatment justified?
51. In order to justify the different treatment, it is first necessary to identify its legitimate objective.
52. The only available ground for assessing the objectives of the design of the contested provision offers a justification for the amendment by which the contested provision was inserted into draft law No 17 / 2022 Coll.. It is clear from this that the aim of limiting the entitlement to the housing allowance in relation to recreational buildings to owners was to "minimise the use of the dose '(see above sub 3).
53. But that doesn't explain much. It is not clear whether it is to prevent abuse of the benefit by tenants of recreational buildings or simply to keep the circle of beneficiaries to a more limited extent, taking into account the lowest possible social costs. The Regional Court pointed out similarities with the housing supplement and possible efforts to prevent abuse of the benefit by the owner of the hostel. However, there is no indication that similar abuses have also taken place in the housing allowance. On the contrary, the housing allowance, unlike the housing supplement, never concerned the dormitories. As the Supreme Administrative Court rightly points out, neither apartment nor holiday building is a hostel. In practice, there is no evidence of any widespread abuse of the housing allowance at all (Lansky O. Who uses welfare? The analysis of the 2019 drawing. Masaryk Democratic Academy, p., 2020, p. 15 and 16. Available at: https: / / masarykovaekademie.cz / cats / publications / lansky-kom-disused-socialni-davky-analyze-cerpani-z-roku-2019 /).
54. Moreover, as the Supreme Administrative Court further contends, the legislation on the housing supplement as a result of the leasing of recreational buildings does not exclude the right to this benefit (in application of Paragraph 33 (6) in conjunction with Paragraph 33a (4) of the Law on aid in material distress). The State Social Aid Act does not contain a similar mechanism of "detention provision '. Therefore, the Constitutional Court does not accept the argument of the legitimate objective of the different treatment of tenants and owners of recreational buildings in the form of an attempt to reduce the abuse of the housing allowance by the owners of the accommodation. That argument doesn't make any sense.
55. Nor does the argument of avoiding "abuse" of benefits in terms of not burdening public budgets stand as a legitimate objective. This objective would undoubtedly constitute a legitimate objective in the field of the social policy of a State whose implementation depends on the possibilities of public finances. However, in the present case, such a legitimate objective cannot be accepted. Firstly, as the regional court rightly argues, such justification is too vague in the present case and could justify virtually anything. Such vague arguments could justify virtually any difference in treatment and virtually any interference with social rights: there is no doubt that any denial of good or cost reduction of the social system is eligible not to increase expenditure (it would therefore be possible to find a legitimate objective and a rational relationship between it and the funds used). The category of constitutionality and the role of the Constitutional Court would be emptied here in applying the argument by seeking not to burden public finances without any further justification and substance. The Constitutional Court therefore considers it legitimate to require that there should be, at least in the basic context, a clear reasoning as to whether different treatment should actually be based on fiscal reasons. Such an objective cannot be accepted on the basis of speculation alone. Even the specific form of the social system cannot be determined randomly.
56. Secondly, it is no longer clear why the owners are entitled to the housing allowance, while the tenants are not. From the logic of the matter, it appears more vulnerable in terms of material emergency than in relation to owners, whose situation depends to some extent on the relationship with the lessor and who have to pay regular rent payments to ensure housing, otherwise they are exposed to the risk of a legitimate termination of the rental relationship. This is also in line with the historical development of the state social aid system, where the comparable benefit originally belonged only to tenants (the Law on the rent allowance), and only later the legislator also included the owners of the apartments (although it can be accepted that this may be partly due to the declining share of the rent compared to the ownership housing since the 1990s, see: How households live according to the census results. Praha: Czech Statistical Office, 2024, p. 13 et seq. Available at: https: / / csu.gov.cz / products / jak-domacnosti-pozle- scitani-lidu-2021). In this context, only tenants of recreational buildings would be entitled to a housing allowance would be more justified and more logical. But this, of course, does not in itself prove insolence.
57. Arguments of purely fiscal reasons make no sense even in the context of the purpose of the amendment of the Act on State Social Support No 17 / 2022 Coll. It is clear from the parliamentary debate that the purpose of this amendment was, on the other hand, to extend the beneficiaries and the situations to which the housing allowance is affected, in response to the so-called covidic crisis and the increase in energy prices after 2020: the group of beneficiaries was extended to the owners of recreational buildings and to the housing relationships (§ 24 (2), third and fourth sentences of the Act on State Social Support, as amended by Act No 17 / 2022 Coll.). It is also clear from the reasons for the amendment that, according to the petitioner, the financial impact of extending entitlement to recreational buildings is negligible. That it should therefore simply be an attempt not to burden public budgets does not result from the information available. The Constitutional Court does not find strong arguments for recognising such a legitimate objective. The Constitutional Court takes the view that it could have been a conscious but unconsistent copy or inspiration similar to the provisions of the Act on aid in material distress, rather than a thoughtful, targeted measure.
58. The Constitutional Court also considers it essential that the Government did not intervene in the present proceedings and therefore did not comment on the Supreme Administrative Court's proposal. The Constitutional Court will, of course, examine the constitutionality of the contested provision itself. It is not the duty of the Government to defend the contested provision in the proceedings for annulment of the law, to make a statement or to take part in the proceedings at all (Section 69 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act). Thus, of course, it is not possible to "punish" the government for implementing its right not to intervene by accepting the appellant's argument without further delay and finding the inconstitutionality of the law essentially for the procedural passivity of the government. There is no such thing as "fiction of recognition" of the inconstitutionality of the contested provision. After all, the government is not the authority that passed the law.
59. Paragraph 69 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, however, provides for a certain interest and operational capacity to defend the interests represented by the contested provision of the Law with the Government as the executive body. The Constitutional Court Act therefore assumes that the Government will put forward relevant counter-arguments against the application for annulment of the law and its justification in the interests represented by it, namely that for good reasons it will make a procedural effort to prevent the Constitutional Court from interfering with the rule of law.
60. In the proposal, the Supreme Administrative Court clearly identified the lack of evidence to establish a legitimate objective and pointed out itself that there is no legitimate objective for the contested provision, which, according to settled case law, constitutes compelling grounds for the repeal of the law. In the interest that the government represents in the annulment procedure, it was therefore to clarify its position in response to the proposal. Here, too, because the contested provision was adopted on the basis of a parliamentary amendment, but the draft law No 17 / 2022 Coll. was adopted on the basis of a government proposal. So the government obviously had to know the details of the agenda. The Constitutional Court, therefore, also partly because of the Government's passivity in this procedure, no longer has any particular reason to examine the objectives of the contested provision and whether it is a legitimate objective. The Constitutional Court cannot, on the one hand, only uncritically take over the appellant's argument, but on the other hand it cannot conjecture the arguments of the parties to which the Law on the Constitutional Court grants a position for good reasons [commensurate with paragraphs 52 et seq., of 7.10.2025 sp. zn. The Government's passivity thus enhances the Constitutional Court's belief that there is no substantive argument or particular state policy behind the different treatment under the contested provision.
61. The lack of clarity about the objectives of the contested provision is also enhanced by the current construction of the state social assistance benefit (so-called superbenefits), whose housing component has replaced the housing allowance since 2025. According to the current legislation, the tenants of recreational buildings are also entitled to this benefit for a comparable purpose (§ 19 (1) in conjunction with § 22 (1) of the State Social Assistance Benefit Act). It also weakens the idea that there is a material or political background behind the construction of the contested provision.
62. The discretion that "hanging in the air" that the different treatment under the contested provision is to be motivated by a simple effort not to burden public budgets cannot therefore be accepted as a legitimate objective in the present case; there is no evidence for such justification, and on the contrary, the purpose of the amendment and the systematic and historical development of the housing benefit scheme suggests that such an objective was not foreseen by the legislator.
63. Furthermore, as a hypothetical legitimate objective of the contested provision, preference is offered, for example, for ownership housing under a state policy or for lower administrative costs associated with checking compliance with other conditions for entitlement to the housing allowance. The Constitutional Court, however, does not find any logic in these hypothetical objectives under the state of the law. Contrary to these hypothetical objectives, the existing construction of the housing allowance for flats (entitled owners, tenants and subtenants) and the "broad" concept of entitlement to the benefit of state social assistance is also active here. It would not make sense for the legislator to promote these objectives for recreational buildings, while not for flats, and for the legislator to leave these targets without further ado.
64. The solution adopted by the legislature also considers the Constitutional Court to be manifestly unreasonable, precisely in view of the historical development of the housing allowance, the definition of beneficiaries in relation to housing at the time of the contested provision's effectiveness, as well as the current construction of the national social assistance benefit.
65. The Constitutional Court therefore found no identifiable justification in the contested legislation. No legitimate objective has been identified, which indicates that the different treatment is not justified and is a manifestation of insolence. The Constitutional Court is aware of the exceptional nature of the conflict with the general prohibition of arbitrary as a reason for the repeal of the law. It respects that differentiation in legislation is essentially a common instrument of regulation, unless it concerns suspicious reasons or serious interference with human rights. When applying Article 1 The Constitutional Court must therefore be careful with the Charter. Unconsidered interference with the rule of law on the basis of a general ban on arbitrary discrimination in law can easily turn themselves into an instrument of arbitrariness. It is therefore necessary to respect the legislator's relatively wide scope, all the more so in the area of state social policy.
66. However, despite these considerations on the meaning of the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination in law as a reason for the annulment of the law, the Constitutional Court finds no relevant reason why the contested provision should be complied with. It is clear from the existing caselaw that the Constitutional Court does not tolerate, in this context, random or completely unfounded solutions (see above sub-paragraph 32). The contested provision cannot be justified by any factual, valuable or other legitimate argument. Of course, the scope of social rights must have a specific threshold that the legislator can determine on its own account, but it cannot be entirely random.
67. The consideration of the Constitutional Court can also be expressed by the fact that the contested provision has proved to be too harsh and unreasonable, which in itself is undoubtedly not a reason for the inconstitutionality of the law. Some hardness of law and unreasonable solutions can be tolerated in the rule of law if they have at least a purpose, good reason, or a valuable political background that balances or gives them legitimacy. In this case, however, the Constitutional Court does not find any argument. The hardness and impartiality of the contested provision does not outweigh anything, nor does the Constitutional Court have anything behind it.
68. Since it was not possible to identify any legitimate objective of different treatment of tenants of buildings intended for individual or family recreation in access to the law guaranteed in Article 30 (2) of the Charter, the Constitutional Court concluded that the contested provision contradicts the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination in access to fundamental rights.
Conclusion
69. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court finds that the contested provision is contrary to Article 1, in conjunction with Article 30 (2) of the Charter, and there are grounds for its annulment (Paragraph 70 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act). However, in view of the expiry of the contested provision, including its successive content equivalents (see above sub-sub-4), only the declaration of unconstitutionality (cf. the finding of 18.5.2021 sp. zn.
Justification for the interpretative statement
70. Nor would a statement of the unconstitutional nature of the contested provision resolve the unconstitutional inequality. There would be a gap at that time: there would be completely no legislation establishing a right to a housing allowance in relation to buildings intended for individual or family recreation. It would be up to the courts, without support in the law, to conclude that the housing allowance also covers these recreational buildings, including owners and tenants. Such a solution is considered inefficient and unpredictable by the Constitutional Court. A reliable solution to the problem does not constitute a part of it in the light of the wording of the contested provision nor does it constitute an inconstitutionality.
71. It is therefore appropriate, in the spirit of the present case-law of the Constitutional Court, to reject the application for annulment of the contested provision and, respectively, to adopt an interpretative [cf., in particular, the situation referred to in paragraphs 31 et seq., of 7 October 2014 sp. zn.
72. The Constitutional Court therefore, having regard to the possibility of a constitutional interpretation of the contested provision, rejected the proposal in operative part I and generalized the conclusions of its decision in interpretative operative part II.
73. In view of the comparable wording of § 24a (1) of the Act on State Social Aid, as amended by Act No. 456 / 2022 Coll. and later also of Act No. 407 / 2023 Coll., when essentially only the extension of this scheme until the adoption of the Law on the Benefit of State Social Assistance, the conclusions adopted on the legislation effective until 31.12.2022 (before the entry into force of Act No. 456 / 2022 Coll.) apply also to later comparable legislation. To this end, the Constitutional Court has agreed that it is not necessary to repropose the annulment or declaration of imconstitutionality of those provisions in any judicial proceedings in which comparable wording of Section 24a (1) of the Act on State Social Aid should be applied. It is clear that later, comparable legislation suffers from the same constitutional deficits. The wording of the interpretative statement II therefore also reflects these considerations.
74. Finally, in order to clarify the temporal effects of this Decision, the Constitutional Court notes that its intention is for the tenants of recreational buildings to have their housing allowance in accordance with the contested provision and later comparable legislation retroactively. Therefore, it should also be concluded that, for the housing allowance, the deadline laid down in Article 54 (2) of the Act on State Social Aid, as effective by 30.9.2025, is to be calculated from the date of the publication of this finding in relation to tenants of recreational buildings. In relation to applications already completed, if the lessee's application for housing allowance was rejected under the contested provision or later comparable legislation, the benefit shall be granted as wrongly withheld under § 53 (1) (c) of the State Social Aid Act. In order not to put those applicants who had previously submitted an application at a disadvantage, an objective period of three years under the same provision shall not apply in this situation.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Findings No 14 / 2026 Coll., sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 10.02.2026 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
Public Contracts 1
tlakové čištění kanalizačních trubek pro rok 2026 v bytových a nebytových prostorách v domech ve vla...
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Votýpka Radek
13.01.2026
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