The Constitutional Court found No. 128 / 2001 Coll.

1. The proposal to abolish the provisions of Article II (2) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., which regulates certain joint ownership relations with buildings and certain ownership relations with apartments and non-residential premises and complements certain laws (the Housing Act), as amended, is rejected.

2. The remainder is rejected.

On 16 October 2000, the Constitutional Court received a proposal from a group of Members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament to abolish certain provisions of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., governing certain joint ownership relations with buildings and certain ownership relations with apartments and non-residential premises, and supplemented by certain laws (Law on the ownership of flats), as amended, ("Law on the ownership of flats') and the Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended (" Law on judicial fees'). The appellants require that the Constitutional Court, in the proceedings referred to in Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution '), abolish the provisions of Sections 9 to 11, including the title and the footnotes and the provisions of Section 5 (5), the second sentence of Section 13 (2), the provisions of Section 13 (7), the words" Committee or entrusted owner' in the provisions of Section 15 (2) and, at the end of this paragraph, the sentence "If the Committee or the authorised owner is elected, the amount of the sums referred to in paragraph 1 shall be decided by an absolute majority of all owners of the units in the house. Paragraph 11 (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis. '; The appellants also ask the Constitutional Court to abolish point (n) of Paragraph 11 (2) of the Law on judicial fees.

From the attached signature sheet of Members, the Constitutional Court found that the conditions laid down in § 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court) were met when it endorsed 60 Members with its signatures.

The Group of Members considers that the contested legal provisions are contrary to Article 1 of the Constitution, Articles 1, 2 (3), 3, 4 and 11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and Article 1 (1) of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The appellants argue that the formation of legal persons entitled" the association of owners of units "under the Law on the ownership of apartments is undermined by the principle of legal certainty enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, since the legal acts of such legal persons and the exercise of the rights and obligations which the law confers upon them, in the version of Act No. 357 / 2000 of the Act on the Law on the Law on the Property of the Czech Republic and in the Act on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on Property and the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on Housing of the Intellectual on the Law on the Law on the Law on Property (2000), which the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on the Law on Legal relations arising for the purposes of the administration, operation and repair of the common parts of the house are still effective on the basis of contracts concluded by the owners of the units or, where appropriate, on the basis of the will of the owners of the units to establish a legal person as a person under private law under the current legislation. The legal relations to be replaced by the legal regulation for which the" unit owners' community is called, "arose at the date of application of the new legislation in accordance with the law and, in the appellants' view, this consequence is, inter alia, an indication of the indirect retroactive effect of the newly adopted legal standards. In Article 9 (3) of the Housing Act, the creation of a" Community 'is linked to the legal facts arising before the entry into force of this provision (to the service of a document bearing a deposit in the Land Register and other facts) and the appellants consider that this is "a typical example of the improper retroactivity of the contested provisions of the Act, consisting of the fact that the new regulation captures past facts and attaches to them other rights and obligations for the future than existing legislation'.

The appellants state that, in the provisions of Sections 9 (9) and 10 (3) of the Law on Housing, the legislature submits to the owners of the units, if they fulfil certain definitions, the statutory obligations imposed by law on the performance of the functions of the Community institutions. The appellants consider that those provisions impose obligations on the statutory owners of units exceeding the constitutional framework of content and the protection of property rights (right to hold, use, take advantage of and dispose of the property). The general legal arrangements contained in particular in the Civil Code do not impose comparable obligations on owners.

The appellants also stressed that, in their view, the legislature, in the provisions of Sections 9 (1) and 11 (4) and 11 (5) of the Housing Act, as well as the entire construction of the Community, its competence and the way in which decisions are taken, placed a disproportionate emphasis on the collective aspect of the exercise of rights relating to the use and handling of the house and its units. The resolutions of the Community, which the law provides for in various cases, replace decisions of owners or co-owners on the management of the common cause. According to the appellants, the legislator, in the contested provisions, overruled the individual will of the owners of the units, the will of the collective, that is, the will of the law created by the Community. This principle, on which the whole construction of the "community of unit owners" is based as legal entities, is, in the opinion of the appellants, the suppression of individual ownership rights, the autonomy of the individual and his will for collective decision-making and, in consequence, is contrary to the constitutional principle of equality of owners in rights. Further violations of the principle of equality of owners in rights are seen by the appellants in the provision of Section 13 (7) of the Housing Act, which is alleged to be burdened by the owners of the units by the guarantor's obligation under the law for the obligations of the community, which they have not even established of their own accord.

The appellants also argue that the provision of Paragraph 9 (2) of the Housing Act provides for a clear delegation of the right of disposal to the unit to an entity different from the owner, the scope of which is not explicitly defined and "thus unconstitutional strengthening of the status of the Community, since the contested standard allows the Community to handle foreign affairs on its own behalf '. The appellants are of the opinion that, by virtue of Article 5 (5) of the Law on the ownership of apartments, the legislature has constitutionally unduly limited the co-owners of a common house if the apartments in such a house are subject to a lease agreement. The legislature was said not to have spared the substance and meaning of ownership - in this case, the right to dispose of its property (i.e. co-ownership) - and the restrictions imposed on a group of co-owners abused the protection of the rental right to the apartment.

The Constitutional Court, having found that the motion of a group of Members was not admissible under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court or there were no grounds for the termination of proceedings under Article 67 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, sent a motion for expression to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in accordance with Articles 42 (3) and (4) and 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and requested the written opinion of the Ministry of Local Development.

In the Chamber of Deputies, signed by its President, Prof. Ing. Václav Klaus, it is stated that Law 103 / 2000 Coll. was submitted because of the need to remedy some shortcomings of the existing legislation which, as a result, prevented the greater use of this specific form of ownership. The shortcomings consisted in the imconsistent definition of the forms of administration and maintenance of the common parts of the house, including responsibility for its performance. In particular, the legislation adopted has newly introduced the so-called "unit owners' community as a specific type of legal person corresponding to its main purpose, which is the proper exercise of the rights and obligations associated with the administration, operation and repair of the common parts of the house. In addition to this change, the other related provisions of the Housing Act have been amended so that such an arrangement does not conflict with the rule of law. The bill was approved by the necessary majority of legislators and the adopted law was duly declared. In this state of affairs, it cannot be concluded, in the opinion of the party concerned, that the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the constitutional order and the legal order of the Czech Republic.

On behalf of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, his President, Dr Petr Pithart, pointed out that a substantial part of the proposal relates to the provisions of the Housing Act, which newly regulates the formation and the internal circumstances of the "Unit Owners' Association 'as a legal entity eligible for the administration of the house and also to the provisions which impose obligations on the owners of the units in connection with the establishment and functioning of the legal entity, or otherwise regulate the relationship between the owners of the units as regards the fulfilment of obligations arising from the use of the common cause - the house. The bill No. 103 / 2000 Coll. was submitted to the Senate on 7 February 2000 after approval by the Chamber of Deputies, which discussed it in the prescribed manner at its 16th meeting of 25 February 2000. In the Senate, both in the committees to which the draft law was ordered and in plenary, extensive debates were held in the Senate, which largely concerned precisely the provisions governing the new community of owners of the units, namely those whose abolition is proposed. A number of arguments were raised in the debates to support the adoption of new legislation, but at the same time a number of opinions were opposed.

The arguments in favour of the adoption of the amendment, or in favour of the reregulation of the association of owners of units as legal entities established by the law, were based on the belief that the choice of legal regulation of social relations arising from the operation of a house, in which the co-owners of the common parts of the house are also owners of apartments (units), reflected in an appropriate manner the needs of the practice, while respecting the principle of collective and / or general interest, while also leading to the fulfilment of Article 11 (3) of the Charter. The advocates of the new legislation also pointed out that the compulsory legal entity - the trustee of a house with a binding membership of apartment owners - is dominant in Europe. Contrary to the current legislation, according to which the association of unit owners without legal personality was also formed ex ante, the amendments saw a change precisely in the enactment of legal personality for these communities.

The new legislation of the unit owners' community has been opposed to the view that the State wants to intervene in the free decision-making of the unit owners in a form which it chooses within the limits of the legal order. According to the opponents of the amendment, the state also undemocratically discriminates against the owners of smaller units by adapting the internal circumstances of the community. Although the Senate decided to return the bill to the Chamber of Deputies, the amendments did not affect the contested provisions. Finally, in the Senate's decision-making, votes prevailed in favour of the rearrangement of the community of unit owners.

In its opinion on the proposal signed by Minister Petr Lachnit, the Ministry of Regional Development states that it is not possible to agree with the promoters, because their opinion according to the Ministry does not in particular take into account the special nature of the apartment ownership, as modified in the legal order of the Czech Republic. Its essence is that an apartment or non-residential space (so-called "unit") is not a separate thing, but is part of a building. The unit may be a separate subject of civil relations, but only because the law expressly provides for it. According to the Ministry, the ownership of the unit as a designated part of the building cannot be owned by which the full authority of the case corresponds. This difference between the ownership of the case (property) and the ownership of the unit is reflected mainly in the scope of the owner's authorisation. Owners' right to the unit has meaning and legal relevance only with a share of the joint ownership right to the common parts of the house. Each owner must be aware of his or her responsibility for the proper maintenance of the house as a whole, in particular its common parts.

The Ministry stressed that the fundamental lack of regulation in force prior to the amendment by Act No 103 / 2000 Coll. was that the association of owners of the units did not have legal personality and the Community could not do legal acts. Only all owners of the units may act together or some owners of the units, provided that they have overruled the other owners in a specified manner. The legal acts could also be performed by the authorised owners of the units on the basis of the power of attorney or by the trustee on the basis of a contract with the owners of the units with a mandate to act. However, the law did not address a situation where the person of the administrator was not designated or the designated administrator would not perform his duties. The law did not impose an obligation on the owners of the units to enter into a contract on the administration of the house, although the existence of the contract was calculated and regulated by some of its formalities. The construction of partial commitments, where each of the owners of the units is obliged and entitled only to the extent that it is attributable to them, unlike the solidarity of the co-owners under the Civil Code, allegedly caused a number of problems in practice. Suppliers of repairs to the common parts of the house preferred the conclusion of a contract in which the client is obliged to pay the price jointly and severally, rather than a contract from which obligations would arise for each owner who would have to invoice and, where appropriate, recover the relevant part of the price separately.

According to the Ministry, it was very sensitive and, for a number of owners, an impossible problem of enforcing the obligation to contribute to the costs of house and land management under the provisions of Section 15 of the Housing Act. If a legal person had not been set up and the trustee in charge of the house had not been given the power of attorney from the owners of the units, it was almost impossible to recover from the payer the contribution to the house administration. In particular, in houses with a larger number of unit owners, arrears were increasing disproportionately and this situation only recorded to non-owners. It was therefore necessary for the law to amend the unit owners' community as a legal person capable of exercising rights and to commit itself to all matters relating to the administration of the house, and for that community to be established subject to certain legal conditions. If the appellants contend that the Housing Act goes beyond the constitutional framework of the content and protection of property rights, if, in § 9 (9) and § 10 (3), it imposes obligations on certain owners of units to perform the duties of the Community authorities, the Ministry considers that the security of the administration, operation and repair of the common parts of the house is one of the essential obligations of all owners of the units which are also joint owners of the common parts of the house. The Community of owners of units as a legal person having the capacity to exercise rights and to undertake, in all matters connected with the administration of the house, that activity may be carried out by its authorities which it chooses. The law must also remember the situation in which it does not happen, and in the Ministry's view it is fair when the owner whose share in the common parts of the house is the largest, or the owners of the units that became members of the community, is entrusted with this function.

Furthermore, the Ministry does not agree with the appellants' view that the law in the construction of the Community places disproportionate emphasis on the collective aspect of the exercise of rights associated with the use of the house. The Housing Act had to adjust the relationship between the owners of the units (and the co-owners of the common parts of the house) in a specific way to the extent provided for by the law. The Ministry also disagrees with the proposal to abolish § 13 (2), second sentence, § 13 (7) and § 15 (2) of the Housing Act and states that the provision of § 13 (2) affects the owners of units which do not fulfil their legal obligations and infringes the principle of the protection of the property rights of other owners of units. Paragraph 13 (7) corresponds to Paragraph 12 on the liability of unit owners. On the contrary, the contested provision of Paragraph 15 (2), according to the Ministry, strengthens the legal status of the owners of the units, since, according to the previous version of the Act, the administrator has communicated the amount of the funds as advances for the costs associated with the management of the house and land, according to the new regulation being done by the Community authority, or by the majority of the owners of the units, if necessary. As regards the provision of Paragraph 9 (2) of the Housing Act, the Ministry notes that the appellants omit that under that provision it is possible to negotiate a pledge contract with the unit only with the consent of the owner of the unit.

With regard to Section 5 (5) of the Housing Act, the Ministry notes that if the provisions of Section 5 (2) and (3) were not supplemented by this provision, it would be possible to circumvent the provisions of Section 22 (1) and (2), which provide the tenant of the apartment - a natural person - the right to have a preferential acquisition of the apartment within the time limits and under the conditions laid down by the law. Paragraph 5 (5) of the block clause is therefore necessary, otherwise the protection of existing tenants would lack meaning. The proposal to abolish it would thus be for the benefit of persons who deliberately acquired housing with tenants into joint ownership in order to obtain the removal of existing tenants without having to be protected by the possibility of obtaining preferential ownership of the apartments they use, which, according to the Ministry, could lead to a breach of Article 11 (3) of the Charter.

The Constitutional Court first examined, in accordance with § 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, whether the law in respect of which the appellants object to the unconstitutionality of its provisions was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner.

It is clear from the observations of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as from the House of Deputies, shortwriting reports, relevant resolutions and data on the voting process of the two chambers that both the Housing Act and Law 103 / 2000 Coll. have been adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution, in compliance with the provisions of Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. The draft law, later published under No. 72 / 1994 Coll., was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by the Government of the Czech Republic. The Act was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies at its 17th meeting on 24 March 1994 (Resolution No 355 of the Chamber of Deputies, House Prints No 599 and No 724), as amended by the approved amendments, when 99 Members voted out of the 169 Members present in favour of the bill and against them were 33. The Act was signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in accordance with Article 51 of the Constitution and was published in the Collection of Laws of 22, 1994 (effective on 1 May 1994).

The bill, in the Collection of Laws later published under No. 103 / 2000 Coll., was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (House Press No. 268) by the Government of the Czech Republic. For the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies, in which it was agreed to this bill, at its 21st meeting on 28 January 2000, out of 165 Members present in favour of it, 72 opposed them. The bill was then referred to the Senate on 7 February 2000, which discussed it in the prescribed manner at its 16th meeting on 25 February 2000 and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies as amended (Senate Resolution 292). The Chamber of Deputies voted on the bill returned by the Senate at its 24th meeting on 4 April 2000, maintained the original bill and approved it in the version in which it was referred to the Senate (134 and 35 of the 188 Members present voted against). The Act was then signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister and declared in the Collection of Laws in the year 32, 2000 (effective on 1 July 2000).

With regard to Act No 549 / 1991 Coll., on Judicial Charges, as amended, the Constitutional Court did not ascertain whether it had been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution's established competence and the constitutionally prescribed manner, since for legislation issued before the Constitutional Tribunal became effective, the Constitutional Court was entitled to examine only their content compliance with the current constitutional order, but not the constitutionality of the procedure and the observance of the legislature (see the order of the Constitutional Court of 22 April 1999, p. The provisions which the appellants require to be repealed were, moreover, inserted into this law by Act No. 103 / 2000 Coll.

The Constitutional Court, after examining the application and considering all the supporting documents collected, concluded that the application was not justified.

First, the Constitutional Court must always consider whether all the formalities laid down for the application for the initiation of proceedings are fulfilled. At this stage, it was first established that the appellants claimed the annulment of Article II (2) of the Housing Act. However, such a provision is not in this Act, but is contained in Act No. 103 / 2000 Coll., which the appellants did not contest. As the Constitutional Court is bound by the petition, it was forced to reject that part of the proposal as manifestly unfounded under Paragraph 43 (2) (a) of the Constitutional Court Act. It should be added that Article II (2) is only a transitional provision of Act No. 103 / 2000 Coll., which establishes the formation of a community of owners of units as legal persons on the date of entry into force of that Act (i.e. 1 July 2000), with the simultaneous imposition of an obligation to hold the first assembly of that Community within three months of that date. At the time of the submission of the motion by a group of Members, the transitional provision thus fulfilled its purpose and no longer produces constitutional effects. Thus, the proposal to abolish it could not change the case, despite the fact that the rights and obligations arising from legal relations arising before the repeal of the law remain unaffected and the findings of the Constitutional Court thus have the effect of ex nunc (Paragraph 71 (4) of the Constitutional Court Act).

1. Application for annulment of the provisions of Sections 9 to 11 of the Housing Act under the heading "Community of Owners of Units."

2. Article 13 (2), second sentence, and Article 13 (7) of the Housing Act, Article 15 (2) of the Housing Act, "Committee or entrusted owner" and the last two sentences and Article 15 (4) of the Housing Act "(Article 9)."

3. Application for annulment of the provisions of Section 5 (5) of the Housing Act.

4. Application for annulment of Article 11 (2) (n) of the Law on Judicial Charges.

The objections of a group of Members shall be concentrated in particular on the applicable legislation of the 'Community of Owners of Units'. The appellants state that the creation of such legal persons, by law called upon to exercise their rights and obligations in all matters connected with the administration, operation and repair of the common parts of the house, is in breach of the principle of legal certainty, including the prohibition of retroactivity of legal standards. The features of the rule of law are certainly the principle of legal certainty, the protection of citizens' trust in law and the prohibition of retroactivity of legal standards, but, in the present case, the adoption of new legislation has not infringed these core principles. Legal science recognises the so-called "true retroactivity ', which includes cases where the legal norm also reflects the emergence of a legal relationship and claims arising from it before it is effective, and the retroactivity which consists of the fact that the legal relationships which arose under the law of the old are governed by that law until the new law is effective, but then governed by that new law. The establishment of legal relations existing before the entry into force of the new legislation, the legal requirements arising from such relations, as well as the legal acts taken, are governed by the repealed legal standard. The issue of the inadmissibility of retroactivity is related to the protection of so-called acquired rights (iura quaesita), although both institutions cannot be identified. A breach of the principle of the protection of acquired rights would only be a change that would deteriorate the legal status of the legal entity retroactively. The fundamental change made here by Act 103 / 2000 Coll. is that the community of owners of the units has acquired legal personality (in an area which is part of the object of its activity) necessary for the proper security of the task of the community as well as the meaning and purpose of its creation. Such an arrangement is undoubtedly available to a democratic legislator who, on principle, had to lay down the conditions under which the legal person eligible to exercise his rights and commit himself to all matters connected with the administration of the house. Under Article 9 (3) of the Community Housing Act, at least five units are established in a house of which at least three are owned by three different owners, on the date of service to the last of those owners of the instrument bearing the deposit in the register of real estate or any other document certified by the competent State authority to the ownership of the unit. The provision is supplemented by the transitional provision of Article II (2) of Law No 103 / 2000 Coll. governing the situation of owners who fulfilled the conditions laid down before the entry into force of the Act (1 July 2000). If such a provision had not been adopted, the principle of equality between the owners of the units would have been infringed. The new legislation could only be regarded as retroactive if it constituted the creation of a community before its effective date. However, the law clearly sets its effectiveness in the future and is in line with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.

The appellants further argue that the contested provisions go beyond the constitutional framework of content and protection of property law (§ 9 (9), § 10 (3) of the Housing Act), or that the legislator places disproportionate emphasis on the collective aspects of the exercise of rights associated with the use and handling of the house (§ 9 (1) and § 11 (4) and (5) of the Housing Act) throughout the Community's construction, its scope and decision-making. First of all, it is necessary to point out the specific nature of the housing property under the Housing Act. According to Article 1 (1), this Act provides for the co-ownership of a building, in which the co-owner of a building is also the owner of an apartment or non-residential space as a space-defined part of the building and also the joint owner of a joint part of the building. The legislation in force is therefore based on a co-ownership concept, where the main object is the building and the secondary object is the apartment or non-residential space, which are not realistically separable parts of the building, and thus the co-ownership of the building accedes to the ownership of the apartment or non-residential space (construction of the so-called dualistic theory of housing in a co-ownership concept). The special legislation provided for by the Civil Code, which provides that the subject of civil relations may also be housing or non-residential premises (§ 118 (2)) and which refers to the contested law in Paragraph 125 (1), is given precisely by the specific nature of the apartment or non-residential space which cannot be de facto separate, separable parts of the building. The ownership of an apartment or non-residential space is, by definition, necessarily limited to the extent that the need to manage the building as a whole must be respected. The rights of individual owners are limited by the same ownership rights of other unit owners. The arguments of the appellants cannot therefore be attested, as the legislation in force is being guided by an attempt to respond to the specific points mentioned. It is an expression of a constitutionally anchored principle that ownership is committed and must not be abused against the rights of others or contrary to the legally protected general interests (Article 11 (3) of the Charter). The legislature was guided by an effort for a fair, balanced solution, supporting owners who respect the principle cited, and providing a higher level of legal certainty, as well as other stakeholders performing their tasks in connection with the administration of the house. The adoption of the new legislation was forced by its social urgency after the experience of the earlier regulation, which, to put it simply, did not sufficiently hinder situations where "the honest paid the unfair." The Constitutional Court, aware of its competence, concluded that the contested provisions are not individually or in summary contrary to the rules of the highest legal force.

Nor is the decision-making method of the unit owners' community defined in Section 11 of the Housing Act. The size of the joint ownership shares of unit owners in the common parts of the house is decisive when voting. In the case of an important matter, the overvoted owner of the unit may ask the court to rule on it (§ 11 (3)). Unanimity is established in the case of decisions on the adoption of resolutions in serious situations, which are a change in the purpose of the use of the construction, a change in the construction or a substantial change in the common parts of the house (§ 11 (5)). Article 11 (1) of the Charter lays down, in particular, the right of everyone to own property and the right to ensure the same legal content and the protection of the right of ownership of all owners. The contested provisions do not restrict everyone's right to own property, nor do they create any inequality in the content and protection of property rights when the legislation affects every co-owner of the house and the owner of the unit equally.

Paragraph 9 (2) of the Housing Act is challenged by the appellant because the legislator delegates the right of disposal to a unit different from the owner, which "strengthens the status of the community in an unconstitutional manner '. However, the Constitutional Court points out that that provision allows the Community to negotiate a lien contract with the unit, including the relevant joint ownership interests in the joint parts of the house, to secure claims arising from a loan granted at the cost of managing the house only with the consent of the owner of the unit. His prior consent to the conclusion of the pledge agreement is necessary here, so it is not an unconstitutional provision, since the freedom of the owner of the unit is not in any way restricted.

Paragraph 13 (2) of the Housing Act provides for the obligation of the owner of the unit to remove the defects and damage caused by other units or common parts of the house or by those using the unit. In the motion of a group of Members, the second sentence of that provision is challenged, which merely strengthens the guarantee of the obligation to remove defects and damage, by the creation of a lien (the date of the court's decision) to the other owners of the units to the compulsory owner's unit and to the movable items. The contested provisions are merely cited in the statement of reasons by the appellants without further explaining what they see as the alleged contradiction with Article 11 (1) and Article 1 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 1 of the Constitution (a manifest clerical error is that they have referred to that provision as Article 13 (3)). More significantly, the applicants oppose the provisions of Paragraph 13 (7), which provides that the owners of the units are liable for the Community's obligations in proportion to the size of the joint ownership shares in the common parts of the house. The appellants consider this to be a "flagrant violation of the principle of equality of owners in rights, the principle of the same legal content and the protection of ownership of all owners and the principle of legal certainty '. The Constitutional Court notes that the contested provisions do not in any way infringe those principles and, on the contrary, strengthen them accordingly in their consequences. The basic rights of the owner of the unit include the right to hold, use and dispose of the unit. However, the owner of the unit also has obligations based in general on the concept of ownership, as expressed in Article 11 (3) of the Charter of Dictions, that ownership is obliged. The owner of the unit is involved in the administration of the house to the extent that it corresponds to its joint ownership interest in the common parts of the house, which is his right and his duty. In addition, it is possible for unit owners to agree otherwise; This is therefore a disposing arrangement (Section 13 (1) of the Housing Act). The obligation of the owners of the units as a guarantor under Section 13 (7) of the Housing Act depends on the amount of the joint ownership interest in the common parts of the house, thus having only a partial nature and the owner of the unit cannot be forced to perform more without his consent.

The appellants further state that the provisions of Section 5 (5) of the Housing Law exclude apartments which are used by the right of rent from the special arrangements for the disposal of co-owners, as provided for in Section 5 (2) to (4), in which they see a constitutionally unacceptable restriction on the co-owners of the house and the abuse of the right of rent to the apartment. The purpose of this provision is the legitimate protection of current tenants, consisting of the fact that the apartment must be offered to the lessee (§ 22 (1) and (2) of the Housing Act), and the solution adopted is not unconstitutional, although it is possible to imagine a solution better suited to the overall concept of the law. However, it is not the task of the Constitutional Court to perfectivistically seek different inaccuracies in the legislation or to instruct the legislature about the regulation more appropriate, but to assess whether the contested law or its individual provisions are contrary to the constitutional law or the international treaty provided for in Article 10 of the Constitution [Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution].

A group of Members no longer makes any more specific arguments against the other legal provisions under appeal in the statement of reasons for their proposal, and since the Constitutional Court, as is apparent from what was stated, did not find the unconstitutional nature of the provisions under examination to be rejected, the application for the annulment of these provisions, in principle only of the Accesoric, the provision [in Paragraph 15 (2) of the Law on the ownership of apartments of the words "committee or entrusted owner 'and the last two sentences of that provision, in § 15 (4) of the Law on the ownership of the apartments of words" (§ 9)' and the provisions of Article 11 (2) (n) of the Law on judicial fees].