The Constitutional Court found No. 127 / 2001 Coll.
The Constitutional Court's finding of 20 February 2001 on the application for annulment of § 250a of Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., Criminal Act, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
12.04.2001
127
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
On 20 February 2001, the Constitutional Court decided in plenary on the proposal by Ing. J. to abolish the provisions of § 250a of Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., criminal law, as amended,
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
On 4 January 2000 the Constitutional Court received a timely constitutional complaint from Ing. J. J., represented by the lawyer JUDr. J. T., against the order of the Municipal Court in Prague of 21.9.1999 sp. zn. 9 To 345 / 99 and against the judgment of the District Court for Prague 5 of 6.5.1999 sp. zn. 3 T 26 / 99, associated with the proposal to repeal § 250a of Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., penal law, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "tr. zázák.").
The second Chamber of the Constitutional Court, by order of 15.2.2000 sp. zn. II. ÚS 4 / 2000, suspended the procedure and the application for the annulment of the individual provision of the law was referred to the full Chamber of the Constitutional Court.
The appellant was rejected by a final order of the Municipal Court in Prague of 21.9.1999 sp. zn. 9 To 345 / 99 against the judgment of the District Court for Prague 5 of 6.5.1999 sp. zn. 3 T 26 / 99. The Court of First Instance recognised him as guilty of the offence of insurance fraud pursuant to § 250a (3) of the Act, for which he imposed a custodial sentence for a period of one year, whose execution was postponed for the same period of trial.
By applying the provisions of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act, the General Courts, in the appellant's view, infringed the constitutional law enshrined in Article 11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms No 2 / 1993 Coll. (hereinafter "the Charter '), according to which the ownership of all owners has the same legal content and protection.
As the appellant points out, the law does not require the intention to cause harm or to enrich such conduct as yourself or others, while the grammatical interpretation, as the general courts have given it, suggests that it may be an indication of any false circumstance, regardless of whether the insurer is misled or not, whether or not he has acted in error in the event of an insurance claim and whether the disclosure of false information is at all eligible for due diligence by the insurer.
If the general courts are based on such an interpretation of Article 250a (3) of the Act, it is clear from the appellant's view that that provision itself contradicts Article 11 (1) of the Charter.
Contrary to the general nature of the criminal offence of fraud under Article 250 (3) of the Act, the contested provision on insurance fraud is, in principle (§ 250a (1) and (2)), constructed as a so-called prematurely completed offence, i.e. a special form of preparation, where it is not required to mislead or use errors for criminal purposes, but it is sufficient to give false or grossly distorted data. Compared to the fraud provided for in Section 250 (3) of the Act, insurance fraud is not required to cause damage or to enrich itself or others. The effect of the damage is merely a circumstance which makes the application of a higher penalty rate conditional upon the damage actually occurring [Paragraph 250a (3), (4) (b) and (5)].
It is clear that the object of the attack, as imported by the appellant, is the property of the insurance undertakings and, in view of the construction of the facts, it is sufficient for criminal liability to be carried out in a manner which does not result in any harmful consequences, as well as that where the harmful consequences arise only because of the lack of care of the insurance employees who do not correctly determine the level of the insurance benefits.
It is therefore clear that the assets of one part of private entities, such as insurance undertakings, are protected in a significantly more stringent and significantly different way than those of other entities, whether commercial or private citizens. There is no objection that insurance companies' assets are attacked more frequently than other assets, and as a result, the social impact of such attacks is more serious and therefore deserves more severe punishment, and that, even in other legal systems (e.g. in Germany), criminal laws know specific cases of insurance fraud. This is not a case of special insurance fraud, because it is not a more stringent penalty because of the subject of the attack more frequently attacked, but it is a completely different construction of criminal protection of insurance companies' assets against fraud and against acts which do not even have the characteristics of fraud (misrepresentation or use of error).
In these circumstances, it was the duty of the District Court for Prague 5 to proceed pursuant to § 224 (5) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on the Criminal Procedure of the Court (Criminal Code), as amended, to suspend the prosecution and bring the case before the Constitutional Court, since the Court itself had to conclude that the application of that provision of the Criminal Code, which is applicable to the decision on guilt and punishment, was contrary to the Charter.
Finally, the appellant notes that the application of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act in its criminal case favours the protection of the insurance company's assets against the protection of its assets and those of other entities, and is therefore itself contrary to the Charter.
From the observations of the parties to the proposal requested by the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 69 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court ("the Act ') by the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (" the House') and the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic ("the Senate '), the following emerged.
The President of the House stated, inter alia, that the provisions of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act apply to cases where false or grossly distorted data or material data are omitted when an insurance contract is concluded or when a claim is claimed. The designated protection of the assets of insurance undertakings shall take into account the fact that the performance of the insurance undertaking takes place on the basis of and under the conditions set out in the insurance contract. In this context, the legislator expressed an interest in protecting or sanctioning these relations. At the same time, it took into account that the property of other owners or the property of the appellant is not the subject of the performance resulting from insurance contracts and it is therefore not justified that such property should be subject to the same or similar protection in this respect. It therefore does not see the contradiction between Article 11 (1) of the Charter and Article 250a (3) of the Act. Following this, it recalls the decision of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR No 11 / 1992 and agrees with the understanding of the constitutional principle of equality as expressed here. In such a situation the participant notes that the legislature acted in the belief that the adopted law is in accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic No. 1 / 1993 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and its legal order. It is therefore up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the contested legislative provision and to rule in the context of the proposal.
In its opinion, the President of the Senate stated, inter alia, that, when discussing a government amendment to the criminal law, as part of the general part of the debate, an attempt was made to delete the provisions of Sections 250a and 250b of the Act. However, the Senate has no longer opened a detailed debate on the submission of amendments since the Senate approved the draft amendment to the criminal law as referred to by the House. It did so in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Czech Republic and international treaties under Article 10 of the Constitution. In this context, it can also be noted that the constitutional right to the same legal content and the protection of property rights contained in Article 11 (1) of the Charter, which the complainant claims to be infringed by the application of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act, is mainly linked in its origin to the refusal of the system of composition of ownership of species with privileged status and protection and to the species of patient (suppressed), applied by the Socialist Constitution of the CSSR of 1960 and following legislation. Thus, as indicated in the explanatory memorandum to Article 11 of the Charter, the objective of the constitutional law in question appears to be to prohibit more the principle of differentiated property rights at the level of the organisation of the company than at the level of the individual, for example, pragmatic differences in the choice of the method of protection of property rights. The completeness of the values of the equivalence of legal content and the protection of property law may be relativised by other constitutional rules of Article 11 of the Charter, which, in paragraph 3, also prohibits the misuse of ownership against the detriment of the rights of others or contrary to legally protected personal interests. It is also possible to remind that the object of the offence under Section 250a of the Act is the protection of the negotiation and performance of insurance contracts and therefore ultimately foreign property, i.e. not just insurance companies' assets. Any party to an insurance contract may be the perpetrator of insurance fraud. It is therefore up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the application for annulment of the contested provision and to rule on it.
First of all, the appellant's legal representative, in reply to the opinions of both parties, notes that the substance of the proposal is not that the conduct towards the assets of the insurance undertakings would be more severely affected. Such an adjustment would be admissible in view of the claims made in the House's observations given the need to penalise the difficult and frequent attacks on the property of insurance companies. On the contrary, the substance of the proposal is that the assets of insurance undertakings are protected against a wider range of offences than those of other entities. Paragraph 250a (1) of the Act is not only a special form of preparation for an offence to cause damage to the assets of an insurance undertaking, as can be deduced from the opinion of the House. If that were the case, the facts would have to include intent to cause damage or to enrich themselves or others, as is the case with the criminal offence of fraud under Section 250 of the Act. The fact that such an intention is not a precondition for criminality makes it possible, according to § 250a of the Act, to affect actions which are not intended to cause harm. If the "cause of harm 'character is set out in the other paragraphs of the provision cited as a so-called more severe consequence, that is to say, as a circumstance making the use of a higher penalty rate, it will be sufficient to cause such damage and the negligence of the perpetrator [§ 6 (a)]. In summary, it can therefore be said that the provisions of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act also protect the assets of insurance undertakings against actions which result from negligence, while the assets of other entities are not protected against such actions. Therefore, the protection of insurance undertakings' assets involves a wider range of criminal offences, where otherwise the basic facts of the other offences referred to in Title Ninth Special Part of the Act do not contain negligence. This is an inequality in which the appellant sees an infringement of the constitutional right to the same legal content and protection of property rights. As regards the Senate's objection that the disclosure of false information within the meaning of Paragraph 250a (1) of the Act may be committed by any party to the Treaty, that is an unfounded objection. It is clear from the observations of the House that the provision is intended primarily to protect the assets of insurance undertakings. It is also used in practice. Even if this were not the case, the fact that the insured person (thought to be" insured ') is favoured does not change the fact that the scope of the protection of the property thus defined is wider than the protection of the assets of other entities. The reason for such an extension cannot then be that the conduct that bears the features of insurance fraud is "criminal under the current regulation, but it is generally not possible', as stated in the opinion of the House. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to the principle of the suspension of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter.
In the context of examining the procedural conditions of the application, the Constitutional Court addressed the question of the validity of the contested provision Article 250a (3) of the law at the time of service of the application to the Constitutional Court. He therefore ascertained, as required by Paragraph 68 (2) of the Act, whether Act No. 253 / 1997 Coll., amending and supplementing Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., the Criminal Act, as amended, which, with effect from 1. 1. 1998, had enshrined the contested provision in the Criminal Act, was adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and the constitutionally prescribed manner. To this end, he requested from the House and Senate the shorthand reports from their meetings at which the amendment in question was discussed and adopted.
In the House, 186 Members voted in favour of the resolution to adopt an amendment to Act 3. A total of 154 Members opposed 3 Members. In the Chamber of 62 Senators and Senators present, 33 Senators and Senators voted in favour of the amendment, as referred to by the House, when at least 32 votes were needed to adopt the proposal.
Law No 253 / 1997 Coll. was thus validly adopted and subsequently signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and published in the Collection of Laws in the light of Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.
In proceedings for the annulment of laws or their individual provisions, it shall examine: The Constitutional Court shall, in accordance with Article 10 of the Constitution, determine the content of such acts in terms of their compliance with constitutional laws and international treaties, as required by Article 68 (2) of the Law.
In this context, the Constitutional Court focused primarily on genesis and the very criminal political nature of the proposal for the contested provision of Article 250a (3) of the Act and notes that the application for its annulment is not justified.
To abolish the proposed legal provision:
Insurance fraud
(1) Any person who, when negotiating an insurance contract or when exercising his right to benefit from such a contract, gives false or grossly distorted information or withdraws substantial information shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for up to two years or by a prohibition of activity or by a penalty or forfeiture of money.
(2) In the same way, it will be punished who intentionally causes an insurance claim or who maintains the condition of the insurance claim to increase the damage caused.
(3) By withdrawing liberty for six months to three years, or by punishable money, the perpetrator shall be punished if the action referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 causes damage to foreign property not minor.
(4) By withdrawing liberty for two years to eight years, the perpetrator will be punished,
(a) commit the act referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 as a member of an organised group;
(b) if such an act on foreign property causes significant damage or any other particularly serious consequence.
(5) By withdrawing liberty for five to twelve years, the offender shall be punished if the action referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 causes damage to foreign property of a large scale. ';
The paper evidence collected by the Constitutional Court in the present case must first be based on the explanatory memorandum to Act No 253 / 1997 Coll.
In the context of Article 250a (3) of the Act, the latter notes that, by supplementing the provision on the crime of fraud, it follows the extension of criminal penalties to other forms of fraudulent conduct, which is already punishable under current legislation, but is generally not possible.
The facts of the crime of fraud so far require the perpetrator to have a fraudulent intention at a time when the objective aspect of the crime begins to be fulfilled. The reason for supplementing the title of the ninth special part of the Act on Insurance Fraud is not only the fact that, in particular, property insurance has recently been misused for unlawful insurance.
It turns out that the "general" nature of the criminal offence of fraud under Section 250 (3) of the Act is not sufficient to penalise all forms of infringement, which only covers the conduct where the property damage has already occurred. Not all cases where the perpetrator is committing an act that is yet to be fraudulent enrichment can be dealt with as a developmental stage in the crime of fraud. Not only in the interest of insurance undertakings which bear the risk arising from the nature of the insurance, but also in the interest of those to which the level of the risk in the form of insurance falls, and in the interests of the protection of property and health from its intentional damage, the requirement that, as a completed offence, the intentional introduction of the consequences of the occurrence of the accident itself is justified. Even in this case, that effect will need to be caused intentionally by the perpetrator. On the other hand, the penalty for such action will not be conditional on the fact that the offender intentionally caused the insurance claim has already notified the insurance undertaking of his intention to obtain or even obtain unlawful insurance benefits. For the same reasons, it is proposed as a criminal offence to penalise negotiations where the insurance event arises not as a result of the intentional conduct of the perpetrator, but only as a result of the situation that has arisen, it will take advantage of the fact that the situation in question maintains the intention to increase the damage suffered. Similarly, as is the case with the facts of the criminal offence of fraud under Section 250 (3) of the Act., it is proposed to more severely penalise cases where the perpetrator causes more damage or other serious consequences by insurance fraud.
From the shorthand report on the proceedings of the House to the point of amendment to the Act containing the contested provision, the Constitutional Court found that at the second reading there was a parliamentary proposal to delete Paragraph 250a of the Act. From the constitutional point of view is the part of the argument where it states:... "the reasons for their (§ 250a, § 250b tr. zak.) launch is more. For example, in these two paragraphs, it is a subtle reversal of the burden of proof... it is the introduction of an unconstitutional inequality in property protection. One property is to be protected other than another property..." That proposal was supported by another Member, who limited himself to criminal-political (criminalisation) arguments, not to other reasons of constitutional law. When voting on the amendments, the proposal was not adopted (of the total number of 188, by a majority of 140 against 17).
The content of the identical amendment to the Government Schedule of the Third Amendment was also heard in the Senate hearing, as documented by the relevant shorthand report, where it was justified as follows:... "by the introduction of these (§ 250a, § 250b) of the Rules of Procedure we are in conflict with the legal principles of the Constitution... Within the meaning of Article 11 (1) of the Charter, the status of all participants in obligations is clearly equal. The draft § 250a Tr. Act... is contrary to this principle, favours insurance... relations with other obligations - namely the introduction of an unconstitutional inequality..." Even in the Senate, that amendment did not pass.
The facts of the offence of insurance fraud, as amended by § 250a (2) of the Act, are known in comparable form by criminal codes and other countries, namely Germany and Austria. However, Paragraph 250a (1) of the Act does not have the corresponding equivalent.
According to German criminal law (StGB, as at 26.1.1998), this is one of the types of "particularly heavy fraud 'within the meaning of § 263 (3) (5), which is assumed as a general rule if the perpetrator pretends to have an insurance event, if he or someone else in that intention ignites the matter of significant value or otherwise by fire completely or partially destroys or sinks or causes the ship to crash.
In addition, the "abuse of insurance 'in Section 265 (1) also offers that the offender who is insured against destruction, damage, limitation of fitness, loss or theft will damage, destroy, restrict its fitness, thereby creating an option or other possibility for him or someone else to be provided with insurance.
The Austrian legislature also mentions the misuse of insurance in § 151 (1) (StGB, as at 1.3.1997). According to the literature, these are preparatory negotiations for insurance fraud (Foregger, R.: StGB, Wien, Manz Verlag 1997, p. 150).
In a number of its earlier decisions, the Constitutional Court took a position on understanding and interpretation of the constitutional principle of equality of a citizen before the law, which plays a key role in the matter.
Already in its Decision No 11 / 1992 Collections of the resolutions and findings of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR, the then Federal Constitutional Court stated that the equality of citizens before the law was not regarded as an abstract and absolute category, but was always attributed to a certain legal standard, taken in a reciprocal relationship between different bodies, etc., i.e. as a relative and not absolute equality. Relative inequality means only the elimination of unjustified differences. Logically, and contrario differences justified are not unconstitutional, based on objective and rational criteria. It is for the State to decide, in order to ensure its functions, to grant a group less benefits than others. However, they must not proceed arbitrarily. If the law determines the benefit of one group and thus imposes disproportionate obligations on another, it can only happen with reference to public values (in the public interest and for the public good, see the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 95, in: ÚS, Sv. 5, p. 107) and not in such a way as to apply, for example, to sp. zn. IV. ÚS 15 / 94, in: ÚS, Sv. 2, p. 115. Equality as relative category is also presented in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 95, in: ÚS, Sv. 3, p. 209.
The view of § 250a of the Act of Accession of quoted foreign adjustments, as well as findings, results in the following conclusions.
The Constitutional Court considers that the construction of the facts of insurance fraud as an offence of an early completion of fraud in the form of its preparation, i.e. at the same time as an act of threat (which applies, inter alia, to Paragraph 250a (1) (a) of the Act and, in part, to paragraph 2 thereof, in relation to § 250 (1) and (2) of the Act), constitutes a standard procedure for the legislator in seeking an answer to the question of what to criminalise. This is documented by examples from abroad as mentioned above. The legislature does so wherever the current criminal law does not allow effective penalties, of a material quality for which other instruments, i.e. extra-criminal legal sectors (criminal law such as "ultima ratio") are no longer sufficient. In other words, if the legislature is in breach of the obligation to notify the conclusion and change of the insurance contract (§ 793 of Act No. 40 / 1964 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Circular ')), primarily by reducing the performance of such a contract (§ 798 of the Circular), then, in cases where false or grossly distorted data or the concealment of material data, under the circumstances mentioned, the criminal penalty is entered into (§ 250a (1) of the Act); the same situation is present at the level of Sections 799 and 809 respectively.
However, it is not in principle for the Constitutional Court, in itself, to consider this issue, namely the breadth of the limits of criminal criminalisation of certain types of conduct, whether it is to duplicate or replace the constitutional role of the legislature. However, this issue should only be addressed in the context of criteria of criminalisation such as public values or interests on which the legislature's criminalisation in the given, i.e. the Constitutional Court considered, width is based.
The reason for the criminalisation of insurance fraud in § 250a (3) (c), as stated in the explanatory memorandum cited, is primarily the extension of the criminal penalty to other forms of fraudulent conduct, which, although criminal under existing legislation, is already illegal, but is generally not possible. Furthermore, it is the fact that, in particular, property insurance has recently been misused to obtain unlawful subsequent insurance benefits, that is to say, the need to criminalise as an act completed and offences completed prematurely at the stage of preparation.
In that way, the justified extension of criminal protection of foreign property is based on constitutionally acceptable public value, i.e. contained in Article 11 (1) of the Charter, provided that the legislature intensifies criminal protection against acts which essentially constitute abuse of the Institute of Insurance of Property, as is the case elsewhere. As a result of such legislation, the possible inequality of criminal protection of the assets of certain entities would then be in line with the Constitution as it would thus compensate for the real inequalities in protection.
However, if the legislature justifies the breadth of criminalisation by "preamble" to property fraud by pointing out the evidentiary difficulties in prosecuting those accused persons, the constitutional weight of this public interest (in criminal penalties) may be problematic. In its reply, the appellant points out that such an interpretation or justification of the legislation would be contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter. The design of the facts of the offence, ensuring that the evidence of the performance of its characteristics gives the law enforcement authorities the least possible difficulty, means that the scope of the subject of the evidence actually narrows down. This also widens the scope, the scope of the facts of such a crime. However, in no way does the obligation to clarify carefully the circumstances which are particularly in favour of the accused move the burdensome law enforcement authorities to the accused. Only in such a case, should the transfer occur, would the principle of presumption of innocence be affected. That is not the case. Although the issues of the scope of the evidence and the transfer of that obligation are closely related, they are not the same. The narrowing of the scope of the evidence taken by the criminal justice authority does not automatically imply the transfer of the abovementioned obligation which that authority has as a result of the presumption of innocence to the person accused.
Therefore, in a deeper view of the matter and the reason for criminalising insurance fraud, which is to try to minimise the evidentiary distress of law enforcement authorities, even if it might be called into question in criminal policy, it is not constitutionally unconformal, as it does not conflict with the presumption of innocence, as it is stated.
As regards the individual primary object of the offence of insurance fraud pursuant to § 250a tr. zázák., the comment on this provision (Šámal P., Púry F., Rizman S.: Criminal law, commentary, 3rd edition, Prague, C. H. Beck 1998, p. 1154) is identical to the statement of reasons in that it is not only the protection of the negotiation and performance of insurance contracts, i.e. the property of insurance companies themselves, but also ultimately foreign property at all. This means, in the view of the Constitutional Court, assets of entities different from insurers (usually insurance undertakings); there are other insurance participants, i.e. policyholders or persons insured, i.e., after all, the claimant, who are affected by the insurance fraud committed by other insured persons in an objective way by reducing the possibility of making surpluses of premiums in which insurance otherwise contributes according to certain principles.
Each of the insurance contract entities may be the perpetrator of the insurance fraud and the victim of the offence, provided that the latter is the other entity of the contract. That must be the opinion of the Senate. If, in that connection, the applicant's reply states that even that fact cannot exclude the constitutionally unequal protection of the assets of the contractual insurance entities on the one hand and the assets of the entities outside the insurance contract on the other, it is not fully justified. It is therefore no longer that, in addition to the above-mentioned basic insurance participants, insurance contract entities, there are other insurance participants, i.e. the so-called "acquired 'or damage to insurance (harmful) events.
Therefore, the threat to property or its defect caused by insurance fraud is typically more serious in their real effect than those caused by a general fraud (§ 250 TRS.), where there is, of course, no link between the different insurance entities. That is why criminal policy is desirable and necessary for the existence of objective inequality in the effects of general and insurance fraud to be offset by criminal law. It has done this task by criminalising not only property disorders, as it has done in general fraud, but also the already mentioned "prediction," i.e. criminalising acts that are still at risk of such failures. The wider and, to that end, criminally functioning "inequality" is necessary to ensure that overall protection against fraud of different types is balanced by law.
Despite the fact that the legislation does not define the concept of insurance, it can be concluded, in particular, from Paragraph 788 (1) of the Act, that the insurance constitutes an obligation to provide, in return for payment, within the agreed range of transactions, a predetermined random event relating to the insured risk. It is a synallagmatic property obligation legal relationship characterised by the equality of participants who are holders of the rights and obligations associated with this legal relationship, or who have taken on themselves by the conclusion of an insurance contract and by the acquisition of these rights as well as by the mutual conditionality of the performance. "(Jedhíčka O., Švestka J. et al.: Civil Code, commentary, 3rd edition, Prague, C. H. Beck 1996, p. 725). It follows that, under the legal regime, in particular the contractual insurance which is under way, all its participants are already equal at the level of the law (i.e. the Act). In this equality, the third way of its § 250a" settles "intentionally unequally in relation to other persons damaged by general fraud (Article 4 (3) of the Charter, sp. zn.
The criminal political (criminalisation) "environment 'on which the contested legal provision was based and also manifested itself, from the point of view of constitutional law, in particular from the point of view of the principle of equality within the meaning of Article 11 (1) of the Charter, does not raise any doubt, therefore neither does the contested provision of the Treaty itself. To some extent, the conclusion is supported by a brief reference to legal comparisons with foreign adjustments similar to those previously mentioned.
The application for annulment of Paragraph 250a (3) of the Act was lodged by the appellant in conjunction with his constitutional complaint because it was not referred to in Article 224 (5) (b) of the Constitution in proceedings before the General Court. The appellant is of the opinion that the General Court had an obligation to suspend the prosecution and to refer Article 250a (3) of the law to the Constitutional Court, as it should have concluded that the contested provision of the law applicable to the decision on its guilt was contrary to the Charter.
This view cannot be entirely borne by the Constitutional Court, since it is already in its finding that the Constitutional Court has found that it is not possible to assess the constitutionality of the law itself, but must refer the matter to the Constitutional Court when it concludes that the law... is unconstitutional. "
Taking into account the results of the legal and constitutional analysis of the provisions of Article 250a (3) of the Act in relation to Article 11 (1) of the Charter carried out in the preceding recitals, the Constitutional Court has decided as set out in the operative part of its decision.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Kessler v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 127 / 2001 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 250a of Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., criminal law, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 12.04.2001 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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