Decree No. 361 / 2016 Coll.
Decree on the security of nuclear equipment and nuclear material
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Order
Effective from 01.01.2017
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361
DECLARATION
of 17 October 2016
on the security of nuclear equipment and nuclear material
The State Authority on Nuclear Safety sets out, pursuant to § 236 of Act No. 263 / 2016 Coll., Atomic Act, for the implementation of § 24 (7), § 159 (2), § 159a (5), § 160 (6), § 161 (4) and § 163 (2) (a) to (c):
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
This decree regulates
(a) the way in which nuclear material is classified for security purposes;
(b) the requirements for the definition, physical boundaries and detection of intrusion of a guarded area, a protected area, an internal space or a vital space, and the extent of the restrictions on entry and entry;
(c) organisational and technical measures to safeguard nuclear installations and nuclear material;
(d) requirements on the scope and manner of ensuring physical surveillance of nuclear installations and nuclear material;
(e) the scope and manner of ensuring the physical protection of nuclear equipment and nuclear material classified in Category I to Category III in its transport with regard to the project's basic threat;
(f) requirements for the content of the documentation for the authorised nuclear equipment and material security activity;
(g) the scope and manner of the security, the continuous development, maintenance and periodic evaluation of the security culture; and
(h) the extent and manner of security of the computer system necessary to manage nuclear safety, the registration of nuclear materials, physical protection and the management of radiological emergencies.
For the purposes of this decree:
(a) a technical physical protection system, an integrated system designed to ensure the detection of disruption of specified spaces, the delay of the disruptor's procedure, the control of the entry and entry of means of transport and the transmission of alarm information and its evaluation at the control centre;
(b) a mechanical means of defence fence, wall, barrier, grate and other means which delay a natural person from entering or preventing unauthorised entry into a guarded, protected, internal or vital space of a nuclear installation;
(c) emergency protection of the concentration of forces and resources of the Police of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the police") to carry out a service operation to avert an attack against a nuclear installation;
(d) subject to a threat to nuclear safety, an object which is capable of being misused for the purpose of theft, sabotage or other unauthorised activities against a nuclear installation or nuclear material which is a weapon, ammunition, explosive, alcoholic drink or other addictive substance, a portable electronic device enabling the processing of information to be affected and to prevent or disrupt the performance of the security functions of the system, construction or component, or any other object which is included in the project basic threat.
DETERMINATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN CATEGORIES AND DETERMINATION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, REQUIREMENTS FOR INSURANCE OF FYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT
Category of nuclear material
The nuclear material shall be classified in Category I, II or III of Annex 1 to this Decree if its mass is greater than the lower weight limit for Category III as set out in Annex 1 to this Decree.
Restricted spaces on nuclear installations
(1) On an energy nuclear installation they must be defined using a depth protection system
(a) a vital area where intentional damage to nuclear safety-critical systems and equipment in that area may lead directly or indirectly to a radiation accident; These include, in particular, the premises where the block guards and backup workstations are located, the control systems of the nuclear reactor, the emergency power supplies, the safety systems for the removal of residual heat from the core, the reactor room and the pool of storage of spent nuclear fuel,
(b) internal space where nuclear material classified in Category I is used or stored on a nuclear installation;
(c) a protected space where a vital or internal space is defined on a nuclear installation, or where a nuclear material classified in Category II is used or stored on a nuclear installation, or where the damage to the technology located in that area may lead directly or indirectly to a radiation emergency which is not a radiation accident; and
(d) a protected area where a vital, internal or protected area is defined on a nuclear installation or where nuclear material classified in Category III is used or stored on a nuclear installation.
(2) A protected area must be defined on a research nuclear facility.
(3) For nuclear installations or parts of nuclear installations containing nuclear material, spaces shall be defined by category of nuclear material, provided that nuclear material classified in:
(a) Category I shall be located in the internal space;
(b) Category II shall be located in the protected area; and
(c) Category III shall be located in a protected area.
(4) If parts of a nuclear installation requiring placing in different spaces cannot be physically separated, those parts as a whole shall be placed in space according to the highest requirements applicable to that space.
(5) Part of the nuclear installation in which radioactive waste is present must be placed in the protected area.
Physical protection measures
(1) The physical protection measures of a nuclear installation shall be implemented according to the highest category of nuclear material handled on a nuclear installation or to a demarcated area of a nuclear installation.
(2) The category with the highest requirements for the level of physical protection for nuclear materials is Category I and the area with the highest requirements for the level of physical protection is an internal or vital space.
Definition of guarded, protected, internal and vital space
For nuclear material classified as Category I and nuclear equipment with a defined internal or vital space, spaces shall be defined in such a way that:
(a) the limit of the protected area shall be an isolation zone of at least 6 m width which shall be bounded by two fences, provided that:
1. the external fence shall be at least 2,5 m high and shall be provided with another mechanical lock on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m,
2. the inner fence shall be at least 2,5 m high and shall be provided with another mechanical superstructure on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m,
3. other mechanical means of defence at least 1,2 m high must be located within the isolation zone;
4. there shall be mechanical barriers at the external border to prevent unauthorised passage of a vehicle of mass and speed according to a specified project hazard;
5. the isolation zone shall be equipped with at least two camera detection systems operating on different physical principles, at least one of which has the character of volume detection, and shall be equipped with a camera system and lighting enabling its use;
6. on both sides of the isolation zone, free terrain of at least 6 m width shall be, and
7. if a building is part of the perimeter of the protected area, it shall be secured from the outside by a detection system and a camera system;
(b) the border of the protected space shall be at least 2,5 m high, which shall be provided with mechanical means of defence on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m high and the fence shall be equipped with a system of detection, camera system and lighting; and
(c) the boundary of the internal or vital space shall be the walls of buildings or rooms situated within the protected space equipped with a system of detection, camera system and lighting for the assessment of disturbances and activities within the internal and vital space.
(1) In the case of nuclear material classified in Category II and nuclear equipment with a defined protected space, spaces must be defined by:
(a) the border of the secured space shall be at least 2,5 m high, which shall be provided with another mechanical lock on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m, and
(b) the boundaries of the protected space shall be made up of an additional fence of at least 2,5 m high, which shall be provided with another mechanical lock on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m, and shall be equipped with a system of detection, camera system and lighting.
(2) Where the walls of buildings with nuclear material classified in Category II or with a part of a nuclear installation requiring a position in the protected area are sufficiently rigid and the results of the efficiency assessment referred to in Section 28 (2) (h) demonstrate the appropriate effectiveness of ensuring physical protection, the wall may be the boundary of the protected space; in this case, the space shall be equipped with a system of detection, camera system and lighting.
(1) In the case of nuclear material classified in Category III and of nuclear equipment with a designated secure space, the spaces must be defined by:
(a) the border of the secured area shall be at least 2,5 m high, which shall be provided with another mechanical lock on the crown of the fence, in such a way that the total amount of the fence shall be at least 3 m, and
(b) its own object with nuclear material or part of a nuclear installation requiring a location in the protected area shall be equipped with a system of detection of disruption.
(2) If the walls of buildings with nuclear material classified in Category III or part of a nuclear installation requiring a location in a guarded area are sufficiently solid and the results of the efficiency assessment referred to in Section 28 (2) (h) demonstrate the appropriate effectiveness of ensuring physical protection, the wall may be the limit of the secured space and, in this case, it shall also be equipped with a system for detecting disturbances.
(1) In exceptional and justified cases, individual premises may be merged or diverted from the border requirements set out in Sections 6 to 8, but at the same time, the efficiency of mechanical means and systems detecting disturbances and the results of the efficiency assessment referred to in Section 28 (2) (h) shall be adequately enhanced, showing comparable physical protection.
(2) An emergency exit and an underground channel located below the border of a guarded, protected, internal and vital space must be secured against unauthorised intrusion from the outside and equipped with a detection system.
Entry of natural persons and entry of means of transport
(1) Unaccompanied access to a guarded, protected, internal or vital space
(a) a natural person for whom the integrity and fulfilment of the requirements under the law governing the protection of classified information in the event of sensitive activities has been verified;
(b) a member of the police which ensures the emergency protection of the nuclear installation.
(2) Entry into a protected, internal and vital space must be limited to the necessary number and entry into such premises is permitted only for reasons relating to the performance of the work here.
(3) The entry into a protected, internal and vital space of motor vehicles must be limited to the number of vehicles strictly necessary. The entry of motor vehicles into the secure area shall be permitted only for reasons relating to the performance of the work here.
(4) Authorisation holder
(a) they must allow entry to an authorised control authority which carries out checks under another legislation, and shall be accompanied throughout the stay by a natural person authorised under paragraph 1 (a) designated by the authorisation holder; or
(b) may allow another natural person, for a period strictly necessary, to enter the guarded, protected and, in exceptional cases, to enter an internal and vital space, and shall be accompanied by the natural person referred to in paragraph 1 (a) designated by the authorisation holder throughout his stay in those premises.
(5) Where necessary, intervention by a person other than the holder of a pre-determined worker shall allow that person to enter a guarded, protected, internal or vital space. In such cases, the authorisation holder shall draw up a list of the personal data of the intervening persons and a list of the means of transport used in the intervention and ensure that they are kept within 3 days of the end of the intervention.
Organisational and technical measures for nuclear installations with defined internal or vital space
(1) Nuclear material classified in Category I and nuclear equipment with defined internal or vital space shall be provided with a physical protection technical system, the control system of which shall allow its control from the main or secondary control centre. The whole system shall have a back-up power supply enabling its continuous operation. The main control centre and the backup control centre shall be located in the space referred to in Section 4 (1) and shall be secured in such a way as to ensure their continuous function even during the threat arising from the project's basic threat.
(2) Anyone entitled to enter a guarded, protected, internal or vital space shall be provided with an identification card enabling automatic access control. Biometric identification shall be used to check the entry of natural persons at least upon entry into an internal or vital space. The current input database shall be available for at least 1 month and shall be maintained permanently.
(3) The technical physical protection system shall allow for the preservation of the facts relevant to the provision of physical protection, in particular the data on input identification cards, the data on the passage of natural persons and the passage of vehicles from their automatic control devices and the data on alarm signalling of safety equipment.
(4) The authorisation holder shall ensure continuous supervision of the designated staff member of the authorisation holder at the management centre of the operation of the physical protection technical system. Voice communication of the shift staff of the control centre of the technical physical protection system after communication links shall be recorded; the record must be available for 7 days.
(5) In the event of a radiological emergency, the technical system of physical protection shall allow the movement of natural persons in designated areas and in shelters of natural persons.
(1) The ratio of the number of natural persons accompanied in an internal and vital space to the number of natural persons accompanying pursuant to Article 10 (1) (a) may not exceed 3: 1 and the ratio of the number of natural persons accompanying in a guarded and protected area to the number of natural persons accompanying in accordance with Article 10 (1) (a) may not exceed 8: 1.
(2) All natural persons, baggage and means of transport must be subject to control when entering the restricted area to prevent the introduction of items that threaten nuclear safety and must be subject to control when leaving the restricted area to prevent the release of nuclear material.
(3) All natural persons moving in an internal or vital space shall be provided with an identification card which must be worn in a visible place at the entrance to the secure area and which allows for the automatic control of the entry into that space and the storage of data on the passage of the automatic control device.
(4) In the event of the entry of natural persons into an internal or vital space, the presence of at least two natural persons authorised to enter without an escort and with knowledge of the systems, structures and components in the visited space shall be ensured.
(5) The holder of the authorisation shall take organisational and technical measures to ensure that the records relevant to the entry permit and to keep records of the issue of keys from selected rooms in a protected, internal or vital space are kept permanently.
(6) A natural person authorised to enter unaccompanied premises in a guarded, protected, internal or vital space as referred to in Article 10 (1) must be trained in the rules of physical protection at least once a year before the first authorisation of unaccompanied entry into designated areas and at least once a year.
(1) Nuclear material must be placed in a room with reinforced concrete walls and a single entrance equipped with a door to prevent unauthorised entry. The internal space boundary shall be equipped with a detection system, a camera system to monitor the situation at the entry and within the internal space and a biometric identification of natural persons at their entry.
(2) The roof of the building in which internal or vital spaces are located must be secured
(a) a system to detect its disruption by means of air transport of natural persons, objects and material according to the parameters included in the project basic threat;
(b) a recording camera system; and
(c) by mechanical means, which must slow the attacker's progress from the roof to the building.
(3) In the case of a vital space, the building openings shall be provided with doors or mechanical means of defence against unauthorised intrusion and a system that detects disturbances.
(4) The boundaries of a vital space must be equipped with a system of detection of intrusion, a camera system to monitor the situation at the entry and within the vital space and a biometric identification of individuals at entry.
(5) In the case of a continuously operated life-critical space, it shall be ensured that the air-conditioning system used is effective in the event of a threat by the intentional use of substances covered by the project basic threat.
(1) In the case of a vital space, the presence of foreign objects before re-introduction of the nuclear reactor into a critical state must be checked after each technological shutdown.
(2) At least once per calendar month, functional testing of the detection elements at the boundaries of the demarcated areas must be carried out.
(3) The used detection elements of the physical protection technical system shall be assessed by an accredited test laboratory.
(4) At least twice per calendar year, a comprehensive exercise of all components providing physical protection shall be organised to verify the actual parameters of the physical protection technical system and at least every two years shall be organised a comprehensive exercise of all components providing protection of a non-military object important to the defence of the State.
Organisational and technical measures for nuclear installations with a defined protected space
(1) Nuclear material classified in Category II and nuclear equipment with a defined protected space must be secured by a safety technology. The alarm signal shall be placed on the counter of centralised protection or a permanent police oversight service and the continued storage of alarm signal data shall be ensured.
(2) All natural persons entering the protected area shall be provided with an identification card which allows for automatic checking of the entry into that area and the storage of data on the passage of automatic checking devices. The current input database shall be available for at least 1 month and shall be maintained permanently.
(3) Natural persons authorised to enter unaccompanied premises in accordance with Paragraph 10 (1) shall be trained in the physical protection rules at least once a year before the first authorisation of unaccompanied entry into the designated area and at least once a year.
(4) The ratio of the number of natural persons accompanying them in the protected area to the number of natural persons accompanying them pursuant to Paragraph 10 (1) (a) may not exceed 8: 1, for natural persons preparing for the pursuit of the profession of 10: 1.
(5) A random check of the natural persons and baggage shall be carried out upon entry into the guarded area.
(6) All baggage carried and natural persons entering the protected area shall be subject to control to prevent the introduction of nuclear safety-sensitive items.
(1) Means of transport and all consignments bound for the restricted area must be subject to control to prevent the entry of natural persons without authorisation and the import of nuclear safety-sensitive objects.
(2) The holder of the authorisation shall take organisational measures to ensure that the records relevant for the authorisation of entry, the keeping of key-delivery records from selected rooms in the protected area are kept and that such records are kept permanently.
(3) At least once a calendar month, functional testing of detection elements at the boundaries of the demarcated areas shall be carried out.
(4) The detection elements used for the security system shall be assessed by an accredited testing body.
(5) At least once a calendar year, the exercise of all components providing physical protection to verify its actual parameters shall be organised.
Organisational and technical requirements for nuclear installations with a defined secure area
(1) A nuclear material classified in Category III and a nuclear device with a protected area defined must be located in a fenced area to which entry and entry control must be ensured.
(2) An object with nuclear material classified in Category III or radioactive waste must be secured by a safety technique which must ensure the continued storage of alarm alarm data and the signalling must be brought to the counter of centralised protection or to a permanent police oversight service.
(3) Natural persons authorised to enter the restricted area without escort in accordance with Article 10 (1) must be trained in the physical protection rules at least once a year before the first authorisation of unaccompanied entry into the restricted area.
(4) The holder of the authorisation shall take organisational measures to ensure that the records relevant to the authorisation of entry, the keeping of key-delivery records from selected rooms in the guarded area are kept permanently and for the retention of such records for 1 year.
(5) At least once per calendar month, functional testing of detection elements shall be performed.
(6) The safety system detection features used shall be assessed by an accredited testing body.
(7) At least once a calendar year, the exercise of all components providing physical protection to verify its actual parameters shall be organised.
Protection of the technical system of physical protection and its data
(1) The technical physical protection system must not be directly linked by communication lines to any other computer system which is not exclusively intended to provide physical protection and no part shall be located outside the external border of the secure area except for selected detection, communication and camera systems and identification card outputs. The technical physical protection system may, on a one-way basis and in a way that prevents unauthorised activities, obtain information from information systems on the site of a nuclear installation intended for:
(a) to manage work on nuclear installations;
(b) to manage the authorisation of inputs to that nuclear installation; or
(c) to monitor and register the qualifications of persons entering or moving within the premises of a nuclear installation.
(2) The physical protection technical system may be linked to a computerised system for managing its administration and maintenance.
(3) Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the operation of a computerised system for the management and maintenance of a technical physical protection system.
(4) Data from the technical physical protection system may be made available only to persons designated by the authorisation holder in order to ensure physical protection, management of radiological emergencies, nuclear safety and radiation protection and to the inspectors of the Office.
Security of computer systems
(1) The computer system necessary for the management of nuclear safety and the registration of nuclear material, physical protection and the management of radiological emergencies must be protected against intrusion of its security by integrating computer systems into levels with the same level of security at each level, taking into account the possible consequences in the event of a project threat being met.
(2) A nuclear installation with a defined internal or vital space shall be designated by the competent person responsible for securing the security of nuclear equipment's computer systems.
(3) The authorisation holder shall take organisational and technical measures to prevent the intentional misuse of computer systems, provided that no individual failure of organisational and technical measures results in a threat covered by the project basic threat.
(4) The authorisation holder shall regularly evaluate the level of security of computer systems, including their regular security testing.
(5) The essential requirements for the security of computer systems and for the separation of computer systems into different levels referred to in paragraph 1 are set out in Annex 2 to this Decree. Where the holder of the authorisation has fulfilled the requirements for implementing security measures for critical infrastructure under the legislation governing cyber security and those requirements comply with those laid down in this Order, the authorisation holder shall be deemed to have complied with the requirements of this Order.
Organisational and technical measures to ensure physical protection and physical surveillance in the construction of nuclear installations
(1) Since the beginning of construction work on the basis of objects having an impact on nuclear safety, radiation protection, the management of a radiological emergency or security, the construction site of a nuclear installation under construction must be fenced and its physical security must be ensured, the control of the entry of individuals and the check of the entry of means of transport. The boundary of the construction site of the nuclear installation under construction shall be a fence at least 2,5 m high.
(2) An object in which a part of a nuclear installation with a designated protected, internal or vital space will be located shall be protected at the level of the requirements for a designated protected space nuclear installation from the start of the installation of technological equipment.
(3) The scope of physical protection must correspond to the procedure for the construction of a nuclear installation, with the separation of the parts of the nuclear installation operated from those under construction.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE METHOD AND SCOPE OF INSURANCE OF PHYSICAL WARNING
Physical security
(1) Physical surveillance of nuclear installations and nuclear material located in a guarded area, a protected area and an internal space or a vital space shall be ensured by uninterrupted natural persons in accordance with Section 22.
(2) Physical surveillance must be ensured when the nuclear material is moved within the guarded and protected space, between these premises and internal or vital space.
(3) For a nuclear installation with a defined internal or vital space, a patrol operation in a guarded and protected area shall be provided by security personnel and telephone and radio communications between physical security posts, control centre, backup control centre and between the control centre and the police emergency base. For voice communication via radio networks, stations equipped with a call secret device shall be used.
Security personnel in physical surveillance
(1) A safety officer who provides physical surveillance at nuclear sites with a defined internal or vital space shall be armed with a short ball gun of a calibre of up to and including 9 mm and shall hold a valid concession for the surveillance of property and persons under the Trade Act or be an employee of that holder.
(2) A security officer who provides physical surveillance at sites of a nuclear installation with a designated secure and protected space must hold or be an employee of a valid concession for the surveillance of property and persons under the Trade Code.
SCOPE OF REQUIREMENTS TO ENSURE THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN ITS TRANSPORT
General provisions
(1) Physical protection for the transport of nuclear material must be ensured at a level appropriate to the classification of nuclear material in categories with the protection of police officers ("police escort") for nuclear material classified in Category I and Category II when it is transported outside the restricted area.
(2) The transport of nuclear material in Category III must be monitored by dispatcher. The dispatcher's traffic monitoring shall be provided at least by telephone between the means of transport and the consignor, the consignee and, in the case of transport referred to in paragraph 3, by the Office and the police. The consignor and the consignee must conclude a written agreement that the consignment will be taken over by protocol upon delivery.
(3) In the case of the transport of nuclear material in the form of fresh nuclear fuel for a nuclear reactor classified in Category III or natural uranium weighing more than 1 000 kg, dispatcher monitoring of such transport and police escort or other police measures shall be ensured.
(4) If the holder of a permit to transport nuclear material finds the loss or tampering with a shipment of nuclear material or in the event of a threat of such an activity, he shall immediately implement measures to ensure nuclear safety and radiation protection. The authorisation holder shall immediately inform the Office and the local competent police authorities thereof.
(5) When transporting nuclear material,
(a) such transport is ensured as soon as possible while ensuring nuclear safety;
(b) ensure the translation of nuclear material between means of transport, the transfer to temporary warehouses and the temporary storage prior to the arrival of the means of transport, as soon as possible while ensuring nuclear safety;
(c) ensure physical protection during temporary storage in a manner appropriate to the category of nuclear material transported;
(d) natural persons involved in such transport shall be trained at least once a year on the rules of physical protection;
(e) ensure, for natural persons, prior verification of their integrity and compliance with the requirements of the law governing the protection of classified information in the event of sensitive activities; and
(f) restricted access to information on such transport to an essential number of persons.
(6) The protection of data relating to the transport of nuclear material, including detailed information on the transport route, the timetable and the arrangements for the coding of messages transmitted by means of communication, must be carried out in accordance with the law governing the protection of classified information.
Scope of requirements to ensure physical protection of the transport of nuclear material in Category I and Category II
(1) The consignor must provide the consignee with a prior notification of the planned shipment of nuclear material specifying whether the shipment is road, rail, sea, air, river or combined. The prior notification must also include the expected time of receipt of the consignment and the exact place of delivery of the consignment in the Czech Republic, with the obligation to ensure its physical protection.
(2) The consignee shall confirm his readiness to accept the consignment at the proposed location and time.
(3) The selection of the type of transport of nuclear material and transport routes shall be carried out in such a way that the number and time of transhipment of the consignment is as low as possible and the safety situation along the transport route is stable.
(4) The consignment containing nuclear material must be transported in a closed and locked means of transport or in packages for the transport of nuclear material. If the consignment exceeds 2 000 kg, it may be transported on an open means of transport, with a tarp on the arches or covered with a tarp. When using the sail, the consignment shall be secured by a sealed seal.
(5) If the means of transport has not been permanently located in the guarded area, its pyrotechnic inspection shall be carried out by the police before loading.
(1) The transporter must be sent to the carrier
(a) written instructions specifying how physical protection is ensured;
(b) the prescribed route of transport of nuclear material;
(c) stop and transhipment points;
(d) details of the persons authorised to take over the consignment;
(e) guidelines for reporting on the process of transporting nuclear material;
(f) specifying the interaction with the police escort, including the connection; and
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Decree No. 361 / 2016 Coll., on the Security of Nuclear Equipment and Nuclear Material |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | Order |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 09.11.2016 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | 01.01.2017 |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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